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５Introduction
Nanotechnologies are technologies that operate on the nanoscale, about one billionth
of a meter. For comparison, the width of a human hair is about 80,000 nm. Although
there is no universal working definition, it is generally accepted that nanotechnologies
involve《the design, characterization, production and application of structures,
devices and systems by controlling shape and size at the nanoscale》(RS/RAEng 2004,
5). Small size could bring novel properties to traditional materials, which can be used
to build, for example, miniaturized diagnostics, photothermal cancer therapy,
light-weight high-strength materials, scratch-resistant coatings and other interesting
applications. These examples illustrate the ‘platform’ or ‘enabling’ nature of
nanotechnologies, which《act as an improver, multiplier and enhancer of already
existing technologies》(Godman 2008). Many products that we use on a daily basis
already utilize nanotechnologies. According to a survey, nanomaterials are already
present in more than 1,800 consumer products, which represents a thirty-fold increase
over the 54 products originally listed in 2005 (Vance et al 2015).
Heralded as ‘the next big thing’, nanotechnologies have attracted wide attention
due to its promising potentials for revolutionizing almost every sector of industry
(Crow and Sarewitz 2001). Since Bill Clinton’s announcement of the National
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), a government research and development (R&D)
program of the United States (US), several OECD countries have established
themselves as leading developers of nanotechnologies, most notably the US, Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), France and South Korea; emerging economies
like China are also conducting applied and basic research in nanotechnology (Falkner
and Jaspers 2012). It is estimated that the global value of nano-enabled products,
nano-intermediates, and nanomaterials will reach USD 4.4 trillion by 2018 (Lux
Research 2014).
６Another part of the story has been the rising concerns about the risks that
nanotechnologies could bring on environment, health, safety (EHS) as well as
economic equality and social justice. For example, mindful of past ‘miracle’
technologies, EU-level civil society organizations (CSOs) noted that putative benefits
cannot legitimate the use of nanotechnologies outside of all democratic control1.
Activist groups such as Pièces et main d’oeuvre (PMO) identified nanotechnologies
as the next target after biotechnology. The fear of repeating the mistakes of GMO
(genetically modified organism), the excitement about the benefi ts that
nanotechnologies could bring and the increasing interest of activist groups in
nanotechnology were all factors which gave rise to a greater willingness among EU
regulatory bodies to engage the public more proactively.
As Janez Potocnik, the former Science and Research Commissioner of the
European Union (EU), put it,《 if the full potential of nanoscience is to be exploited
however, public concerns must be taken into account... If Europe does not address
problems early on, they will come back later with more force.》2 An awareness of the
necessity to intervene from the early stage of the R&D process constitutes a striking
feature of nanotechnologies governance landscape in the EU. All these discussions
and dynamics in the infancy of nanotechnologies’ development also provide fertile
ground for theoretical discourses.
Nanotechnologies came along at a specific time during which the impetus was
gathering in democratizing science and technology (Toumey 2006). Scholars note that
nanotechnologies represent a golden opportunity for building in social science
insights from the outset (Macnaghten, Kearnes, and Wynne 2005; Davies, Kearnes
and Macnaghten 2010) and a ‘test case’ in experimenting with novel approaches of
risk governance on emerging technologies (Bensaude-Vincent 2012; Stilgoe 2007). It
is suggested that dealing with the societal dimension of nanotechnologies should be a
1 ETUC. 2009. “Why there must be a public debate on nanos.” Special report 30/30
2 CORDIS news. 2006. “Communication and risk assessment: keys to unleashing nano-potential.” October 20.
http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/26531_en.html.
７prerequisite for its further development (Mnyusiwalla, Daar, and Singer 2003;
Wilsdon and Willis 2004). Against this backdrop, the researches on public perception
and attitude towards nanotechnologies and its applications have boomed (Cobb and
Macoubrie 2004; Gaskell et al. 2005; Siegrist et al. 2007; Satterfield et al. 2009). In
2007, an academic magazine entitled NanoEthics was founded, focusing specifically
on ethical and social concerns related to nanotechnologies. Scholars observe that
《study of perceptions, at so early a stage in the development trajectory of a
technology, is probably unique in the risk perception and communication field》
(Pidgeon, Harthorn, and Satterfield 2011).
What have driven these rapid academic interest towards nanotechnologies? A
scholar points out that it is《a historical coincidence, not a scientific result》(Toumey
2006). A researcher of Demos, a political think-tank in the UK, also notes that
《nanotechnology happened to be the thing that came along at the right time to have
that debate》(Bullich 2009, 69). Apart from the ‘enabling’ or ‘platform’ nature of
nanotechnologies, the specific ‘timing’ that technologies of the infinitely small have
arrived at should also be taken into consideration so as to examine its distinctive
character: academically, among a trend of re-negotiation about the relationship of
science, technology and society; politically, during a paradigm shift related to the
chemical regulatory framework in the EU, in which REACH has been debated,
developed and shaped and the principle of ‘no data, no market’ established (Chaskiel
2013; Suraud 2013).
As one of the next transformative technologies after biotechnology,
nanotechnologies become an important site for both theoretical and practical inquiry.
We could see a multitude of Science and Technology Studies (STS) in which
‘upstream public engagement’ has become a popular notion since the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
８Considering that the trajectories of nanotechnologies were still undetermined,
scholars actively advocated to move public engagement ‘upstream’ and to
re-conceptualize the science-technology-society relationship (Wilsdon and Willis
2004; Wilsdon, Wynne, and Stilgoe 2005; Rogers-Hayden, Mohr, and Pidgeon 2007).
The shift of science-society relationship is the backdrop against which the work for
this dissertation was carried out. ‘Upstream public engagement’ has come under
criticism due to its lack of a ‘link’, or ‘feedback loops’, to the political system
(Krabbenborg and Mulder 2015). Drawing on conceptual tools provided by Jürgen
Habermas, this dissertation seeks to investigate and clarify this ‘link’ with a specific
focus on the capacity of CSOs to ‘distill’, ‘transmit’ and ‘problematize’ societal
concerns in amplified form to the public sphere.
Have we been moving forward or in circles? Irwin posed this question and
suggested that no such easy shift has been made in despite of all the ‘from deficit to
democracy’ talk (Irwin 2014). In addressing nanotechnologies, has there been a shift
towards more democratic governance? How public engagement initiatives influence
the dynamics of the public spheres? The objective of this dissertation is to investigate
whether and to what extent ‘upstream public engagement’ could trigger an
institutional learning process within the EU regulatory authorities, and how such
process further influences the strategies and positions that CSOs adopt towards
nanotechnologies, studying the factors which may contribute or limit their
involvement in policy debates.
In order to tackle these research questions, it is necessary to provide a historical
review of the policy development concerning nanotechnologies over the past decade
and to examine the interplay between CSOs and the political system. Scholars outline
the phases of nanotechnologies development in the EU according to different criteria.
For example, focusing on the debates about the social aspects of nanotechnologies,
Doubleday (2007a) sums up “emerging period” (2000-mid 2003), “expansion and
assessment” (mid 2003-early 2005) and “institutional responses” (2005 onwards).
９From the perspective of the EU policy development, Jaspers (2012) provides analyses
on the dynamics of “agenda-setting phase” (the late 1990s to the early 2000s), the
“information gathering phase” (2004-2008) and the “decision-making phase” (2008
onwards).
Inspired by precedent research, this dissertation attempts to give a historical
review of the dynamics in the public spheres that have made salient the roles of EU
level CSOs in policy debates on nanotechnologies. It seeks to acquire a deeper
understanding about how CSOs maneuver within differing political contexts and
whether they could succeed in bringing some concrete policy outcomes. Based on
content analysis and semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders, I divide
the process of CSOs’ involvement into three phases: the “awareness-raising phase”
(2000-2005), the “capacity-building phase” (2006-2009) and the “alliance-forming
phase” (2009 onwards).
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. In the first section, I
set the scene by reviewing STS literature related to nanotechnologies and on that basis,
formulates research themes for ‘upstream public engagement’ and its limitations. It
further introduces the conceptual tools proposed by Habermas concerning the
circulation of political power, explaining how his thought can be productive for
understanding the link between engagement process and political system. Finally,
it specifies the methodology and research design.
The next three chapters, corresponding to the “awareness-raising phase”, the
“capacity-building phase” and the “alliance-forming phase”, provide a historical
review of the dynamics in the public spheres over the past decade. Specific attention
is paid to the roles that CSOs have played, explaining why collaborative rather than
confrontat ional strategies have been adopted in addressing the issues of
nanotechnologies at the EU level. It also argues that the government thinking marked
by a blend of inclusiveness and scientism, together with other factors, have led to a
１０
few CSOs’ retreat from this arena.
Chapter V focuses on the interplay between CSOs and the political/economic
system. It firstly examines the policy developments regarding three layers of
legislation on nanomaterials at the EU level (product-specific legislation, an EU
nanomaterials register, and nanomaterials in REACH), clarifying CSOs’ role in the
process of alliance-forming. It then investigates CSOs’ influences on the economic
system, arguing that CSOs, through resonant and autonomous public spheres, could
exert influences “in a siege-like manner”. Chapter VI envisages the opportunities and
challenges for CSOs to gain new momentum in future debates in the EU, set against
the backdrop of growing institutional divergence between the “pro-industry alliance”
and the “green alliance”. I conclude with a synthesis and some suggestions for future
studies.
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Chapter I: Upstream public engagement: a new governance vision
During past decades, huge disasters (e.g. the Fukushima nuclear accident, the AZF
explosion in Toulouse), controversies (e.g. GMOs, human genetics, waste
incineration), health scandals (e.g. asbestos, mad cow disease) have led to mounting
public concerns over the negative impact, sometimes irreversible, of emerging
technologies on environment, health, safety as well as economic equality and social
justice. Consumer backlash, petition, demonstration, environmental movements, etc.,
testify to the growing tension between science, technology and society.
The impetus is gathering in opening up the ‘black box’ of science and its
governance. The autonomy of science in producing knowledge and fostering
‘progress’ becomes problematized, and the need for legitimation becomes
increasingly acute (Lovbrand, Pielke, and Beck 2011; Suraud et al. 2011; Chaskiel
2014). As noted by Habermas, in the case of legitimation crisis,《grounds for the
legitimizing force of this formal procedure must be given》 (Habermas 1988, 98).
What’s required is a de-politicalized public realm which could contribute to a robust
social process.
One institutional reaction in several EU member states has been the introduction
of institutional arrangements to foster public understanding and debates regarding
risk-related technological issues, e.g. the foundation of the UK Committee on the
Public Understanding of Science in 1985, the establishment of Danish Board of
Technology in 1986, the creation of French National Commission of Public Debate in
1995. The EU also highlighted the necessity to《build public confidence in the way
policy makers use expert advice》and《structure the EU’s relationship with civil
society》(Commission of the European Communities, 2001).
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These initiatives and commitments testify to the booming of various approaches
and proposals with the aim of exploring richer understanding of the relationship
between science, technology and society. The focal point of STS literature has shifted
from ‘deficit model’ to ‘upstream public engagement’.
A. A review of STS literature
1. Deficit model (from 1960s to mid-1990s)
According to Bauer et al., the efforts to promote “scientific literacy” and “public
understanding of science”, supported by top-down science education and one-way
communication, have dominated earlier research (Bauer, Allum, and Miller 2007).
Literature and scholarship committed to improving scientific literacy as well as
investigating factors that influence public attitude towards science is well
documented (Miller 1998; Bauer and Schoon 1993; Evans and Durant 1995).
Some scholars observe a small positive correlation between general knowledge
and attitudes towards science; however, the correlation tends to be lower or zero when
it comes to controversial issues (Allum et al. 2008). For example, comparing the
Eurobarometer survey conducted in 1991, 1993 and 1996, Gaskell (1997) finds a
slight increase of knowledge towards basic biology; in contrast, optimism about the
contribution of biotechnology to improve way of life has declined. His research also
shows a striking mismatch between the concerns of regulators about issues of risk and
safety, and that of the public about moral acceptability. Far-flung efforts and activities
of knowledge dissemination, with the aim to《abolish ignorance and correct
misunderstandings of agreed facts》(Turney 1996), have proved to be inadequate and
failed to generate desirable results in explaining the loss of public confidence in
science.
Although the emphasis of “scientific literacy” and “public understanding of
science”, with the former on measurement of knowledge level and the latter on public
attitude, is slightly different, both of the two approaches assert “public deficiency, but
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scientific sufficiency”(Gross 1994) or “public problematic, but science sound”
(Gaskell and Allum 2001) . Such attempts have been subjected to critical scrutiny and
came to be known as ‘deficit model’ (Irwin and Wynne 1996; Durant 1999; Sturgis
and Allum 2004). Under this model, the public is merely assumed to be receivers and
repositories of information (Michael 1996).
Subsequent researches indicate that local or context-specific knowledge
grounded in everyday experience could provide important insights and alternative
perspectives in addressing a range of practical issues (Horlick-Jones 1998, 2004;
Horlick-Jones et al. 2007). Scholars also highlight the role that the “mediating
institution” (e.g. environmental groups, mass media, local industry, interpersonal
networks) could play in conveying scientific argumentation to the general public
(Kasperson et al. 1988; Irwin and Wynne 1996, 10). As a consequence, scientific
knowledge needs to be more reflexive and self-aware, as it has no superior status, but
must compete with all other sorts of knowledge (Irwin, Dale, and Smith 1996).
Literature on risk society suggests that risks are not “real”, they are “becoming
real” (Beck 1992; Van Loon 2000). Scholars suggest that risks and uncertainties
around science and technologies must be tackled as not only a scientific-technical
matter, but also involving public values and social preferences (Fischhoff 1996;
Gaskell et al. 2005; Renn 2008). These thoughts highlight the ‘constructivist’ aspect
of risks. Against this backdrop, some show concerns that《the prospect of a society
that entirely rejects the values of science is too awful to contemplate》(Collins 2009).
Above-mentioned literature does not deny the usefulness or value of scientific
knowledge, but the indeterminacy, complexity and ambiguity of emerging
technologies are highlighted. Under this context, scientists alone cannot have all the
answers and acquire the whole picture.
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At the millennial turning point, the House of Lords report noted that a
fundamental crisis of trust in the UK science policy-making had occurred, and
《society’s relationship with science is in a critical phase》(House of Lords 2000) .
According to Miller, with the announcement of “demise of the deficit model” by
British Science Minister Lord Sainsbury, a new era is being ushered in (Miller 2001).
The legitimation crisis of science and technology could also be examined, to a greater
or lesser degree, in other European countries. For example, the White Paper on
Governance released by the European Commission (EC) highlighted the necessity to
《build public confidence in the way policymakers use expert advice》(EC 2001).
The fading of ‘deficit model’ was in line with a more general trend of
re-conceptualizing the division of labor among science, government, and civil society.
As scholars put it,《science will not be represented as a simple ‘body of facts’ or as a
given ‘method’, but as a much more diffuse collection of institutions, areas of
specialized knowledge and theoretical interpretations whose forms and boundaries
are open to negotiation with other social institutions and forms of knowledge》(Irwin
and Wynne 1996, 8). A researcher claimed that the age of science for its own sake was
coming to an end (Levy-Leblond 2000). And science was to a less extent considered
as a pure, neutral, and value-free process guaranteed by depoliticized peer review, but
characterized by the co-constructed, hybrid and contingent feature (Wynne 2002;
Horlick-Jones et al. 2007, 16). Jasanoff also observed the shift of the focal point from
“preserving science’s autonomy and integrity” in the 1960s to more discussion on
“regulation and control of scientific production” in the 1990s (Jasanoff 2005).
The greater movement across institutional boundaries and the increasing
complexity of modern society (Gibbons 1999), the closer and denser networks of
relationship of science with business and politics (Wilsdon and Willis 2004), the
emergence of new actors, e.g. ethics committees, CSOs that address the topic of
science and technology (Bensaude-Vincent 2012; Suraud 2013), the explosion of risks
issues raised in the public sphere (Beck 1992; Bonneuil 2004), etc., all these factors
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cut across the conventional division of labor among state, science, and society. And a
new social contract is required in this regard. Although this is not agreed by all,
especially some scientists (Taverne 2004; Graur 2007), the callings for dialogue and
engagement have gradually gained mainstream support in the dawn of the 21st century
(Bensaude-Vincent 2012, Burgess 2014), among which ‘upstream public engagement’
has become an influential ‘sub-branch’, especially in addressing the issues of
nanotechnologies .
2. Upstream public engagement (2000s onwards)
Heralded as ‘the next big thing’, nanotechnologies have attracted wide attention
due to its promising potentials for revolutionizing almost every sector of industry
(Crow and Sarewitz 2001). The magnitude of such transformations also triggers the
burgeoning of science and technology studies, among which ‘upstream public
engagement’ has become a popular notion.
The notion of ‘upstream public engagement’ originated in the UK and has been
actively advocated by the political think-tank Demos and other scholars. Earlier
technological controversies— such as mad cow disease and GMOs— encouraged
scholars to re-conceptualize the science-technology-society relationship such that it
would shift from the education-focused deficit model, by emphasizing two-way
communication in the form of dialogue, to upstream public engagement (Wilsdon and
Willis 2004). With the aim of restoring public trust and《building more reflective
capacity into the practice of science》(Wilsdon, Wynne and Stilgoe 2005, 35), STS
scholars use nanotechnology to test novel forms of engagement and deliberation at an
early stage of the R&D process and in advance of significant applications or social
controversy (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007). As scholars put it,《much
nanotechnologies is at an equivalent stage in R&D terms to biotechnology in the late
1970s or early 1980s. The forms and eventual applications of the technology are not
yet determined. We still have the opportunity to intervene and improve the social
sensitivity of innovation processes at the design-stage—to avoid the mistakes that
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were made over GM and other technologies》(Willis and Wilsdon 2003).
Rogers-Hayden and co-authors note that what is new about upstream public
engagement is its emphasis on involving the public (or different publics)
“prospectively” rather than “retrospectively” (Rogers-Hayden, Mohr and Pidgeon
2007).
These reflections are not confined to academic circles, as we could see some
official policy documents of the UK as well as other EU member states incorporated
the idea of ‘upstream public engagement’ rapidly. For example, the UK government
showed determination to《 enable public debate to take place ‘upstream’ in the
scientific and technological development process, and not ‘downstream’ where
technologies are waiting to be exploited but may be held back by public scepticism
brought about through poor engagement and dialogue on issues of concern》 (HM
Treasury 2004, 105). The 2004 report by Royal Society and Royal Academy of
Engineering inquiry (RS/RAEng) suggested that most developments in
nanotechnologies were ‘upstream’ in nature when accounting for three factors: current
decisions, impacts and public acceptance (RS/RAEng 2004, 64). The report continued
by noting that《the upstream nature of most nanotechnologies means that there is an
opportunity to generate a constructive and proactive debate about the future of the
technology now, before deeply entrenched or polarized positions appear》(Ibid. 67).
In the Netherlands, the 2006 Dutch parliamentary documents suggested that《the
Cabinet wants to work towards a societal basis for nanotechnologies by engaging in
dialogue with citizens. If there is one thing that we have learned from the debate on
genetically modified organisms, it is that societal acceptance of technologies that
have ethical questions alongside risks only comes about when these questions are
taken seriously in an early stage.》3 Experiences of ‘upstream public engagement’
employed for nanotechnologies in Europe also inspired the development of a new
3 Parliamentary Documents. (2006). Vision Document: Nanotechnologieen: Van Klein naar Groots (29338 No. 54).
The Hague. Translated by Lotte Krabbenborg
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vision of ‘participatory technology assessment’ in the US, which emphasized
supplementing expert opinion with early input of society (Sclove 2010; Nature 2010) .
Despite the encouraging signals that favor upstream public engagement, it is
clear from later research that putting the notion into practice entails a variety of
dilemmas and paradoxes.
2.1. Tensions and dilemmas
As researchers of Demos put it,《the sudden vogue for upstream engagement may
prove ephemeral, or may develop into something more promising》 (Wilsdon and
Willis 2004, 21). Since 2007, more scholars have joined the discussion and provided
further clarification and investigation of this notion, pointing out the potentials as well
as limitations and tensions that ‘upstream public engagement’ holds. It is of particular
interest to see how this notion has been defined, deployed and for some reasons
abandoned as an instrument in addressing nanotechnologies.
2.1.1. Too broad/ too narrow dilemma
When translated into practice, the first and foremost challenge is the ‘too broad/
too narrow’ dilemma. Instead of focusing narrowly on downstream impacts or ‘side
effects’ of new technologies, ‘upstream public engagement’ holds the potentials of
opening up broader framing and wider agenda, which put the assumed ends and the
purposes of scientific research in line with public accountability (Rogers-Hayden,
Mohr, and Pidgeon 2007). However, it is also this broadness and open-ended nature
that poses one of the greatest challenges.
Scholars point out that《on the one hand it must be broad enough not to restrict
and decontextualize debate, on the other hand too much flexibility means
recommendations are rather abstract and thus difficult for policymakers to utilize》
(Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden 2007). Several practitioners of ‘upstream public
engagement’ claimed to have encountered such dilemma in practice. For instance,
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Richard Jones, the chair of the UK Nanotechnologies Engagement Group, noted that
《the uncertain nature of the subject itself has sometimes made it hard to focus the
discussions》(Gavelin, Wilson, and Doubleday 2007). Jack Stilgoe, the coordinator of
another project, Nanodialogues, mentioned in an interview,《the lesson of all of that is
it was all pretty messy, nobody really knew what he was doing》(Bullich 2009, 70).
Together with the ‘too broad/ too narrow’ dilemma is the paradox of participation.
According to Collingridge,《as public awareness of an issue and its implications is
often lowest precisely when the margins for influencing decision making are widest,
while public awareness tends to be much greater only when those margins narrow》
(Collingridge 1981). The nascent nature of nanotechnology means wide margins of
influences, but the public as well as CSOs may lack interest and know-how to get
involved. Concerns are also raised that upstream public engagement could empower
activist groups who advocate their own special interests instead of that of common
good, manipulating policy in misguided directions (Taverne 2004; Tait 2009). By
contrast, scholars of Demos and Lancaster University indicate that such charges
exaggerate the capacities of CSOs (Kearnes et al. 2006). Researchers argue that
models of engagement often appear to be based on ‘half-baked ideas’ of the public
(Stilgoe, Lock, and Wilsdon 2014). In this regard, more studies about how CSOs
manoeuver in upstream mode are needed.
2.1.2. Implicit linear model of innovation
The term of ‘upstream’ is used by scholars to “identify moments of flexibility”
(Wilsdon and Willis 2004). However, there remains much ambiguity and difficulty
regarding how to define the conditions that make up ‘upstreamness’. Scholars argue
that upstream public engagement is still embedded in a linear model of innovation
that displays the deterministic connotation of a necessary direction of flow (Joly and
Kaufmann 2008; Stirling 2008).
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Demos researchers acknowledge the linearity of the metaphorical stream and
tend to describe ‘upstream engagement’ as:《a process of ongoing deliberation and
social assessment which embeds dialogue... within all stages of the R&D process》
(Wilsdon, Wynne and Stilgoe 2005, 38). Mohr holds the same view, referring
‘upstream public engagement’ as ‘a continuous flow’ (Mohr 2007). This dissertation
suggests that such critiques and corrections may ignore the critical edge that
‘upstream public engagement’ holds. And it is the very emphasis of ‘moving
upstream’ that makes it distinguished from other concepts such as ‘analytic
deliberative process’ (Renn 1999).
It is worth noting that ‘upstream’ here not simply means ‘early’, but also
represents a proactive approach characterized by foresight, anticipation and
deliberation (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hoyden 2007; Barben et al. 2007; Jaspers 2012).
Other proposals and notions, such as ‘real-time technology assessment’ (Guston and
Sarewitz 2002), ‘safety by design’ (Kelty 2009), ‘value-sensitive design’ (Van den
Hoven, Lokhorst, and Van de Poel 2012), though different in details, all indicate a
more proactive and inclusive tendency.
As Vicki Colvin, Director of the Center for Biological and Environmental
Nanotechnology, Rice University, put it,《nanotechnology has a unique opportunity in
the history of technology: this could be the first platform technology that introduces a
culture of social sensitivity and environmental awareness early in the lifecycle of
technology development》4. Wynne held similar point of view, arguing that《the
‘upstream’ metaphor was never intended to be a catch-all model. But it made one
central analytical point of distinction— the difference between innovation-oriented
and protection-oriented science—from which much else follows》(Kearnes,
Macnaghten, and Wilsdon 2006, 75).
4 Vicki, Colvin. 2002. “Responsible nanotechnology: Looking beyond the good news.” EurekAlert.
http://www.eurekalert.org/context.php?context=nano&show=essays&essaydate=1102
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In this regard, Doubleday proposed moving beyond discussion about the way to
identify the conditions characteristic of ‘upstreamness’, but to consider the locations
for a ‘democratic space’ about the role of science and technology in society. Based on
a laboratory-based collaboration between STS and nanoscience, he suggested a new
perspective to view ‘upstreamness’ :《as a location in space rather than a point in time
at which interventions in the emergence of new technologies are possible》(Doubleday
2007b). Inspired by this proposal, the dissertation will draw on the theoretical tool of
‘public sphere’ as such a ‘location’, which refers to a social space generated in
communicative action (Habermas 1996, 360).
2.1.3. Lack of a link with the political system
Last but not least, “pull one hair and the whole body moves”, as a Chinese
proverb goes. Upstream public engagement underlines the importance of “pulling the
hair”, that is to say triggering the reconceptualization of the science-society
relationship; however, it does not give much in the way of any indication about how
the “whole body” can be moved. In other words, moving engagement ‘upstream’ does
not necessarily bring an improved regulatory system and institutional change. It
remains unclear how public input could be incorporated into the policy-making
process and bring some concrete policy outcomes. Other scholars highlight the short
of knowledge regarding the interactions between the microcosm of public
participation and the wider world (Marris, Joly, and Rip 2008).
Such ambiguity could lead to the situation marked by “all talk but no action”.
Fiorino develops three rationales in explaining the motivation behind public
engagement: normative (it is the right thing to do), substantive (to produce a better
result) and instrumental (to achieve a predefined end) (Fiorino 1990). The authors of
Demos observe that《the language of ‘upstream engagement’ is there, but... the
motivations for doing it are instrumental rather than substantive》(Wilsdon and Willis
2004, 49).
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Scholars claim that the true purpose of policymakers seems only to “manufacture
public opinion”, as《too often these forums are too restrictive... and seem to be
designed only to alleviate <groundless fears>》(Wullweber and Vlandas 2006).
Concerns are raised that ‘upstream public engagement’ is only used as a more
sophisticated and subtle tactic to familiarize the public with nanotechnologies before
they become commercialized so as to generate public acceptance and avoid
controversies (Delgado, Lein Kjolberg, and Wickson 2011). As highlighted by
precedent research,《upstream engagement would fail if it simply moves the same set
of ‘downstream’, risk-based questions to an earlier point in the research process》
(Wilsdon, Wynne, and Stilgoe 2005, 32). In this case, the efforts of promoting
engagements may “hitting the notes, but missing the music” (Wynne 2006).
As the editorial of Nature put it,《upstream engagement is no panacea》(Nature
2004). Without commitments and genuine openness, a democratic governance of
emerging technologies would not be automatically achieved by simply moving public
engagement ‘upstream’. Demos researchers also acknowledged that《engagement
processes need some kind of link to the political system》(Wilsdon and Willis 2004,
46). At this point, Habermas’s analysis concerning the interplay between civil society
and the political system could serve as a theoretical entry point for clarifying and
examining this ‘link’. Research in that direction remains an understudied area. And
this dissertation seeks to provide some tentative analysis to fill the gap.
B. Revisiting ‘upstream public engagement’: from a Habermasian
perspective
Have the experiments over the past decade in opening up nanotechnologies at an
early stage lived up to the expectation of its proponents and practitioners? What
gains have been achieved and what have been dismissed or downplayed? Some
scholars share the view that the shift towards more democratic engagement with
nanotechnologies hasn’t been as profound and complete as has been expected (Kurath
and Gisler 2009; Toumey 2011). In the UK, Pidgeon and his colleges observe that the
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ethos of public engagement has been declining subtly (Pidgeon et al. 2009).
Doubleday observes that major actors, including social scientists, CSOs, and the
government, are taking a step back due to different reasons:《my sense is that we have
entered in a very quiet period ... I have seen nothing of particular interest since 2007》
(Bullich 2009, 79) . Bullich examines the case of Switzerland, concluding that《the
culmination of mobilization around debates on nanotechnologies seems to have
passed5》(Bullich 2009, 8) . Interest towards ‘upstream public engagement’ has
decreased significantly, with the precise form and timing varied in different countries.
What are the factors behind the disappearing enthusiasm towards ‘upstream
public engagement’? Apart from the implicit tension and dilemma discussed above,
this dissertation argues that previous literature has mostly included theoretical
reflection or one-off case studies, and research based on long-term observations is
scant. We should avoid dismissing the significance of ‘upstream public engagement’
out of hand. For example, scholars suggest that policy debate on nanotechnology in its
upstream stages is in itself “an enormous achievement” (Sarah, Phil, and Matthew
2009,11). The dynamics in the public spheres over the past decade or so provide
valuable opportunities to investigate the real potential offered by ‘upstream public
engagement’ and to infuse some new vitality to existing discussions.
1. Conceptual tools
My contribution is to revisit ‘upstream public engagement’ by drawing on the
conceptual tool of ‘communicative power’ proposed by Habermas. This concept
occupies an important place in the building of Habermas’s two-track deliberative
politics. It provides a standpoint from which we could examine how public opinions
in engagement activities could be incorporated into the policy-making process by
addressing two research questions:
5 The original text:《le pic de mobilisation autour d’un débat sur les nanotechnologies semble être passé》.
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1) whether moving public engagement ‘upstream’ could contribute to a more
vibrant public sphere;
2) how and to what extent the influences that CSOs acquire in the public sphere
could coalesce into communicative power.
1.1. The Circulation of Political Power
In his early work, Habermas suggested to《erect a democratic dam against the
colonializing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of the life-world》
(Habermas 1992). And it was through later academic works that his ideas became
clearer with regard to how such a ‘democratic dam’ could fulfill its function.
In the book Between Facts and Norms, Habermas envisages the ‘communicative
power’ as the key normative resources of life-world, which is supposed to counter the
norm-free steering media of ‘money’ and ‘administrative power’ (Habermas 1996;
Flynn 2004). As he puts it,《the social substratum for the realization of the system of
rights consists...in the currents of communication and public opinion that, emerging
from civil society and the public sphere, are converted into communicative power
through democratic procedures》(Habermas 1996, 442). The word ‘power’ is likely to
cause ambiguity, which requires further clarification.
Habermas’s thought regarding ‘power’ has undergone fundamental changes. In
his early works such as Knowledge and Human Interest and The Theory of
Communicative Action, ‘power’ is primarily understood as the ability of an agent to
coerce or dominate others owing to hierarchical priorities; or as non-symbolic steering
medium of the system which facilitates the organization and management of complex
modern society.
Inspired by Hannah Arendt, who opposes ‘power’ to ‘violence’ but considers it
as《the potential of a common will formed in noncoercive communication》(Ibid.,
147-148), Habermas further differentiates political power into ‘administrative power’
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and ‘communicative power ’. The two respond to ‘system’ and ‘life-world’
respectively, the former being in charge of collective binding decisions and the latter
acting as a “pool of reasons”, providing legitimate force. It is the medium of law that
renders feasible a sociological model of constitutionally regulated circulation of
power:《legitimate law is generated from communicative power and the latter in turn
is converted into administrative power via legitimately enacted law》(Ibid.,169).
Given the cases in which administrative or social power bypasses communicative
power and cuts across the circuit of democratic decision-making, the model proposed
by Habermas places considerable normative responsibility on civil society:《this
weight depends primarily on whether civil society, through resonant and autonomous
public spheres, develops impulses with enough vitality to bring conflicts from the
periphery into the center of the political system》(Ibid., 330). It is of necessity to
introduce Habermas’s though on CSOs and the public spheres.
1.2. CSOs and the public sphere
According to Habermas, CSOs form the ‘organizational substratum’ of the
general public of citizens. He defines CSOs as《those more or less spontaneously
emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal
problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in
amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of
associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general
interest inside the framework of organized public spheres》(Ibid., 366-367).
In this dissertation, CSOs mainly refer to environmental organizations, consumer
associations and trade unions concerned with nanotechnology issues and devoted to
defending ‘general interests’. From a Habermasian perspective, this dissertation will
investigate whether and how upstream public engagement could add vibrancy to the
public spheres and facilitate the formation of communicative power, thus limiting and
influencing the function of the system.
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1.3. The definition of ‘upstream public engagement’
Before moving on to the introduction of research methodology, I provide some
clarifications about what ‘upstream public engagement’ means in this dissertation. As
discussed above, with different objectives, ‘upstream public engagement’ may have
diverse meanings under different context. While for Doubleday, ‘upstream’ means a
location for ‘democratic space’ (Doubleday 2007b); for others, it is the general title of
a series of experiments in opening up science and its governance. With a specific
focus on the dynamics of EU-level CSOs, I define ‘upstream public engagement’ as
follows: the provision of opportunities for a broad set of actors to participate and
deliberate from the very beginning of the R&D process.
Once the definition settled, some questions now come to the fore: where exactly
at the EU level are procedures, practices, and arrangements created, if any, to further
‘upstream engagement’? Would ‘upstream engagement’ encourage particular forms of
action or strategies that CSOs utilize in addressing nanotechnologies6? Scholars,
based on analyses at the member state level, have provided some insights in this
regard. For example, Wullweber argues that the new stratagems of the government
seem to be successful, as《the resistance to nanotechnology is by no means as strong
as e.g. the anti-GMO protests》(Wullweber 2007). This dissertation attempts to shed
light on the dynamics in the public spheres at the EU level, which is still
under-emphasized.
2. Research methodology
In order to answer the research questions posed above, content analysis and
semi-structured interviews have been used to investigate the interplay between CSOs
and the political system.
6 This question has been addressed by Seifert and Plows in their article <FromAnti-Biotech to Nano-Watch: Early
Risers and Spin-Off Campaigners in Germany, the UK and Internationally>. However, their research, as indicated
in the title, is mainly focusing on the Member State level.
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2.1. Content analysis
As a first step, I analyze the materials obtained from CSOs’ websites. These
materials include CSOs’ position papers, reports, joint letters, press releases, meeting
records, contributions to public consultation, video materials, etc. A dynamic analysis
enables me to track the evolution of CSOs’ stance and strategies towards
nanotechnologies in different phases.
In order to see whether ‘upstream public engagement’, as a new governance
vision, actually inspired the EU regulators, I also study the principal EU policy
documents regarding the governance of nanotechnologies, e.g. the Communication
Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology, action plan, code of conduct, two
regulatory reviews of nanomaterials, the 2009 resolution of the European Parliament
(EP), etc. Workshops, seminars reports, EU-funded projects and CASG-nano meeting
records have also been collected and analyzed.
2.2. Semi-structure interviews
While content analysis provides a preliminary and general picture of CSOs’
involvement in the policy-making process of nanotechnologies, semi-structured
interviews allow me to gain a deeper understanding of the subtle relationship,
tensions, and interactions between different stakeholders.
In total, twenty-three interviews had been conducted with a range of stakeholders
between June and December 2014, either face-to-face in Brussels or by telephone (see
Table 1 for the list). The semi-structured interviews lasted roughly an hour each, and
were subsequently fully transcribed.
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Table 1. List of interviewees
DG SANCO
DG ENV
DG ENTR
DG EMPL
Advisor to the Parliament
Official of member state
Environmental organization
Consumer association
Trade union
Total Interviewees
In selecting the interviewees, I mainly consider two factors: firstly, an
interviewee should have a solid understanding of the policy development of
nanotechnologies in the EU. Secondly, an interviewee should have been actively
involved in the policy-making process of nanotechnologies, for example, rapporteur,
shadow rapporteur, advisors to the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs),
different Directorates-General (DGs) of the Commission, regulatory authorities of
member states. Focusing narrowly on the interplay between CSOs and the political
system, other important stakeholders such as industry representatives and research
community are not in the list of interviewees.
23 stakeholders have finally accepted the invitation for an interview. Among
them, nine were conducted with the EU regulatory authorities, including an advisor to
the Parliament, representatives of the DG for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO),
Environment (DG ENV), Enterprise and Industry (DG ENTR), and Employment,
Social Affairs & Inclusion (DG EMPL) as well as one official from the Netherlands.
3
1
1
1
2
1
9
3
2
23
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Interviewed EU-level CSOs include the Center for International Environmental
Law (CIEL), ClientEarth, the European Consumers’ Organization (BEUC), the
European Consumer Voice in Standardization (ANEC), the European Environmental
Citizens Organization for Standardization (ECOS), the European Trade Union
Institute (ETUI) and Health Care Without Harm Europe (HCWH Europe). As several
member states of the EU play a critical role in nanotech debates, interviews have also
been undertaken with CSOs that act at the national or regional level, for example
Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND), the French Democratic Confederation of
Labor (CFDT), the Danish Ecological Council, the Belgian Inter-Environment
Wallonie (IEW), and the Mediterranean Information Office for Environment Culture
and Sustainable Development (MIO-ECSDE). I also communicated with Greenpeace
UK, Greenpeace Europe and the Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL) by e-mail.
These three CSOs do not or no longer have long-term interest in nanotechnology.
The interviewees can be divided into two groups. Interviewees from the ‘system’
were mainly asked about: 1) what lessons have been learned with regard to involving
CSOs in policy-making process of nanotechnologies; 2) how would they evaluate the
roles that CSOs have played in debates around nanotechnologies. The members of the
other group, composed of CSOs, were asked about: 1) whether ‘upstream public
engagement’ has brought more political opportunities to get involved in the
policy-making process of emerging technologies; 2) how do their approaches and
tactics evolve within different political contexts and to what extent their advocacy has
been incorporated into the policy results. Both of the groups were asked about their
observations towards the challenges, difficulties as well as future opportunities in
generating genuine and constructive dialogue between different stakeholders.
During the process in contacting the interviewees, a lot of difficulty emerged.
Firstly, it was extremely difficult in gaining contact with regulatory authorities,
especially the MEPs. Several MEPs (e.g. Satu HASSI) declined the interview
invitation directly; some main actors were not standing in re-election (e.g. Hiltrud
２９
Breyer, Malcolm Harbour, Carl Schlyter) during the 8th EP election in May 2014, and
others (e.g. Michele Rivasi, Christa Klaß, Jill Evans) did not give any response. The
DGs of the Commission were relatively more accessible. They responded my e-mails
personally and provided abundant time for carrying out the interviews. As a result, we
could see an imbalance of number distribution with regard to interviewees who come
from the Commission and those of the Parliament. Great efforts have also been made
to talk with regulatory authorities of member states, especially those of the
Netherlands, France, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden. However, only Monique
Bosman, Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, finally accepted the
invitation for a phone interview.
Secondly, this dissertation succeeded in getting contact with most of EU level
CSOs which addressed the topic of nanotechnologies. However, senior policy officers
of two principal CSOs— Tatiana SANTOS (EEB) and Aida Ponce Del Castillo (ETUI)
—did not accept the invitation. Fortunately, Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, who has working
experiences in both EEB and ETUI, has contributed her knowledge and insight to this
research. Greenpeace UK only agreed to respond to two questions through e-mail.
Although some useful information has been obtained, it is not sufficient to fully
understand the whole process why Greenpeace UK lost interest in nano issue.
Furthermore, due to high turnover of personnel, there is no campaigner available
within Friends of the Earth Europe (FoE Europe) who has advocacy experiences on
the topic of nanotechnologies. The author contacted the policy officer of FoE
Australia and U.S. for complementary information.
3. Research design
On the basis of content analysis and the interview results, the following table is
summarized to show how decisions taken by CSOs to address nanotechnology
differed in terms of timing and background. Two points can be drawn from Table 2.
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Firstly, ‘upstream public engagement’ did not succeed in generating much early
interest of EU level CSOs, as we could see only two CSOs from Member States
—Greenpeace UK and PMO— started to address the topic of nanotechnologies from
the very beginning of R&D process. This conclusion is in line with early research,
which suggests that《campaigning intensity seems rather moderate... European groups
are few and started to raise their voices at a relatively late stage》(Seifert and Plows
2014). CSOs’ engagement is not as ‘upstream’ as some STS scholars envisage, which
acts as another manifestation of the above-mentioned dilemma and difficulties when
translating ‘upstream public engagement’ into practice.
Secondly, the number of CSOs which started to get engaged has increased
significantly between the year of 2006 and 2009. During this period, NanoCap Project,
funded by the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6), was launched by the Commission.
As an interviewee of ECOS put it,《nanotechnology is a very complex topic, which
requires a lot of organizations, like CSOs, to be able to first understand and to
influence.》7 This demonstrates the importance of expertise and capacity building in
influencing CSOs’ decisions to address a topic.
EU-level CSOs’ involvement in the nanotech debates is accordingly divided into
three phases: the awareness-raising phase, the capacity-building phase and the
alliance-forming phase. The following chapters will evaluate in more detail the
interplay between CSOs and the political system in each phase. The last chapter
provides some concluding remarks.
7 Interview with Dania CRISTOFARO, Policy Officer of ECOS, 21/10/2014
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Table 2. CSOs that were involved in the nanotech debates
Name Country Time Background
PMO France 2002 The specific context of the local political environment of
Grenoble, France.
Green
peace
UK 2003 GMOs open up windows of opportunity to promote debates on
nanotechnology
EEB EU level 2006 CSOs Capacity Building Project NanoCap
ETUC EU level 2006 CSOs Capacity Building Project NanoCap
MIO-
ECSDE
Mediterr
anean
2006 CSOs Capacity Building Project NanoCap
ANEC EU level 2006 The release of several documents, e.g. the risk assessment review
by SCENIHR, the development of the Woodrow Wilson database
BEUC EU level 2006 Consumer products that contain nanomaterials continued to pour
into the EU market, such as in the areas of food, toys
CIEL EU level 2007 Nano has been under the radar of other CSOs; Given that nanotech
is still young, CSOs could limit the possible risks from early on
CFDT France 2007 Nanomaterials appeared in the workplace;
Militant groups started to target nanomaterials
FoE EU level 2008 The mobilization of sister CSOs, e.g., FoE Australia
ECOS EU level 2008 The release of the programming mandate (M/409 nanotechnology)
HEAL EU level 2008 Push from membership organizations and partner organizations;
Hearing from concerned scientists
Client
Earth
EU level 2010 Addressing nanomaterials is in line with its priority on toxic
chemicals
IEW Belgium 2010 Encouraged by the Belgian presidency, who brought the
traceability of nanomaterials on the policy agenda
HCWH
Europe
EU level 2012 Concerns about the use of nano in medicine and medical devices
３２
Chapter II: Awareness-raising phase (2000-2005)
European nanotech policy direction is located in the EC’s DG for Research and in
particular in its “Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Unit”, headed by Renzo
Tomellini (ETC Group 2005b). The Commission adopted the Communication
Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnologies in 2004 and the Nanosciences
and nanotechnologies: An action plan for Europe 2005-2009 in 2005, proposing a
‘safe, integrated and responsible’ strategy and setting the tone for the EU
nanotechnology policy. Believing that nanotechnologies could contribute to the
knowledge-based objectives of the Lisbon process, the EU increased its funding with
1.4 billion euros allocated under FP68 and a further doubled budget under FP7 (EC
2005). Nanotechnologies, identified as one of the EU’s key enabling technologies
(KETs), started to be put on the agenda of the regulatory authorities. As Kulinowski
(2004) put it, nanotechnologies were given a ‘very high wow index’ .
Meanwhile, large budget invested into the R&D of nanotechnologies has aroused
civil society scrutiny. CSOs and concerned scientists showed concerns about the
possible negative impact of nanotechnologies on environment, safety, health as well
as its ethical and societal implications. Voices calling for a worldwide moratorium on
nanotechnology by ETC Group (action group on Erosion, Technology and
Concentration), a CSO based in Canada, tended to attract growing attention (ETC
Group 2003). A scholar observed the influence of the atmosphere marked by legal
uncertainty in the industry,《indiscriminate use of nanotechnology within consumer
products in the mid-2000s led to some business shying away from the technology》
(Maynard 2015).
Against this backdrop, Kulinowski (2004) alarmed that《societal and ethical
concerns can rapidly turn “wow” into “yuck”》. Will nanotechnologies experience
this rapid turn? How will European CSOs respond to ETC Group’s proposal of a
8 FP6: Nanotechnologies and nanosciences, knowledge-based multifunctional materials and new production
processes and devices https://cordis.europa.eu/fp6/nmp.htm
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moratorium on nanotech? This chapter examines CSOs’ approaches towards
nanotechnologies during the early period and finds out that the real situation is much
more complex than a ‘wow’ or ‘yuck’ assertion. Rather than bearing in one mind,
CSOs’ responses were quite diverse and uneven: while several activist groups from
Member States (e.g. PMO, France; THRONG, the UK) resorted to confrontational
methods (e.g. demonstrat ions, direct action) and rapidly turned against
nanotechnologies, branches of supranational CSOs (e.g. Greenpeace UK, FoE) were
relatively mild, balanced and in some cases slow9. And they participated in a
cooperative, argumentative and expertise-based manner. EU-level CSOs, the main
subject of this article, were largely absent during early debate. How can this
preference for different approaches be explained? The indeterminate and embryonic
feature of nanotechnologies has provided an interesting testing ground on which we
could observe how different stakeholders strive to define, shape and frame
nanotechnologies.
Centered on these questions, this chapter will be structured as follows: it begins
with an introduction of the policy development of nanotechnology in the world as
well as in the EU, outlining key events during the awareness-raising phase. After the
introduction of the background, the second section examines CSOs’ approaches
towards nanotechnologies, arguing that their uneven and diverse responses actually
helped to diluting the momentum of potential anti-nanotech campaigns, winning a
relatively positive environment for nanotechnologies’ early development in the EU;
the third section concludes three factors in explaining CSOs’ preference for different
approaches, including the indeterminacy and broadness of nanotechnologies, the
different outlooks and values behind each CSO as well as the wider regulatory
environment.
9 For example, it was not until 2008 that FoE Europe published its first report on nanotechnologies.
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A. Background
The early period saw both utopias and dystopias discourses around
nanotechnologies. Proponents spoke highly of the great potentials and revolutionary
breakthrough that nanotechnologies could bring. As Mark Modzelewski, executive
director of the Nanobusiness Alliance, put it,《nanotech’s promise is clean industries,
cures for disease, nearly unlimited energy supplies, a continuance of Moore’s Law
and perhaps the end of hunger.》10 Another camp, represented by celebrities (e.g. Bill
Joy, Prince Charles) and CSOs (e.g.ETC Group), warned the catastrophic
consequences that nanotechnologies could bring on society and proposed monitoring
this emerging technology with great caution. A polarized debate has emerged between
those who believe that the rapid growth of nanotechnologies will have strongly
positive economic benefits, and those who on the grounds of environmentalism and
social equity seek to slow or halt its development (Wood, Jones, and Geldart 2003).
As a scholar puts it,《nanotechnology is not a definite technology, but an empty
signifier and a political project that serves certain interests and strategies》
(Wullweber 2008).
1. Fear of the small thing: ‘Grey Goo’
2003 is a year of significance in the development of nanotechnologies in the EU:
Prince Charles’ concerns about nanotechnologies triggered wide media coverage;
ETC Group was invited to attend a seminar at the office of the Parliament;
Greenpeace UK published a report and started to participated in nano debates the
same year. As Philip Ball, science writer for Nature, put it,《2003 was the year when
nanotechnologies collided with the real world. It was a painful collision, bringing
prophecies of doom, fears of hidden dangers and call for a moratorium on
nanoscience》11. Nanotechnologies started to appear on the radar screen of the media
and militant groups.
10 McKibben, Bill. 2003. “Promising the World, or Costing the Earth?” The Ecologist, May 1.
http://www.theecologist.org/investigations/science_and_technology/268683/promising_the_world_or_costing_the
_earth.html
11 Ball, Philip. 2003. “2003: nanotechnology in the firing line.” Nanotechweb.org, December 23.
http://nanotechweb.org/cws/article/indepth/18804
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These early prophecies of doom and fears were mainly caused by ‘grey goo’, a
buzz word popularized in early debates on nanotechnologies. Coined by Eric Drexler
in his book Engines of Creation, the term ‘grey goo’ describes an end-of-the-world
scenario where self-replicate nanorobots go out of control and bring planetary
catastrophe, threatening the very extinction of human beings. Bill Joy expanded
discussions of ‘grey goo’ from science fiction to the real world. In 2000, he published
an influential article <why the future doesn’t need us> in Wired magazine. In this
article, he showed grave concerns about the ever accelerating expansion of GNR
(genetics, nanotechnologies, and robotics) technologies, which, according to him,
could threaten to make humans an endangered species12. Others echoed his concerns,
underlining that《the power of science to alter nature has reached such a state that
society needs to have a much more fundamental place in considering its support》
(Nature 2003). The later publication of the best-seller science fiction novel Prey put
the ‘grey goo scenario’ once again into the spotlight.
ETC Group, the first CSO worldwide which ignited an anti-nanotech campaign,
depicted another term of ‘green goo’: the merging of living and non-living matter
resulting in hybrid organisms, which are previously unknown on earth. According to
ETC Group, this merging underpinned by nanobiotechnology could bring not only
ethical problems (e.g. the blurring of distinction between biological and
non-biological materials, human enhancement), but also uncontrollable and
unpredictable disastrous impact (ETC Group 2003a; 2004c).
The approach of ETC Group to marry fears of GMOs to their campaign on
nanotechnologies proved to be successful. A particularly visible manifestation is the
response of Prince Charles. He was reported to ask RS/RAEng to launch a study to
investigate the risks of nanotechnologies after reading ETC Group’s report <The Big
12 Joy, Bill. 2000. “Why the future doesn’t need us.” Wired, April.
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html
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Down>13. It is worth noting that Prince Charles has always been interested in topics
regarding technological risks. He has attacked GM food in various occasions. For
example, he pointed out that《mixing genetic material from species that cannot breed
naturally, takes us into areas that should be left to God. We should not be meddling
with the building blocks of life in this way...Advanced technology brings its own
dangers.》14 In light of precedent knowledge and insights, he proposed dealing with
nanotechnologies with great caution given the incredible power it may bring:
《discovering the secrets of the Universe is one thing; ensuring that those secrets are
used wisely and appropriately is quite another.》15
Scholars observed that there were three sources which dominated the major
sources of media coverage from the year of 2002 to 2003: Michael Crichton’s novel
Prey, ETC Group’s report, and the speech of Prince Charles (Gaskell et al. 2005). The
news coverage crystallized around several frames: risks, control, lessons from past
mistakes, ethical implications, etc. Faced with mounting discussion on nanorobotics
or ‘grey goo’, Stephen Wood, professor of Sheffield University, alarmed that《the
debate at the moment is being framed wrongly and in extreme ways.》16 There were
concerns that early actors who were skeptical of GMOs would continue to campaign
against nanotechnologies; and public perceptions were at risk of becoming mixed into
‘an exotic cocktail’ (Moore 2004).
With the release of several scientific and policy documents (RS/RAEng 2004;
Swiss Re 2004; EC 2004), the focus of debates started to shift from future scenario
towards more near-term concerns. Debates on nanoparticles toxicity and associated
health and safety concerns began to gain momentum, which were considered to be
13 Radford, Tim. 2003. “Brave new world or miniature menace? Why Charles fears grey goo nightmare.”
The Guardian, April 29. http://www.theguardian.com/science/2003/apr/29/nanotechnology.science
14 BBC News. 1999. “Prince Charles speaks out against GM food.” April 9.
http://news.bbc.co.the UK/2/hi/special_report/1999/02/99/food_under_the_microscope/285408.stm
15 BBC News. 2004. “Prince warns of science ‘risks’ .” July 11. http://news.bbc.co.the UK/2/hi/the
UK_news/3883749.stm
16 Radford, Tim. 2003. “Nanotech moves the future to a new level.” The guardian, July 28.
http://www.theguardian.com/the UK/2003/jul/28/nanotechnology.science
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more urgent issues. For example, CSOs pointed out that some nanotubes may share
structural similarities with asbestos fibers (ETC Group 2002b; Arnall 2003) and
nanoparticles may even cross the blood-brain barrier (Kreuter et al. 2002). With the
accelerating commercialization of synthetic nanoparticles, many toxicologists agreed
that too little was being done to address the toxicity of nanoparticles (Giles 2003).
Swiss Re, the second largest re-insurance company in the world, contributed to the
discussion and alarmed that《the precautionary principle should be applied whatever
the difficulties》(Swiss Re 2004, 47).
2. Anti-nanotech campaign ignited by ETC Group
Early period has witnessed the emergence of CSOs which started to eye
nanotechnologies as the next target after biotechnology. Among these CSOs, ETC
Group is the most active and prominent one. Its activities have not only attracted the
attention of policymakers and nanotechnologists, but also mobilized other CSOs to
get involved in monitoring nanotechnologies.
ETC Group, the former Rural Advancement Foundation International, is a CSO
located in Canada. As a highly flexible organization with only nine staff members17,
ETC Group has profound expertise and know-how in addressing new technologies
issues. A scholar describes the feature of ETC Group as《smart, highly wired, fast,
seemingly intangible yet highly respected for its breadth of knowledge》(Osgood 2001,
95). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, ETC Group has observed the
emergence of nanotechnologies. It predicted that《this complex of new technologies
will change the world more than any other technological advance》(Mooney 2001, 45).
At that time, ETC Group had not yet developed a clear posit ion towards
nanotechnologies. After two years of investigation, ETC Group came up with a
decision and demanded for《an immediate moratorium on commercial production of
new nanomaterials》(ETC Group 2002). Since then, ETC Group has put
nanotechnologies highly on its agenda and published more than 20 bulletins and
17 http://www.etcgroup.org/people
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reports during the early period, covering a wide range of topics.
A review of these reports enables us to see the evolution of ETC Group’s
strategies: two reports were published in 2002, which mainly deal t with
environmental and health aspects of nanotechnologies. The issue of nanoparticle
toxicity was put to the fore. These reports highlighted that “size matters”. For instance,
particles at nano scale may penetrate living cells and accumulate in animal organs.
New forms of carbon (e.g. nanotube and fullerenes) may bring unknown impacts on
the environment (ETC Group 2002a; 2002b).
The year of 2003 and 2004 saw an increased number of reports (15 in total).
More evidence was assembled by ETC Group to support its alarm of nanoparticle
toxicity. It listed ‘Ten Toxic Warnings’, highlighting the following scientific findings:
buckyballs are toxic to water fleas; titanium dioxide and zinc oxide nanoparticles
from sunscreen may cause free radicals in skin cells and damage DNA (ETC Group
2004b). These reports also investigated the social and economic aspects of
nanotechnologies, covering regulatory aspects, the convergence of technologies,
nanobiotechnology and ‘green goo’, control and monopoly, etc. (ETC Group 2003c;
2004d).
The year of 2005 saw several in-depth reports regarding the possible impacts that
nanotechnologies could bring on the global south and marginalized communities and
risk governance issues. ETC Group believed that under the current patent and trade
systems, which characterized by the privatization of science and the concentration of
corporate power, nanotechnologies will only exacerbate rather than reduce existing
inequalities between North and South. This ‘technological tsunami’ will bring
social-economic disruptions to the vulnerable and poor which are not well prepared
(ETC Group 2005d) . As a consequence , i t proposed a mora tor ium on
nanotechnologies before its impacts in a larger social and political context examined
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and best practices established (ETC Group 2005c). These publications translate
complex scientific information and re-frame the policy discourse, offering rich
sources for later debates and discussions.
Apart from publishing reports, ETC Group also organized seminars and
workshops to advocate its claims. For example, the seminar organized at the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg was considered by attending
scholars as “a wake-up call for nanotechnologies”. Scholars of Toronto University
observed the gap between the rapid development of nanotechnologies and the lagging
behind of ethics, suggesting that《either the ethics of nanotechnology will catch up, or
the science will slow down》(Mnyusiwalla, Daar, and Singer 2003). Another seminar
that ETC Group held at the EP’s office aroused the attention of green MEPs as
well as other CSOs. More analysis will be provided below.
ETC Group’s activities are eye-catching and sensational. As Pat Mooney, its
Executive Director, put it,《we are obnoxious, and that is part of our strategy. It gets
us attention》(Osgood 2001, 95). This ‘smart’ CSO is good at linguistic invention to
catch the attention of the media and the general public. The phrase ‘terminator seed’
was created and widely circulated during its anti-agricultural biotechnology campaign.
The good use of linguistics continued to be applied to the nanotechnologies case.
Apart from ‘green goo’, it also creates the term ‘atomtechnology’ to highlight
nanotechnologies’ feature of manipulating the fundamental building blocks of matter,
just like “a painter controls a palette of pigments” (ETC Group 2003b). It also uses
‘Little BANG’ (Bits-Atoms-Neurons-Genes) to replace the official saying of ‘NBIC’
(Nanotechnologies-Biotechnology-Information-Cognitive) by national and
international institutions. Although its sensationalism received a lot of criticism, ETC
Group has successfully turned nanotechnologies into an issue of concern. Its
campaigns have attracted wide media coverage, including those of the Economist,
BBC News, the Guardian, New York Times , just name a few. It has also done
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important conceptual work regarding a general social critique of nanotechnologies in
the form of many well-written reports, providing an ‘entry point’ for other interested
actors and CSOs.
In the times of globalization, each part is closely connected with one another.
Faced with mounting anti-nanotechnologies campaigns at the other side of the
Atlantic, European CSOs couldn’t sit by and ignore such an important issue. New
actors began to come to the scene. Still in embryonic, nanotechnologies provide an
interesting testing ground on which we could observe how CSOs, holding different
values and commitment, frame an emerging issue and maneuver under conditions of
upstream engagement.
3. Not another GMO: the societal dimension of nanotechnologies highlighted
Will technologies bring a ‘brave new world’? How to set the limit between
“exploring nature” and “playing God”? How to define an acceptable level of risk?
These questions cannot be answered by scientists alone. Earlier controversies around
GMOs have revealed the power of ‘social constitutions’ of technologies. A learning
process is triggered among scientists, industries and policymakers, who begin to
reflect on the relationship between science and society.
As Mark Welland, head of Nanoscience Center of Cambridge University, put it,
《I’ve learned from the GM debate. It’s easy to condemn a technology, but hard to
fight back》(Giles 2003). In the light of past mistakes, his team recruited an ‘unusual
member of staff’— a social scientist to conduct research on the social dimension of
nanotechnologies. As this new member put it,《the project at the Nanoscience Center
reflects a turn to the social sciences by science policymakers in response to recent
controversies over new technologies》(Doubleday 2007a).
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Scientists and industrialists were concerned that《a fledgling industry might suffer
stigmatization and amplified public concern》(Pidgeon, Harthorn, and Satterfield
2011) . According to Tim Palmer, Chief Executive Officer and President of Cientifica,
the world’s largest supplier of nanotechnology information, nanotechnology was not a
helpful term in business affairs:《we need to quickly move away from the
nanotechnology word and describe its applications》(Moore 2004).
Nanotechnologies also started to appear on the radar screen of militant groups.
French activist group PMO targeted and agitated against nanotechnologies rapidly,
emphasizing the importance of ‘anticipation’:《be offensive rather than defensive》18.
CSOs like Greenpeace UK seized the opportunity and called for a ‘root-and-branch
rethink’of deeper issues about science and innovation (Parr 2005).
This situation has resulted in a surge of interest and commitment in incorporating
public concerns and preferences early into the R&D process of nanotechnologies. Ian
Pearson, the UK government minister, noted that nanotechnologies’ development was
《an ethical as well as a scientific question, and the public’s voice should be heard in
answering it.》19 We could find similar statements at the other side of the Atlantic
ocean: the report of the US National Research Council acknowledged that《failure to
attend to dialogue at the early stages of problem framing can be particularly costly,
for if a key concern is missed in subsequent analysis the danger is that the whole
process may be invalidated》(Fineberg et al. 1996). As Editorial of Nature put it, on
both sides of the Atlantic, funders of nanotechnology research started to《take the
issue of public acceptance seriously》(Nature Materials 2003).
In this regard, great efforts have been made to engender public acceptance and
avoid repeating past mistakes of GMOs. For example, companies like DuPont began
18 The original text: 《une critique dont on peut énoncer quelques lignes élémentaires : Anticiper. Contester à
propos, avant coup plutôt qu’ après coup - les nanotechnologies par exemple. Etre offensif plutôt que défensif》.
PMO website: http://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?page=plan
19 http://www.dius.gov.the UK/news_and_speeches/speeches/past_ministers/ian_pearson/nanotechnologies
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to invest in environmental risks studies (Nature nanotechnology 2007). The report of
Greenpeace UK remarked《some nano-advocate awareness of environmentally-sound
practice》(Arnall 2003, 41). The EU policymakers well recognized the possible
negative impact that GMOs could have on the framing of nanotechnologies. As an
interviewed DG SANCO put it,
“in terms of the quality and nature of the debate, I would say GMOs actually
played a negative role. The temptation was for people who had been engaging
in GMOs to use what they knew to have positions towards nano, which is very
different”.
The fear of repeating the GMO mistakes, the excitement about the benefits that
nanotechnologies could bring and the increasing interest of activist groups in
nanotechnologies were all factors which gave rise to a greater willingness among the
EU regulatory bodies to engage the public. Against this backdrop, a timely,
anticipative and proactive approach towards nanotechnologies has become part of the
mainstream policy discourse of the EU (EC 2004; 2005) and various initiatives in this
respect have been introduced. This section will provide an overview of the procedures,
arrangements, initiatives that put into practice in response to the reinforced demands
for ‘upstream public engagement’ at the EU level.
3.1. Policy documents
The Commission adopted the Communication Towards a European Strategy for
Nanotechnology in 2004, in which it showed the determination to《adopt a proactive
stance and fully integrate societal considerations into the R&D process... This needs
to be carried out as early as possible and not simply expecting acceptance post-facto》
(EC 2004) . The fol lowing 2005-2009 action plan for nanosciences and
nanotechnologies highlighted once again the need to 《integrate societal
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considerations into the R&D process at an early stage and encourage a dialogue with
citizens》(EC 2005). An interviewed DG SANCO, who has participated in the drafting
work, introduced the context within which the action plan was released,
“(we had) very bad experiences with GMOs and we were convinced that the
engagement of the public was a necessity. It was a relatively top-down
enlightened approach, and at that time the public knew nothing about
nanotechnologies… It was a policy decision to actually go from research to an
European action plan and to include the societal considerations.”20
Remarking the proactive approach of the EU policymakers, a scholar highlights
that it is remarkable to see the rate at which societal considerations emerge on the
policy agenda (Scheufele 2011). The commitments of policymakers signaled a shift in
mindset as a result of an accelerated learning process, which helped create
favorable conditions for conducting upstream public engagement.
3.2. Engagement activities and programs
At the Member State level, various innovative initiatives and activities, which
include focus groups, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, and larger scale national
debates, have gained impetus (e.g. the NanoJury in the UK; the Nanoviv and
Nanomonde conferences in France; the ‘Publifocus’ project in Switzerland; the
establishment of NanoKommission in Germany) (Laffite and Joly 2008). By contrast,
activities to promote public engagement, which were initiated by the EU institutions
during the early stage, were more in traditional form. The activities include
stakeholder workshops, seminars, public consultations, EU-funded projects
(Nanologue21, NanoDialogue22), etc.
20 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
21 ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/nanologue_projectdescription_en.pdf
22 Final report of Nanodialogue
http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/documentlibrary/102583451EN6.pdf
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It is remarkable to see the rate at which CSOs got involved in the policy debates
on nanotechnologies. For example, in mid-2003, green MEP Caroline Lucas invited
the ETC Group to present their views of nanotechnology as the ‘centrepiece’ of a
meeting comprising other CSOs (e.g. ETC Group, Genewatch UK, Greenpeace),
decision-makers from the Parliament, and the Commission (Healey and Glimell 2004,
6). Many participant MEPs came from a political grouping which had《taken a strong
line in favor of the moratorium on GM crops》(Ibid., 6). Claiming that innovation was
running ahead of regulation, Caroline Lucas called for a moratorium on nano-products
applied to the skin during the meeting23. Her tough stance also triggered the media
interest (e.g. the Guardian24, BBC News25) as well as follow-up deliberation among
scientists and regulatory authorities26. The subsequent workshop Mapping Out Nano
Risks organized also invited CSOs such as Greenpeace to participate27. According to
an organizer of the workshop,
“I invited Greenpeace to the very first meeting that I organized on this subject.
But it became increasingly difficult to get Greenpeace to come to the table. Very
soon in the process that Greenpeace and other groups like FoE completely got
out of the discussion”.
Based on content analysis, we could find that Greenpeace UK has withdrawn
from this arena since the publication of its position paper in 2007. Greenpeace Europe
never touched upon nanotechnology issues officially. Chapter IV will provide more
detailed analyses with regard to the evolution of CSOs’ strategies and approaches
towards nanotechnologies.
23 CORDIS News. 2003. “Nanotechnology: opportunity or threat?” June 12.
http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/20401_en.html
24 Lucas, Caroline. 2003. “We must not be blinded by science.” The Guardian, June 12.
25 BBC News. 2003. “The truth about nanotechnology.” June 19.
26 The Guardian. 2003. “Don’t believe the nanotechnology scare stories.” June 17.
27 EC. 2004. “Nanotechnologies: A Preliminary Risk Analysis on the Basis of a Workshop Organized in Brussels.”
March 1-2. http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/documents/ev_20040301_en.pdf
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3.3. Informal commitment of the EU policymakers
As Janez Potocnik, the former Science and Research Commissioner of the EU,
put it,《if the full potential of nanoscience is to be exploited however, public concerns
must be taken into account... If Europe does not address problems early on, they will
come back later with more force.》28 A vigilance has been cultivated among EU
policymakers to《integrate potentially antagonistic positions》and anticipate probable
public backlash against nanotechnologies in a proactive way (Wullweber 2008).
Interviewed DGs of the Commission also shared the opinion that big lessons have
been learned from the earlier GMOs case. The whole context made the EU
policymakers more aware of the importance of engaging the public. Some passages
are selected:
“GMO was a major disaster story. People did not want to see the same happen
with nanomaterials...That’s the reason why we involved the CSOs in the early
discussions”. 29
“a lot of things have been done wrong. Some of the work has not been
anticipated properly and some unexpected things basically had not been taken
into account.”30
Considering the past controversies over GMOs and the risks that could
potentially be associated with nanotechnologies, policymakers showed determination
to create a positive and favorable environment for nanotechnologies from the very
beginning of the R&D process. Scholars argue that nanotech policy’s emphasis on
inclusion and public engagement constitutes a ‘political opportunity’ for CSOs
(Seifert and Plows 2014). For example, apart from early involvement, an interviewed
Dutch regulatory authority also pointed out the necessity of supporting CSOs,
28 CORDIS news. 2006. “Communication and risk assessment: keys to unleashing nano-potential.” October 20.
http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/26531_en.html.
29 Interview with a DG SANCO, 17/06/2014
30 Interview with a DG ENV, in charge of incorporating nanomaterials in REACH and CLP Regulation,
20/06/2014
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“once the discussion is framed, it is very difficult to frame it back again. Being
open about uncertainties and having all parties involved from the start is very
important…it was important to support our own counterforces, to keep
policymakers and politicians ‘sharp’, to learn from as many different opinions as
possible, and to keep in touch with CSOs.”31.
Although these informal commitments signal a ‘shift of mind’ among regulatory
authorities, the motivation behind is more to win public acceptance rather than open
up the innovation process to the public. We could in fact see a broad spectrum of
initiatives which are inspired by the ‘deficit model’, ‘upstream public engagement’, or
a combination of the two. In this point, scholars call for ‘a radical shake-up’ in
developing public engagement and highlight the importance to《develop a healthy
skepticism about the rhetoric of the win-win situation.》32 As Moore (2004) puts it,
《society and scientists should be grateful when someone raises a warning flag
before a real public-relations disaster happens.》
CSOs attempted to use the opportunity to trigger deeper reflection and discussion
on the science-technology-society relationship and other fundamental issues. It was
against this backdrop that new players emerged and CSOs started to address
nanotechnologies. Their intervening further contributed to influencing the trajectory
of nanotechnologies in the EU.
B. Emerging actors, different approaches
During the awareness-raising phase, a few CSOs began to come on the scene and
put the topic of nanotechnologies onto their agenda. These CSOs include branches of
supranational CSOs (e.g. Greenpeace UK, FoE) and local CSOs of Member States
(e.g. PMO; Trades Union Congress; GeneWatch; Corporate Watch; THRONG; ITDG).
31 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
32 EurActiv. 2009. “Nanotech at risk of repeating ‘GM food fiasco’”. September 29.
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/nanotech-risk-repeating-gm-food-news-222615
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It is worth noting that CSOs which operate at the EU level, the main subject of this
dissertation, are largely absent during the early debate. This demonstrates that EU
level CSOs could have less flexibility and organizational feasibility compared with
local ones or well-established ones. The absence of EU-level CSOs also brought to
the fore the failure of ‘upstream public engagement’ in stimulating considerable
interest in civil society.
Scholars point out that there exists a continuing misunderstanding which
assumes the public as a homogeneous mass (Irwin and Wynne 1996) and CSOs to be
purposeful institutionalized, of one mind, and to manipulate policy in misguided
directions (Grove-White et al. 2004). As Williams puts it,《there is in fact no masses,
but only ways of seeing people as masses》(Williams 1989, 11). This dissertation
observes that in dealing with the issue of nanotechnologies, CSOs’ positions and
strategies are diverse, varied and in constant change.
We were able to examine a range of responses towards this emerging technology:
while local CSOs represented by PMO and the Heavenly Righteous Opposed to
Nanotech Greed (THRONG) turned against nanotechnology rapidly; well-established
ones (e.g. Greenpeace UK; FoE) engaged in a cooperative, argumentative and
expertise-based manner. Others (e.g. Corperate Watch; ITDG), while identified
nanotechnologies as an issue of concern, were not sure how to address such a new and
broad issue. And they did not develop a clear position yet. The following section will
investigate European CSOs’ strategies and positions towards nanotechnologies, their
interaction with transnational ones (mainly ETC Group), and their reinforced
demands for ‘upstream public engagement’.
1. Leading position of the UK
It’s worth noting that most of CSOs involved from the start come from the UK.
ETC Group observes that《issue of nanotechnologies has registered higher on
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government and public radar in the UK than in any other country so far》(ETC Group
2005b). The following figure summarizes the distribution of nanotechnologies
advocacy CSOs in different regions. Based on a web-based search, the author has
analyzed 64 CSOs in total, demonstrating that CSOs from the EU lag behind those
from the North America and the UK (Lee 2006, 6).
Figure 1: Advocacy CSOs by Country/ Region
Source: Lee 2006
Two factors are summarized here to explain the rapid involvement of British
CSOs. First of all, after a series of food safety scandals and controversies, a
fundamental crisis of trust in the UK’s science policy-making occured (House of
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 2000). This situation mobilized
various stakeholders to find a solution together and to re-conceptualize the
relationship between science, technology and society. Secondly, during the
preparation of its report, RS/RAEng have invited civil society to make comments and
suggestion. During a meeting, some attendees shared with the view that《now is a
prime time to instigate this (communication) process, as there is an increasing desire
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amongst scientists to act as citizens, and, post-GM, an awareness amongst business of
the importance of engagement.》(RS/RAEng 2003). The provision of opportunity has
triggered the early interest of CSOs (e.g. GeneWatch, FoE, ITDG) to get involved in
the process. For example, FoE, in its contribution to the stakeholder consultation,
advocated a precautionary approach to minimize or eliminate risk at an early stage of
public scrutiny33.
By contrast, in other EU countries, the involvement of CSOs in nano debates
remained weak. For example, Rinie van Est, Coordinator of Technology Assessment,
Rathenau Institute, introduced the example of the Netherlands. Although they
organized a discussion on nano risks as early as 2004, it was quite hard to get the
environmental organizations involved, as《it was not on their agenda at that time.》
(Bullich 2009, 23).
2. Divergences between Greenpeace UK and ETC Group
In his article <why the future doesn’t need us>, Bill Joy claimed that
‘relinquishment’ may be the only alternative for avoiding catastrophic results caused
by over-speeding development of GNR (genetics, nanotechnologies, and robotics)34.
On 11th June, 2003, ETC Group disseminated its proposal with regard to a moratorium
on nanomaterials in Europe: a two-day seminar was organized in the Parliament,
which brought together CSOs (e.g. ETC Group, Greenpeace, Genewatch UK),
decision-makers and other interested actors to discuss the societal impacts of
nanotechnology. The context was considered as the signal that anti-nanotechnology
campaigners declared war on this new technology. Observers claimed that《it is very
comparable to the situation in GM food 8 or 9 years ago.》35 However, ETC Group
did not succeed in mobilizing the branches of supranational CSOs in supporting its
proposal. And the ‘anti-nano war’ was not triggered, but largely muted.
33 Friends of the Earth. 2003. “The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering study on nanotechnology:
comments from Friends of the Earth.” http://www.nanotec.org.uk/evidence/43FOTE.htm. Accessed 19 June 2003
34 Joy, Bill. 2000. “Why the future doesn’t need us.” Wired, April.
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html
35 Hogan, Jenny. 2003. “Anti-Nanotech Campaigners Declare War on Tiny Things.” New Scientist, June 21.
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During the seminar, a wide range of issues concerning ownership and control,
global equality, health and environmental risks as well as potential benefits of
nanotechnologies were discussed. ETC Group highlighted the ‘revolution’ that
nanotechnologies could bring to the whole society and the current situation which was
marked by ‘regulatory vacuum’. Green MEP Caroline Lucas claimed that innovation
was running ahead of regulation, calling for a moratorium on products applied to the
skin36. She further expressed concerns that nanotechnologies just provided another
profitable ‘technofix’ for the affluent rather than addressing the root causes of
inequality, poverty and hunger or other pressing problems37. Greenpeace UK paid
specific attention to the issue of public engagement. Its chief scientist Doug Parr
underlined that policy must not be composed by small groups of experts and
bureaucrats, and the EU should act as a technology facilitator with a user or civil
society forum38. Renzo Tomellini, the Head of Nanotechnology Unit, also attended the
seminar. Faced with growing concerns over possible risks of nanotechnologies, he
highlighted the need for science-based information and responsible research39.
The media have given extensive coverage to this seminar. And the strategies of
ETC Group received a lot of criticism. As New Scientist put it,《scare-mongering and
ill-informed campaigning undermine the debate.》40 The Nature editorial commented
its campaign as ‘downright ludicrous’ and ‘patent nonsense’: in the seminar, one
activist even claimed that《potatoes could be constructed from nanorobots, threatening
traditional methods of agriculture》(Nature 2003). The editorial continued by pointing
out the challenge to convey the risks of nanotechnologies without painting it as “a
panacea or a plague”. The pamphlet of Demos proposed using the precautionary
principle wisely, arguing that《CSOs are often too quick to invoke the precautionary
principle to justify a ban, which can be unhelpful》(Wilsdon and Willis 2004, 54). One
36 Cordis News. 2003. “Nanotechnology: Opportunity or Threat?” http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/20401_en.html
37 Green Party. 2003. “Getting past ‘grey goo’”. May 22.
https://www.greenparty.org.the UK/archive/news-archive/567.html
38 Cordis News 2003. “Nanotechnology: Opportunity or Threat?” 12 June
39 CORDIS News. 2003. “Supporting responsible nanotechnology research will benefit Europe's citizens, says
head of unit.” June 24. http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/20466_en.html
40 New Scientist. 2003. “Why fighting nanotech is anti-globalisation’s new cause.”
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month later, a report commissioned by Greenpeace UK was released, suggesting that
《an externally imposed nanotech moratorium seems both unpractical and probably
damaging at present》(Arnall 2003, 41). This conclusion could be considered as a
signal that ETC Group’ anti-nanotech campaign failed to invoke much resonance
among principal European CSOs.
The report of Greenpeace UK provides a balanced review of nanotechnologies,
which examines both the benefits and risks of this emerging technology. The report
notes that nanotechnologies could bring benefits such as energy-efficient products,
cleaner manufacturing processes and other promising applications. It also highlight
the environmental (e.g. nanoparticles infiltrating humans, self-replication) and
socio-political concerns (e.g. the nano-divide, medical ethics, destructive uses) posed
by nanotechnologies. Faced with the moratorium proposal of ETC Group, the chief
scientist of Greenpeace UK suggested taking both the merits and risks of
nanotechnologies into consideration. He also renounced the employment of
confrontational methods in addressing nanotechnologies. As he put it,《campaigning
to stop things—as Greenpeace frequently does—is fundamentally unsatisfying. We
would like to see answers to problems — technology has the ability to deliver some of
these answers》(Parr 2003). Although Greenpeace UK disagrees with a ban on
nanomaterial, it highlights that industry should take the issue of public acceptance
seriously, otherwise, a fate of public backlash will be ‘virtually self-imposed’ (Arnall
2003, 41).
Apart from the ‘moratorium or not’ argument, there exist divergences between
ETC Group and Greenpeace UK in other aspects. To begin with, ETC Group
highlights that nanotechnologies, due to its unparalleled breadth and scale, will bring
‘technological tsunami’ and large socio-economic disruptions to the vulnerable and
marginalized communities:《when the nanotech-wave comes to shore, it will bring
rapid, monumental, inescapable and potentially devastating change》(ETC Group
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2005c). By contrast, Greenpeace UK believes that《we are unlikely to witness any
radical developments during the next 15 years unless a series of fundamental
breakthroughs occur between now and then.》 The development of nanotechnologies
is ‘evolutionary’ rather than ‘revolutionary’:《these changes are likely to be gradual as,
on the whole, the displacement of an old technology by a new one tends to be both
slow and incomplete》(Arnall 2003, 41).
Secondly, two CSOs utilize different strategies to address nanotechnologies. ETC
Group, given its rich experiences in dealing with emerging technologies, has made up
a good number of reports and bulletins on its own, adopting a radical and clear
position towards nanotechnologies. Greenpeace UK did not develop its own
conclusive position on this emerging technology during the early period41. Instead, it
commissioned Imperial College London to provide independent advice. According to
Douglas Parr,《a deliberative public process at the very early stages of technology
development seemed like the best way of achieving progress in these areas rather than
endless Greenpeace policy papers》(Parr 2005a). Thus, Greenpeace UK has made a lot
of efforts in organizing citizen’s jury, public debates, deliberation, etc. For example, it
has co-organized a five-week citizens’ jury— “NanoJury UK”—together with the
Guardian, Cambridge University Nanoscience Center and the Ethics and Life
Sciences Research Center of the University of Newcastle in summer 2005. NanoJury
provided an opportunity to invite the ordinary public to contribute their voices and
opinions. As Douglas Parr put it,《the implications of the findings of Nanojury reach
far into not just science and innovation policy in the UK, but also the political model
of economic resource deployment which underpins the technology commercialization
process》(Ibid.).
Last but not least, ETC Group is a small and professional CSO, which operates
on a global scale. ‘ETC’ implies《Erosion is created by Technology introduced in the
context of corporate class power Concentration》(Mooney 2001). This abbreviation
41 It was not until 2007 that Greenpeace published its position paper on nanotechnologies.
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demonstrates its emphasis on the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI)
aspects of technologies. By contrast, Greenpeace is an environmental organization
with more than 40 years of histories, having branches in more than 40 countries42. It is
worth noting that Greenpeace UK was —if not the only, then certainly a key branch—
addressing nanotechnologies ‘upstream’. Neither its sister organizations nor
Greenpeace International was involved in this arena. Greenpeace UK, which operates
at both national and European scale 43, conducts campaigns more from the
Environment, Health, and Safety (EHS) perspective. Technology is not per se good or
bad. What’s important is on what conditions and towards which aims that technology
develops (Greenpeace 2002).
Table 3 gives a brief summary of the above-mentioned diverging aspects
between ETC Group and Greenpeace UK, revealing their different reference frames
and scale of interest in addressing nanotechnologies.
Table 3. Position of ETC Group and Greenpeace UK towards nanotechnologies
ETC Group Greenpeace UK
Focus area ELSA issues EHS issues
Scope Global National and European level
Activities Reports and bulletins;
Seminars; lobbying
Debates and deliberation
(e.g. Nanojury)
Evaluation of nanotech’s
impact
Revolutionary;
Technological tsunami
Evolutionary;
Gradual
Position
towards nanotech
Moratorium No conclusive position
42 http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/
43 Though located in a Member State, Greenpeace UK actively promoted discussions on nanotechnology in both
the UK and the EU.
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Greenpeace UK’s report evoked wide responses. Tim Harper, the executive
director of the European NanoBusiness Association, claimed to have breathed a sigh
of relief among “a worrying trend towards demonizing nanotech indiscriminately”44.
And he highlighted the significance of the report:《having one of the world’s most
prominent environmental organizations weigh in on the side of rationality has lowered
this risk (public backlash) enormously.》Authors of Demos report also praise
Greenpeace UK for its ‘subtle and intelligent stance’ (Wilsdon and Willis 2004, 62).
An interviewed DG SANCO praised the efforts of Greenpeace UK as drafting《a very
good report, which asked very good questions.》45 Besides Greenpeace UK and FoE,
other EU level CSOs did not develop any activities on nanotechnologies during
the first half of 2000s.
Despite the surge of activism led by ETC Group, the momentum against
nanotech seemed to abate rather than intensify in the EU. According to the
commentary of New Scientist, Greenpeace UK《put the brakes on a full-scale
campaign against the science of small things.》46 Although ‘full-scale’ campaign was
faltered, we could examine some sparse protests against nanotechnologies emerged at
the Member State level.
3. Local direct actions against nanotechnologies
In contrast with the branches of supranational CSOs, activist groups from
Member States largely based their positions on historical experiences in dealing with
precedent technologies (biotechnology, nuclear technology, etc.). Adopting a critical
and skeptical position, a few activist groups quickly turned against nanotechnologies
by using confrontational methods, e.g. direct action, demonstrations. Among these
CSOs, PMO is a typical example.
44 Harper, Tim. 2003. “Greenpeace to nanotechnology: let’s be rational about this.” Nanotechweb.org, Augest 1.
http://nanotechweb.org/cws/article/articles/17979
45 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
46 Hogan, Jenny. 2003. “No nanotech ban, says Greenpeace.” New Scientist, July 26
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17924051.000-no-nanotech-ban-says-greenpeace.html
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PMO, an activist group located in Grenoble, France, was established in the
autumn of 2000. It is the first CSO within the EU that conducted campaigns against
nanotechnologies. Since 2002, PMO has started to monitor this topic and organized
several protest activities against nanotechnologies. Technology was considered by
PMO as《the principal front of the battle between the powerful and the powerless.》47
And it based its position more on political reflection rather than scientific
understandings. By using its own words,《nanotechnologies is not a scientific project,
but a political and philosophical issue》(PMO 2006a).
Within local context, PMO paid more attention to ethical (e.g. social control,
human enhancement, privacy, liberty and autonomy, research ethics), local
social-economic (e.g. environmental damages; impacts on local employment structure,
real estate and renting), as well as democratic concerns (e.g. lack of public
participation). For example, PMO objected to the takeover of Grenoble by the
‘military-scientific-industrial complex’48. Faced with an emerging technology which
was still in the infancy, PMO proposed anticipating rapidly:《be offensive rather than
defensive.》49
The criticism led by PMO mainly comes from the following aspects: Firstly,
nanotechnologies further strengthen the domination of ‘techno-divin’, leading to ‘a
totalitarian world’. According to PMO, nanotechnologies will bring a series of
potentially damaging applications, including homo-robot, eugenics, enhanced Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID), military weapons. These applications could bring
grave consequences like ubiquitous surveillance, replacement of human labor,
nanotechnologies arms race, further enhancing enslavement of citizens and
threatening citizens’ autonomy, freedom and dignity.
47 Original text:《le front principal de la guerre entre le pouvoir et les sans-pouvoir》.
PMO website: http://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?page=plan
48 http://www.indymedia.org.the UK/en/2004/12/302728.html
49 PMO website: http://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?page=plan
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Secondly, PMO criticizes the logic behind the development of nanotechnologies,
which is assumed to focus on economic gains instead of social goods. PMO has
published a series of publications entitled ‘today the nano world’ (Aujourd’hui le
nanomonde), in which Bill Joy’s words are put in the prominent position. As Bill Joy
put it,《we are being propelled into this new century with no plan, no control, no
brakes.》50 And PMO claims that《Bill Joy has noticed something that our
decision-makers neglect》(PMO 2003). PMO calls for redefining the progress of
humankind, which goes towards《a social organization guided by the common good
and the fight against social inequalities, ecological disaster, the degradation of
human relationships, the concentration of powers, the loss of autonomy of the
population》(PMO 2006c) 51.
Thirdly, the democratic deficit of the decision-making process also meets with
strong criticism. PMO comments the local government as《an opaque structure,
enclosed, and constantly monitored》 (PMO 2006c) 52. Decisions are dominated by
‘techno-gratin’ and citizens have no access to influence the policy-making process.
PMO also observes the manipulation of media by ‘techno-gratin’ with the aim of
‘faire acceptabilité’ (PMO 2006b). PMO comments the manipulation ironically,
《briefly we can talk about everything except for the social and ecological effects of
the semi-conductor industry, let alone its military implications ... Everything is fine.
And everything is nice》(PMO 2006c) 53.
While Greenpeace UK acknowledges the benefits that nanotechnologies could
bring in dealing with some urgent problems, PMO considers nanotechnologies as
another tool of attracting industrial and military profits. According to PMO,
50 Joy, Bill. 2000. “Why the future doesn’t need us.” Wired, April.
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html
51 Original text: 《d’une organisation sociale orientée par le Bien commun et la lutte contre les inégalités sociales,
le désastre écologique, la dégradation des relations humaines, la concentration des Pouvoirs, la perte d'autonomie
de la population》.
52 Original text:《le CEA-Grenoble est une structure opaque, clôturée, surveillée en permanence》.
53 Original text:《bref on parle de tout, sauf des nuisances sociales et écologiques de l’industrie des
semi-conducteurs, encore moins de ses implications militaires...Tout il est beau, tout il est gentil》
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nanotechnologies do little to fix more pressing problems like inequality, loss of
autonomy, environmental degradation. Operated at local context, PMO believes that
the ‘Grenoble Model ’ (research , indust ry, employment) in developing
nanotechnologies will bring negative local social-economic consequences,
such as the rising of local rent, environmental damages. Figure 2, made by a French
scholar, illustrates the different or even opposite vision between officials and activists
towards nanotechnologies.
Figure 2: two visions towards nanotechnologies in Grenoble
Source: Laurent 2007
This figure reveals the different perspective of looking at emerging technologies
between officials and activists: on the one hand, activists were skeptical about the
motivation behind the development of nanotechnologies and refused to have dialogue
with the industries or the local regulatory authorities; on the other, according to the
observation of social scientists who have participated in the preparation of local
public debate, local policymakers, still sticking to technocratic governance, were not
ready to enter a genuine public engagement process (Joly and Kaufmann 2008). This
dilemma poses a tough challenge for promoting public debate and other participatory
measures.
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Against this backdrop, polarized positions have been formed from the very early
R&D process of nanotechnologies. The year of 2004 has witnessed several protests
emerged in the UK as well as France. In November, the Nanotech/Convergent
Technologies conference in Leeds was disrupted by stink bombs. Protesters claimed
that nanotechnologies《puts mind control, body control, social control and control of
the natural world more firmly in the hands of the state, the corporations and the
ruling elite.》54 Their advocacy echoed the argument of ETC Group, which noted
that《controlling Bits, Atoms, Neurons and Genes adds up to a little BANG theory
enabling a godlike mastery over all knowledge, matter, mind and life》(ETC Group
2004d).
In December, activists from THRONG dressed up as angels and disrupted
another nanotechnologies conference in Buckinghamshire, a ceremonial county in
South East England. (see Figure 3). These ‘angles’ claimed that former proponents of
biotechnology now attempted to rush nanotechnology to market:《the same greedy
corporations who messed with the genetic basis of life are now seeking to alter and
privatize nature right down to the atomic level.》55 The same month, activist groups
located in Grenoble interrupted the construction and occupied the cranes on the site of
Minatec, which set to be the largest center for nanotech in Europe56.
54 http://www.indymedia.org.the UK/en/regions/leedsbradford/2004/11/301222.html
55 See the website of ‘Angels Against Nanotech’:
http://www.angelsagainstnanotech.blogspot.fr/2004/12/press-release-nanotech-protest.html
56 PMO. “Quand les Verts s’opposent à Minatec”. http://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/spip.php?article79
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Figure 3: activists from THRONG interrupted conference on nanotechnologies
Source: Indymedia UK, 200457
These protests brought to the fore the lack of trust on industries and the
regulatory authorities. As the ‘angels’ put it,《we have little to gain by entering into
dialogue with an organization that can only ever represent the interests of industry
and not the concerns of the public.》58 Democratization of technologies remained one
of the primary concerns of local militant groups.
4. Common concerns shared by CSOs
4.1. EHS aspect of nanoparticles
Apart from the divergences discussed above, European CSOs also have some
common concerns. Given the knowledge gap concerning the toxicology of
nanoparticles, the first and foremost concern shared by CSOs is the EHS aspects of
engineered nanoparticles.
57 Indymedia the UK. 2004. “Angels at nano-tech conference.” December 9.
https://www.indymedia.org.the UK/en/regions/oxford/2004/12/302576.html
58 See the website of ‘Angels Against Nanotech’: http://angelsagainstnanotech.blogspot.fr/
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Small size may bring interesting new properties to traditional materials. However,
will it also bring new threats and unknown risks? Will this small size make it easier
for nanoparticles to infiltrate human bodies? European CSOs have two-fold concerns:
firstly, by reducing to nano-scale, materials may become more reactive and therefore
potentially more toxic. It is claimed that ultra-small particles appear to have inherent
toxic properties (FoE 2003; Corporate Watch 2005); some nanotubes may share
structural similarities with asbestos fibres (Arnall 2003; FoE 2003). Secondly, CSOs
find it even more worrying that human bodies may have not evolved to recognize
nanoparticles. Thus, there exists possibility that particles in nano-scale slip the human
immune system without being noticed (Arnall 2003; Corporate Watch 2005). Trades
Union Congress (the UK), one of the earliest worker unions that address
nanotechnologies, showed concerns that nanoparticles could get into the body through
the skin, lungs and digestive system, even cross the blood-brain barrier59.
Concerns are also expressed about the possible damages that nanotechnologies
could bring to the environment. PMO argues that the R&D of nanotechnologies not
only consumes clear water and energy, but also generates tons of electronic wastes
which are toxic.60 The report of Greenpeace UK also highlights that《quantum dots,
nanoparticles, and other throwaway nanodevices may constitute whole new classes of
non-biodegradable pollutants that scientists have very little understanding of》(Arnall
2003, 36). In its comments to the consultation by the RS/RAEng, FoE claimed that
self-replicating substances with no equivalent in nature may pose many risks to the
environment (FoE 2003).
CSOs advocated that the precaution principle should be applied in dealing with
the above-mentioned EHS concerns. For example, mindful of early asbestos tragedy,
Trades Union Congress reacted promptly and stressed the importance of protecting
59 Worker Union TUC. 2004. “Nanotechnology factsheet.” July 29.
https://www.tuc.org.the UK/workplace-issues/health-and-safety/nanotechnology-factsheet
60 PMO. 2003. “Aujourd'hui le nano monde #3.” September 24.
http://www.piecesetmaindoeuvre.com/IMG/pdf/A_h_le_nanomonde_3.pdf
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the safety and health of workers. It suggested that the production and use of
nanoparticles should be carried out in a contained process61. Based on discussions
with citizens during NanoJury, Greenpeace UK came up with some provisional
recommendations: to label manufactured nanoparticles and test them in controlled
environments (Parr 2005a).
4.2. Public engagement
How would nanotechnologies be deployed? In which direction and for whose
benefits? European CSOs claimed that public value and social preferences should be
incorporated ‘upstream’ into the R&D process of nanotechnologies. As Greenpeace
UK put it,《if nanotech is going to be as big as many think, then it’s a question that
every person on Earth has a stake in》(Parr 2003). PMO had similar demands:《we
should all decide the project that concerns every one of us》(PMO 2003). PMO also
cri t icized strongly the lack of access to the decision-making process of
nanotechnologies, which was only confined within the ‘techno-divin’. As PMO put it,
《the Grenoble development (research, industry, jobs) does not have an odor. Our
living standard is not negotiable》62(Ibid.).
GeneWatch UK, a CSO dedicated to addressing the issue of genetic technologies,
has started to track nanotechnologies since mid-2003. Its director Mayer Sue argued
that the debate on nanotechnologies was quite insular:《the ability to generate
materials from atoms and molecules raises many serious questions, yet only the
scientists themselves are debating its future》(Mayer 2002) . She examined the
dislocation of science from the public and democratic processes, proposing engaging
civil society in the shaping of the research agenda. She alarmed that《if the science
that is funded or the attitudes underpinning it are at odds with broader social values,
trouble may emerge》(Mayer 2003).
61 Worker Union TUC. 2004. “Nanotechnology factsheet.” July 29.
https://www.tuc.org.the UK/workplace-issues/health-and-safety/nanotechnology-factsheet
62 Original text: 《nous devrions tous décider de ce projet qui nous concerne tous...le développement grenoblois
(recherche, industrie, emplois) n'a pas d'odeur. Notre niveau de vie n'est pas négociable》.
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During the preparation of the report on nanotechnologies, RS/RAEng asked
CSOs to provide input and comments. Attendant CSOs claimed that lessons from
precedent controversial technologies should be learned, where《technological progress
needed to slow down to keep pace with citizen deliberations and democratic controls,
and decision-making》(Ibid.). Several initiatives and deliberation measures were
introduced in this regard, e.g. Nanojury in the UK, Nanologue and NanoDialogue at
the EU level.
4.3. Other ethical and social concerns
Nanotechnologies hold potentials for improving medical diagnosis and therapy;
however, it may also bring essential ethical concerns: how to define the line between
human enhancement and therapy? Will nanotechnologies bring genetic discrimination
or ‘ability-divide’? Could the rich and the poor have equal access to the technological
benefits? During the early period, wider ethical and social issues, which include
human enhancement, privacy, military uses, nano-divide, ownership and control, etc.,
were put forward by European CSOs.
Focusing on monopoly and patenting issue, a comparison is made between
biotechnology and nanotechnologies: while the former creates patents on life, the
latter is linked to patents on matter and nature (the ‘building blocks of life’ by using
ETC Group’s words). CSOs argued that this could raise fundamental ethical questions
(FoE 2003; Corporate Watch 2005). Corporate Watch examined ‘a gold rush to claim
patents at the nanoscale’, where 800 nano-related patents were granted in 2003
(Corporate Watch 2005). In its comments to the RS/RAEng consultation, GeneWatch
UK showed its concern that《if the scope of monopoly rights is too wide, fundamental
knowledge and basic techniques are patented, innovation will be stifled.》63 As the
report of Greenpeace UK put it,《‘nano’ can be viewed as a useful tag with which to
boost funding》(Arnall 2003, 60).
63 Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering Working Group on Nanotechnology: Comments from
GeneWatch UK. 2003
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CSOs showed concerns that if drove simply by industrial interests instead of real
societal needs, nanotechnologies may open new ownership and corporate
concentration. CSOs alarmed that this could bring huge economic as well as social
disruptive impacts to the poor or marginalized, for instance, the impacts on trade
commodities, displacement in terms of unemployment, farmers’ rights for free choices,
enlarged gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ (FoE, 2003; Arnall 2003; Corporate
Watch 2005; ITDG 2004).
C. Explaining European CSOs’ approaches: three factors
As discussed above, while the branches of supranational CSOs represented by
Greenpeace UK and FoE adopted cooperative stances towards nanotechnologies, local
CSOs rejected the invitation for a dialogue by the local government, developing
polarized stances towards nanotechnologies rapidly. This section seeks to figure out
the factors behind their divergences and preference for different approaches in
addressing nanotechnologies.
1. Novelty, broadness and complexity of nanotechnologies
During the early period, nanotechnologies are still in the infancy of the R&D
process. Faced with the novelty as well as the broadness of nanotechnologies’
potential applications, a learning process is necessarily required for all interested
stakeholders. They need to firstly acquire a basic understanding of the whole picture
and then to address this emerging technology.
According to the chief scientist of Greenpeace UK,《we wanted to ground our
view on a solid understanding of what such technologies are capable of...Greenpeace
sees no reason to consider nanotechnologies intrinsically harmful or damaging》(Parr
2003). Two years later, in 2005, Douglas Parr still held the view that《Greenpeace
believes that it is impossible to have a ‘view’ about nanotechnologies as a whole》
(Parr 2005). In an e-mail exchange, he shared his idea about a feasible approach to
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address such a broad issue:《those can be treated individually on their merits rather
than treating a heterogeneous set of applications (nanotech) as a single entity.》64
As a scholar put it, different from biotechnology or nuclear technology,
nanotechnologies, rather than a discrete technology, more represents ‘a way of
thinking or doing things’. This makes it particularly difficult to discuss potential risks
of nanotechnologies in general terms (Maynard 2006). Such a wide-encompassing
topic poses a challenge for not only CSOs, but also the EU policymakers. According
to an interviewed DG SANCO, it has taken a long time for different DGs of the
Commission to acquire basic understanding about nanotechnologies,
“I am an expert, I do not feel competent at all… It is an area of high complexity,
and very few people could really understand. I feel frustrated when I see some
CSOs just put things neatly in a package and try to solve the problems.”65
During the early period, several European CSOs star ted to identify
nanotechnolgies as an issue of concerns; however, most of them had not developed a
decisive stance towards this new topic. As ITDG put it,《the challenge for ITDG in
defining its position with respect to nanotechnologies is that we do not have a record
of work in the area... We need to draw on our strong intellectual and philosophical
traditions》(ITDG 2004,16). This situation renders it even less possible for CSOs to
bear in one mind and trigger another round of anti-nanotech campaign, as supposed
by some stakeholders (Taverne 2004).
2. Different outlooks and values of CSOs
CSOs adopt different approaches in addressing nanotechnologies out of their
different missions and values. Faced with a whole new field, CSOs turn to draw from
64 E-mail exchange with Dr. Doug Parr, senior scientist of Greenpeace UK, 21/05/2014
65 Interview with a DG SANCO, who is in charge of the working groups of the European Scientific Committee on
Emerging to develop risk assessment and methodologies and to develop potentially regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials, 17/06/2014
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existing experiences and capacities.《Conflicts and differences of political value and
on ethical questions are going to condense onto features of these technologies》66, and
also onto features of CSOs themselves.
Analyses begin with Greenpeace UK, a principal actor during early debates.
Established in 1971, Greenpeace is one of the most influential environmental
organizations all over the world. From environmental degradation to climate change,
from toxic pollution to nuclear technology, its campaign covers a wide range of topics
and generally focusing on EHS aspects. As Kellow (2000) puts it, the campaigns of
Greenpeace are strictly limited to environmental issues, factoring out other in the
green ideology connected topics like gender, racism or third-world. The argument of
its chief scientist also indicates the values and tradition of Greenpeace UK:《our
position is about scientific risks. Our kind of globally applicable standard is the
science of environmental risk. You can say that’s the basis of our campaign policy and
that’s where we’re coming from》(Robin Grove-White et al. 2004, 79).
In the case of nanotechnologies, Greenpeace UK holds on this tradition and
bases its position on scientific evidence and results from citizen deliberation, avoiding
stepping into value-based discussions. For example, in 2002, Greenpeace and New
Scientist magazine co-organized a series of four debates entitled Science, Technology
and the Future, which provided a platform for triggering public deliberation on issues
around emerging technologies67. Greenpeace UK indicated in its report that《most
contemporary experimental capabilities in this area are still in their infancy... It is
extremely difficult to foresee many outcomes that developments in this field will bring
over the next 10 years, let alone assess their likelihood》(Arnall 2003, 41), acting in a
balanced and cautious manner. To conclude, Greenpeace UK has to incorporate new
issues into its mission in addressing environmental problems.
66 Grove-White, Robin. 2002. “New Scientist and Greenpeace Science Debates.” May 14.
http://www.greenpeace.org.the UK/files/pdfs/migrated/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/4906.pdf
67http://www.greenpeace.org.UK/media/reports/new-scientist-and-greenpeace-science-debates-science-technology-
and-our-future-the-big-questions
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Well-established CSOs like Greenpeace have advantages including high
reputation, a wide membership base, and relatively abundant resources; however, it
may sometimes lack flexibility compared with smaller-scale CSOs. For example, the
establishment of GeneWatch in 1997 was partly in reaction to the perceptions that
Greenpeace was too slow to take up the GM issue (Robin Grove-White et al. 2004,
14). Reduced into a passive position, Greenpeace was then forced to respond to
mounting public unease concerning this topic. Scholars observe that environmental
CSOs like Greenpeace UK is keen to re-position itself regarding technological issues
after being seen as anti-technology in the GM debate (Pidgeon and Rogers-Hayden
2007). This is another factor in explaining Greenpeace UK’s balanced and mild
approach towards nanotechnologies.
Similar trend can be traced when we examine the dynamic of CSOs during the
early period: small-scale CSOs took up the issue of nanotechnologies quicker than the
well-established ones. Besides Greenpeace UK, other EU level CSOs like FoE Europe,
EEB, ETUC, etc., were rather slow in joining the debates. Instead of waiting until
more science-based evidence being investigated and proved, local activist groups
acted promptly and proactively when there was still possibility to make a difference
and influence the R&D process. As PMO put it,《there is pointless to groan. We must
act in time. It is now that we should take action.》68
Local activist groups developed their positions on the grounds of historical
experiences in dealing with precedent technologies and came up with a decisive
position rapidly. For example, opponents at Leeds, based on earlier experience in
dealing with genetic engineering and biotechnology, considered nanotechnologies as
《the newest weapon against diversity, rebellion, difference, autonomy and freedom.》
69 And they called for ‘drastic action’ to confront this newest weapon.
68 Original text:《rien ne sert de gémir, il faut agir à temps. C’est maintenant qu’il faut s’y employer》.
PMO(2003) AUJOURD'HUI LE NANOMONDE #1
69 http://www.indymedia.org.the UK/en/regions/leedsbradford/2004/11/301222.html
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Furthermore, local activist groups tended to associate the issue of emerging
technology with wider trend of capitalism and globalization. For example, as PMO
put it,《this mechanism of the ‘link between research and industry’ is under the belief
of capitalism, since Watt’s engine and the first industrial revolution》(PMO 2003) 70.
Nanotechnologies just act as another tool to enhance the control of the powerful over
the powerless.
3. Policymakers’ prompt anticipation helps creating positive interaction
space
As scholars put it, a common pattern in governing new technologies often goes
as: addressing hopeful promises and functional issues first, and sequentially
addressing broader aspects like regulations and societal embedding (Deutena, Ripa,
and Jelsma 1997). In the case of nanotechnologies, efforts have been made to do
things differently: a perceived ‘legitimation crisis’ and reinforced demands for
‘upstream public engagement’ have made the EU policymakers well recognize the
necessity to integrate societal consideration into the R&D process ‘as early as
possible’ (EC 2004; EC 2005). The prompt and anticipatory approach of the EU
regulatory authorities is another contributing factor in explaining the relatively calm,
balanced and cooperative approaches of well-established CSOs.
In the UK, the release of the report by the Royal Society is widely considered as
a watershed in the R&D process of nanotechnologies. This report adopted a
precautionary tone and attached great importance to social and ethical issues around
nanotechnologies. As Pidgeon put it,《a new understanding of science and society is
spreading through the work of the Royal Society》(Wilsdon and Willis, 15). Besides
NanoJury UK (2005) mentioned above, there were another three public engagement
projects initiated in 2006, including “People’s Inquiry on Nanotechnologies and the
Environment”, “Small Talk” and “Nanotechnologies, Risk and Sustainability”
70 Original text: 《ce mécanisme que la “liaison recherche-industrie” est une idée reçue du capitalisme, depuis la
machine de Watt et la première révolution industrielle》.
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( Doubleday 2007a). A scholar points out that nanotechnologies have elicited little
protest , because《potentially crit ical stakeholders were included in the
nanotechnologies debate at a very early stage》(Wullweber 2014). According to an
interviewed DG SANCO,《with the work in nano, in a sense, we have opened up rich
potential forms for better framing of the issue.》71. The forums, initiatives and policy
measures by the EU as well as Member States have shown policymakers’
determination and commitment to restoring public trust in science and technology and
to create a positive and dynamic communication space with civil society.
D. Conclusion
Before Bill Clinton’s announcement of the NNI, a R&D program of the U.S.
Government, nanotechnologies were more framed within the scientific field. Within
merely five years, nanotechnologies were transformed into a heated discussed topic in
the political battleground. According to Renzo Tomellini, head of unit for
nanosciences and nanotechnologies in the EC, with expectations and hopes, polemics
and fears, nanotechnologies have become “a bit of a show piece”72.
During this period, new players began to come to the scene and put the topic of
nanotechnologies onto their agenda, seeking to influence the trajectory of
nanotechnologies development. As ETC Group put it,《the barren policy landscape
around nanotech risks and issues has begun to take on features and shapes》(ETC
Group 2005b). It is interesting to see that stakeholder debates have not followed, but
preceded or accompanied formal policy decisions made by the European regulatory
authorities. Several factors (e.g. anti-nanotech campaign initiated by ETC Group;
engagement initiatives introduced by policymakers; the intervention of celebrities like
Prince Charles and Bill Joy) have helped improve the awareness of European
CSOs into the issue of nanotechnologies.
71 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
72 CORDIS News. 2003. “Supporting responsible nanotechnology research will benefit Europe's citizens, says
head of unit.” June 24. http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/20466_en.html
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CSOs who involved from the start are still in the minority. And most of them had
records of campaigns against GMOs. Given the ‘upstream’ nature of nanotechnology,
green activism remained relatively fragmentary and localized. CSOs have developed
uneven stances towards nanotechnologies: while well-established ones represented by
Greenpeace UK and FoE adopted a cooperative and expertise-based form of
involvement, local activist groups which came from France and the UK turned against
nanotechnologies rapidly. Between these poles stood an array of CSOs whose
approach was neither to promote nor to stop nanotechnologies. Considering
nanotechnologies are still in an embryonic stage, these CSOs believed that their
knowledge was not sufficient to develop a decisive position towards such a wide
issue.
According to Habermas,《the communicative structures of the public sphere
constitute a far-flung network of sensors that react to the pressure of society-wide
problems and stimulate influential opinions》(Habermas 1996, 300). It is of
importance to hold a dynamic view and keep evolving with the communication
process within the public spheres, and to identify key concerns and different frame of
reference of key actors. As mentioned above, the UK has been in a leading position in
addressing nano-related issues. And most CSOs emerged during the early period came
from the UK. However, subsequent chapters will demonstrate that this leading
position did not last for long. And the UK soon lost CSOs’ support.
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Chapter III: Capacity-building phase (2006-2009)
The capacity-building phase sees a multiplication of participatory exercises and
deliberation activities introduced at both Member State and the EU level (Laffite and
Joly 2008). Amidst these activities, CSOs have more opportunities to participate in the
policy-making process. And we can see an increasing number of CSOs began to put
the issue of nanotechnologies onto their agenda. These ‘new comers’ include
consumer associations (e.g. BEUC, ANEC, ECOS), worker unions (ETUC and ETUI),
environmental organizations (e.g. EEB, FoE Europe, CIEL, HEAL), etc. These are
also some CSOs which are based at Member State or regional level. As they have also
contributed to the policy debates at the EU level (e.g. Which? the UK; BUND,
Germany; MIO-ECSDE), their activities and input will also be taken into
consideration. This period is characterized by the burgeoning capacity and enhanced
professionalism of CSOs.
It is interesting to note that early actors of the precedent phase (e.g. Greenpeace
UK; PMO; GeneWatch UK) are mainly composed of the ‘spin-off’ campaigners of
anti-GMOs movement (Seifert and Plows 2014). By contrast, these relatively
‘late-comers’, which emerged on the scene during 2006 and 2009, do not necessarily
have similar records against GMOs. They seldom use confrontational strategies, while
preserve a critical position towards emerging technologies. When it comes to the case
of nano technologies , they st ick to a kind of exper t i s e -based fo rm of
involvement and seek to find out a solution together with other stakeholders.
Based on semi-structured interviews with EU level CSOs, they took up the topic
of nanotechnologies for different reasons: the invitation of regulatory authorities, the
fact that an increasing number of nano-products hitting the market place, the release
of scientific reports and policy documents, hearing from concerned scientists, etc. The
various motivations in part reveal the trend that the framing of debates around
nanotechnologies has started to step out of the shadows of GMOs and develop its own
distinctive feature.
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The rest of this chapter will be structured as follows: the first section introduces
the background that EU level CSOs started to put nanotechnologies on their agenda
between 2006 and 2009, outlining important events happened in the EU and
worldwide. The second section investigates the communication process of EU level
CSOs, which include: 1) how EU level CSOs enhanced their expertise (key activities);
2) the forming and evolution of their positions towards nanotechnologies (key
concerns); 3) the influences that CSOs have exerted on the policy-making process of
nanotechnologies (key results). Specific attention will be paid to the dynamics of
green activism during this phase, what the convergences and divergences are among
different stakeholders, and how precaution practices, as expressed in the ‘no data, no
market’ principle of REACH, facilitate the dialogue and cooperation between CSOs.
A. Background
Before turning to analyses of the dynamics of EU level CSOs along this line, it
is necessary to introduce some background information, especially the parallel
development of the policy toward nanotechnology in the world as well as in Europe
so as to set the stage for the work.
1. Nanotechnologies as a matter of policy concern
In March 2006, Germany saw what appeared to be the first recall of a
nanotechnology product: a number of consumers experienced serious respiratory
problems after using a bathroom cleaner called ‘Magic-Nano’ (see the media
coverage73). Even if it was later proved that the product didn’t, in fact, contain any
nanoparticle, FoE Australia74 and ETC Group75 used this opportunity to advocate
their concerns over the lack of regulation on nanomaterials. A scholar noted that the
73 The Economist. 2006. “Has all the magic gone? A nanotechnology product is recalled in Germany after health
concerns.” April 12. http://www.economist.com/node/6795430
Weiss, Rick. 2006. “Nanotech Product Recalled in Germany.” The Washington Post, April 6.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/05/AR2006040502149.html
74 FoEAustralia. 2006. “First ever nano product recall.” May 1.
http://emergingtech.foe.org.au/first-ever-nano-product-recall/
75 ETC Group. 2006. “Nanotech Product Recall Underscores Need for Nanotech Moratorium: Is the Magic
Gone?.” April 7. http://www.etcgroup.org/fr/node/14
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word ‘nano’ was no longer a hot marketing term in the eyes of some companies
(Gewin 2006). In early 2008, Soil Association, the largest organic certification body
of the UK, became the first organization in the world to ban man-made nanomaterials
from its certified organic products76.
Although the market withdrawal of Magic Nano and the ban of nanomaterials by
organic body have received some media attention, academic research indicated that
public awareness towards nanotechnologies was still low (Gaskell et al. 2005).
Scholars pointed out that Europeans considered nanotechnologies as useful and
morally acceptable, where the majority view was positive and without concern that
the technology was risky (Gaskell et al. 2006, 20).
Independent institutions were requested by the EU regulatory authorities to
provide scientific opinions. In 2006, SCENIHR provided its scientific opinion to the
Commission, suggesting that《current risk assessment methodologies require some
modification... in particular that existing toxicological and ecotoxicological methods
may not be sufficient to address all of the issues arising with nanoparticles》
(SCENIHR 2006, 4). In 2008, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
underlined that《it is extremely difficult to evaluate how safe or how dangerous
nanomaterials are because of our complete ignorance about so many aspects of their
fate and toxicology》(Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2008, 30). These
results have highlighted the situation marked by great uncertainty and gaps in the
scientific understanding of nanomaterials. A scholar showed concern about the
widening knowledge gap:《our understanding of the interaction of nanoscale objects
with living matter, even at the level of single cells, has not kept pace with the explosive
development of nanoscience in the past decades》(Klein 2007).
76 Smithers, Rebecca. 2008. “Soil Association bans nanomaterials from organic products.” The Guardian,
January 15. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/jan/15/organics.nanotechnology
７３
Meanwhile, scientific research has revealed some worrying results. An article
published in Nature demonstrated that some carbon nanotubes can cause precancerous
growths in the same way that asbestos does, suggesting《great caution before
introducing such products into the market if long-term harm is to be avoided》(Poland
et al. 2008). Nanotechnologists called for prompt government action to ensure that
carbon nanotubes to be properly regulated (Sanderson 2008). The Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution highlighted that《while any kind of blanket moratorium
does not seem appropriate, there may well be specific cases where it is necessary to
slow or even hold up the development while concerns are investigated》(Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution 2008, 8). Arie Rip, researcher of Twente
University, considered ‘slow innovation’ as a more sustainable approach to
developing new technologies, which could allow the society to make preparation for
technological innovations77.
Nanotechnologies, with its indeterminacy and tremendous prospects, open up a
new challenge for its governance within the EU. According to the observation of the
Wall Street Journal,《the debate over how the EU should regulate nanomaterials is
just beginning.》78 Against this backdrop, the Competent Authorities for REACH and
CLP (CARACAL) subgroup on nanomaterials, CASG Nano, was set up in 2008,
which brought together interested stakeholders to look at how REACH could be
worked for nanomaterials. EEB and ETUC act as observers within this group79. It is
reported that the EU policymakers, competent authorities of Member States, CSOs,
and industry stakeholders have been “on a steep learning curve” to pick up knowledge
regarding nanomaterials and REACH80.
77 EurActiv. 2009. “Nanotech at risk of repeating ‘GM food fiasco’.” September 29
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/nanotech-risk-repeating-gm-food-news-222615
78 Dalton, Matthew. 2008. “Nanotechnology experts are calling for declare the use of carbon nanotubes.” The Wall
Street Journal, May 29. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121201044102027389
79 http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2385
80 Chemical Watch. 2008. “REACH authorities mull options for nanotechnology.” December 03.
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The EC conducted the first regulatory review on nanomaterials, noting that
《current legislation covers to a large extent risks in relation to nanomaterials and
that risks can be dealt with under the current legislative framework... needs mostly to
be enhanced by improving implementation of current legislation》(EC 2008e). It later
released A code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies
Research, a soft law instrument with non-binding feature (EC 2008a). Seven general
principles—meaning, sustainability, precaution, inclusiveness, excellence, innovation
and accountability— were offered to guide the actions of relevant stakeholders.
Voluntary measures are welcomed by CSOs, but considered as with limit
effectiveness.
The conclusion of the Commission regarding the adequacy of existing regulation
was questioned by CSOs as well as the EP. An interviewed policy officer of ANEC
commented the review as《of poor quality… not a sound and proper assessment》81.
Green MEP Carl Schlyter, the rapporteur of the EP’s 2009 resolution, pointed out that
the current rules were about as effective as trying to “catch plankton with a cod
fishing net”. He further suggested that good regulation could not only better protect
the environment and mankind but also provide certainty and predictability to
economic operators (Schlyter 2009). Improving the implementation of existent
legislation, as proposed by the EC, was considered insufficient and unsatisfying. The
EC was under growing pressure to revise and adapt existent laws to incorporate the
particular features of nanomaterials.
2. From ‘science and society’ to ‘science in society’
Science has long been being viewed as a system which enjoys autonomy and
authority. Habermas observes a trend of ‘scientism’:《we can no longer understand
science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with
science》(Habermas 1971, 4). However, with a series of safety scandals such as
asbestos, mad cow disease, and heated debates around nuclear technologies, GMOs,
81 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
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the previous authority that science enjoyed has been weakened significantly. The EC
White Paper on Governance singled out for explicit mention that《the advent of
biotechnologies is highlighting the unprecedented moral and ethical issues thrown up
by technology》(EC 2001). A growing literature has suggested that scientific expertise
is facing a problem of legitimacy (Lovbrand, Pielke, and Beck 2010).
According to an interviewed DG SANCO,《the public no longer has faith on
science as they used to have. This shift of culture is very strong.》82 Under this
situation,《the constitutional scheme for regulating access to normative reasons
acquires a sharper profile… characterized by a consciousness of crisis, a heightened
public attention, an intensified search for solutions, in short, by problematization》
(Habermas 1996, 357). One manifestation of the “consciousness of crisis” is the
European regulatory bodies’ determination to involve the civil society and foster
public trust in science and technology and its governance. A series of engagement
programs and projects have been introduced in this regard.
Take the funding programme for example. The EU initiated the Science and
Society Work Programme under FP6 (2002-2006), with 88 million euro allocated.
This programme continued to be funded under FP7 (2007 and 2013), with the budget
quadrupled. It is interesting to note that the project’s name turned into the Science in
Society Work Programme. From ‘Science and Society’ to ‘Science in Society’, this
slight change signals a shift in mindset regarding the science-society relationship,
which is resulted from an accelerated learning process. Science is to less extent
regarded as autonomous, but an integral part of the society. José Manuel Silva
Rodríguez, a DG Research of the Commission, argued that《clear messages have
emerged, confirming that the shift... requires a transformation of the way research and
research-based policies are developed》(Stirling 2006).
82 Interview with a DG SANCO, who is in charge of the working groups of the European Scientific Committee on
Emerging to develop risk assessment and methodologies and to develop potentially regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials,17/06/2014
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Nanotechnologies have received substantial amount of funding from FP6 and
FP7 projects. Between 2001 and 2012, the Commission has spent around €19 million
to fund projects related to ELSA and governance aspects of nanotechnologies
(Hullmann 2008). Among these projects, the capacity building programmes for CSOs
are worth noting, which include: ‘NanoCap’83, to improve the understanding of
worker unions as well as environmental CSOs towards nanotechnologies;
‘DEEPEN’84, to develop methodological tools for engaging the civil society;
‘NANOPLAT’85, to offer a platform for deliberative processes on nanotechnologies;
‘CONSIDER’86, to investigate CSOs’ involvement in EU-funded research;
‘NanoDiode’87, to combine ‘upstream’ public engagement with ‘midstream’ and
‘downstream’ strategies for communication, outreach, education and training, just
name a few.
The findings of a meeting organized by the Rathenau Institute revealed that
participation by the CSOs cannot be taken for granted; and some encouragement was
required (Hanssen, Walhout, and Est 2008). The coordinator of NanoCap project, a
CSO capacity-building project, also noted that CSOs were not motivated to have
nanotechnology as a topic for deliberation as there was nothing at stake for them
(Krabbenborg 2015). NanoCap project is particularly notable, as it contributed to the
direct involvement of CSOs in nanotech debates. Funded under FP6, NanoCap has
supported various working conferences, position discussions, workplace visits, etc.88
Five environmental CSOs89 and five worker unions90, with the technical input of five
academic institutions, have participated and developed their position paper on
nanotechnology. A programme officer of MIO-ECSDE, a participant CSO, introduced
the background under which NanoCap Project was initiated,
83 http://www.nanocap.eu/Flex/Site/Page4662.html?PageID=%26Lang=
84 Deepening Ethical Engagement and Participation in Emerging Nanotechnologies (DEEPEN)
https://www.dur.ac.the UK/geography/research/research_projects/?mode=project&id=241
85 http://www.nanoplat.org/
86 http://www.consider-project.eu/
87 http://www.nanodiode.eu/
88 http://www.nanocap.eu/Flex/Site/Page4662.html?PageID=%26Lang
89 They are: Baltic Environmental Forum, EEB, LEGAMBIENTE, MIO-ECSDE and Natuur en Milieu
90 They are: FNV, EUTC, Kooperationsstelle Hamburg, AMICUS and PPM
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“they realized that the progress made in the nanotechnologies sector was very
fast, and EU level CSOs were less developed and informed in order to keep up
with the developments.”91
NanoCap Project, by bringing ten CSOs together, actually laid the foundation for
their future concerted efforts. This interviewee continued by arguing that《things are
quite advanced. CSOs became more organized when they came to address this issue...
It was a learning process for every stakeholder who has participated in the project.》92
It was through the NanoCap Project that major EU level CSOs (represented by EEB
and ETUC) started to deal with nanotechnologies. They started to play an increasingly
important role in subsequent policy debates.
The Commission has also initiated a Communication Roadmap of nanotech,
promoting ‘a new communication model’, which was supposed to shift from “public
understanding of science” towards “scientific understanding of the public”. This
report also acknowledges that《the responsibilities conventionally entrusted to science
are currently being re-examined》(EC 2010a, 33). As observed by Krabbenborg, in the
case of nanotechnologies,《spaces for interaction are organized proactively at an early
stage of the development》(Krabbenborg 2013, 11).
These engagements and capacity-building activities could bring direct as well as
indirect impacts on regulatory debates on nanotechnologies. For example, as an
interviewee put it,《a lot of people who participated in the NanoCap project continued
to be active in the policy debates. They met frequently with CSOs.》93 For example, we
can see that Carl Schlyter, the rapporteur of the Parliament’s 2009 resolution, also
attended the NanoCap final conference94. He used CSOs’ reports (Azoulay 2012) as
instruments in supporting his own position with regard to the shortcomings of
91 Interview with Dr. Thomais Vlachogianni, Programme Officer of MIO-ECSDE, 02/12/2014
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Final conference of NanoCap Program
http://www.nanocap.eu/Flex/Site/Page533b.html?PageID=15409
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REACH in covering nanomaterials95.
Not only regulatory bodies, but also industries seek to develop cooperation with
civil society and the wider public. For example, collaboration was established
between a green NGO (Environmental Defense) and a large industrial group
(chemical company DuPont), which have jointly released a ‘Nano Risk Framework’
to address the potential risks of nanomaterials96. While David Byrne, the former EU
commissioner for health and consumer protection, considered this cooperation as
“moving in the right direction”; a coalition of CSOs claimed that this project was
‘fundamentally flawed’. In a open letter, twenty CSOs, which include ETC Group,
FoE, Greenpeace, Corporate Watch, etc., jointly claimed that such an industry-CSO
cooperation was just a “public relations campaign”, in which《broad public
participation in government oversight of nanotech policy is usurped by industry and
its allies.》97
As a scholar puts it,《social and ethical concerns have become an obligatory
footnote to nanotechnology’s technological promise》(Stilgoe 2007, 16). All of the
above-mentioned efforts have demonstrated the determination of policymakers and
industries to deal with the legitimation problems and to foster public trust in the
governance of emerging technologies.
3. Worldwide CSOs established a coalition to address nanomaterials
In early 2007, an international coalition of nearly 70 CSOs, spanning six
continents, released a joint declaration on Principles for the Oversight of
Nanotechnologies and Nanomaterials. Eight principles were highlighted (Nanoaction
2007), which included:
95 Carl Schlyter. 2012. “Second regulatory review of nanomaterials. To Mr. J.Potočnik.” European Parliament.
96 EurActiv. 2007. “Former foes join forces to assess nanotech risks.” June 29.
http://www.euractiv.com/science/foes-join-forces-assess-nanotech-risks/article-164991
97 CSOs Joint letter. 2007. “Civil Society-Labor Coalition Rejects Fundamentally Flawed DuPont-ED Proposed
Framework.” April 12.
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/610/01/coalition_letter_april07.pdf
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I. A Precautionary Foundation
II. Mandatory Nano-specific Regulations
III. Health and Safety of the Public and Workers
IV. Environmental Protection
V. Transparency
VI. Public Participation
VII. Inclusion of Broader Impacts
VIII. Manufacturer Liability
Among them, less than ten CSOs (e.g.Vivagora, France; BUND, Germany) came
from the EU. The mobilization of European CSOs was still weak when the declaration
was released. Taking FoE as an example: the engagement of FoE Australia and U.S.
was much more active than those located in the EU. It is of necessity to introduce
some activities of supranational CSOs here, which act as the context of EU level
CSOs’ engagement.
FoE Australia has been involved in nanotech debates since 2006, with a series of
independent reports released. The cosmetic field was the earliest area on which FoE
Australia focused: in a 32-page report, FoE Australia analyzed 116 cosmetics,
personal care products and sunscreens that incorporated nanomaterials, which were
assumed to pose serious toxicity concerns. For example, as FoE Australia put it,
《nanoparticles of titanium dioxide and zinc oxide...are photoactive, producing free
radicals and causing DNA damage to human skin cells when exposed to UV light》
(Miller 2006b) . It suggested that specific attention should be paid to possible
penetration of nanoparticles through broken skin (Miller 2006a). In another report
published at the same year, FoE Australia considered nanotechnologies as a
‘technological tsunami’ which may bring disruptive impacts on society, including
nano-divide between rich and poor, an elite minority of nano-enhanced humans,
threats on the labor markets and global trade (Miller and Senjen 2006). Apart from
publishing reports, FoE Australia also ignited campaigns in advocating a moratorium
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on nanotechnologies. For example, it called on Samsung to recall its ‘Nano Silver’
rang (e.g. washing machine, refrigerator) from sale in Australia98. BUND is another
early player which has published a position paper on nanotechnologies. It actively
dealt with this topic at national and the EU level, hoping to《contribute to the
development of a common European policy of Friends of the Earth on this issue》
(BUND 2007).
ETC Group, a principal actor during the previous period, continued its
eye-catching campaigns. It used novel methods to attract attention and to advocate its
calling for a moratorium on nanotechnologies. In September 2006, ETC Group
launched an ‘International Nano-hazard Symbol Design Competition’, which attracted
482 designs from 24 countries99. Media groups have also reported this event100. CIEL
appraised the ‘forward-looking’ approach of ETC Group. It decided to put the topic of
nanotechnology onto their agenda given the fact that《nanotechnologies have been
under the radar of some CSOs.》101 According to a report of the Rathenau Institute, for
most Dutch CSOs,《their attention was drawn to nanotechnologies through
attendance at international conferences and/or contacts with international partners
and sister organizations》(Hanssen et al. 2008). Scholars argue that trans-national
nanowatch campaigners actually play a role of ‘intellectual vanguard’ (Seifert and
Plows 2014).
4. The dual influence of REACH on CSOs’ approaches towards nano
The regulatory issues of nanomaterials arose precisely at the time when
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)–the
98 FoEAustralia. 2007. “FoE calls for Samsung ‘Nano Silver’ washing machine recall in face of growing risk
concerns.” February 26. http://emergingtech.foe.org.au/162/
99 ETC Group. 2007. “Winners of Nano-Hazard Symbol Contest: Announced at World Social Forum, Nairobi,
Kenya”. News Release, January 24.
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/604/02/wsffinalcontestjan24_07.pdf
100 Weiss, Rick. 2007. “Signs Done on Speck”. Washington Post, January 21.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/20/AR2007012001565.html
101 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
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flagship chemicals policy of the EU— was in the process of being shaped and adopted.
‘Timing’ is an important factor that should be taken into consideration so as to track
the dynamics of green activism at the EU level.
From the Informal Environment Council in Chester (April 1998) where concerns
were raised over chemical legislation in Europe, to 1st June, 2007 when REACH
finally entered into force, this far-reaching chemical legislation has taken a long time
to develop. The drafting, shaping and final adoption of REACH has triggered one of
the most fierce lobbying battles in the EU. During the public consultation, the
Commission had received more than 6,400 contributions from those of governments,
regulatory authorities, CSOs, industries, scientists, etc.102 Guido Sacconi, the former
rapporteur on REACH, claimed that《unbelievable pressure was brought to bear on
MEPs by big businesses.》103
During this ‘lobbying battle’, most well-established CSOs had involved and
launched campaigns, e.g. WWF’s DetoX campaign104, FoE’s Safer Chemicals
Campaign105. ‘Chemical Reaction’, a new and single issue organization, was
established by three CSOs (Greenpeace, FoE, and EEB), which have joined their
forces together and worked closely and extensively in influencing the process of
REACH (Coen and Richardson 2009). Tony Musu, ETUC chemicals advisor,
highlighted that《alliances with Environmental and Consumers NGOs are key.》106 A
scholar argues that CSOs, the strongest supporters of a radical change in chemicals
policy, have played a crucial countervailing power to the chemicals industries
(Pesendorfer 2006). However, it is worth noting that the topic of nanomaterials was
only mentioned and addressed by these CSOs occasionally. For example, ‘Chemical
102http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/documents/reach/archives/consultation/contributions/index_en.h
tm
103 BBC News. 2005. “Euro MEPs back major chemicals law.” November 17
http://news.bbc.co.the UK/2/hi/europe/4444550.stm
104 WWF. 2007. “DetoX: Campaigning for safer chemicals.”
http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/detox___campaigning_for_safer_chemicals.pdf
105 http://www.foe.co.the UK/sites/default/files/downloads/cyw_24_chemical_generation.pdf
106 ETUI. 2013. “How to monitor and influence the EU decision-making process from a trade union perspective: A
guide for trade unions.” https://www.etui.org/content/download/11471/96669/file/manualEtui-V4.6-WEB.pdf
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Reaction’ expressed its concerns over the potentially adverse effects of nanoparticles,
proposing regarding nanomaterials as new substances and adjust REACH threshold
quantity (Chemical Reaction 2007, 32). WWF also showed concerns that
nanomaterials, produced in low volumes, may not be adequately covered by REACH
and proposed a ‘simple registration’ for nanomaterials 107. For these CSOs,
nanomaterial was an appendage and extension of existing work on REACH and far
from an independent issue of concerns.
The final adoption of REACH was considered as a victory of the alliance of
green policy advocates (Selin 2007). This dissertation suggests that the green
advocacy coalition formed during former negotiations on REACH continued to
influence the trajectory of nanomaterials in Europe. For example, an interviewed
Dutch regulatory authority introduced how Member States continued their joint
efforts in dealing with regulatory issues of nanomaterials,《we used the good network
that we have established on the REACH dossier for this action... We hope our actions
could help finding a solution.》108 Some CSOs, encouraged by their earlier gains in
REACH debates, continued to use their experiences and expertise into the case of
nanomaterials. Joint actions led by CSOs were largely resulted from their
convergence of interests in chemical issues. According to an interviewee who has
working experiences in both EEB and ETUC,《we found that the views were generally
the same, so we continued to work together very closely…That was something built on
the joint efforts that were made in working on REACH.》109 The actors who addressed
chemicals issues continued to actively address nanomaterials110.
107 WWF. 2004. “The REACH Files: a policy guide.” http://assets.panda.org/downloads/reachfilespolicyguide.pdf
108 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
109 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
110 E.g. Aïda Ponce of ETUI, Tatiana SANTOS of EEB, Vito Buonsante of ClientEarth, David Azoulay of CIEL,
Franz Fiala of ANEC.
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On the other hand, the considerable efforts and resources put into REACH
debates gave rise to a feeling of fatigue among some CSOs. An interviewee observed
that,
“nanomaterials came more towards the end of all of the work was being done to
agree the REACH legislation ... A lot of people who were working on chemicals
at the time stopped then. When you have a piece of legislation you say ‘OK my
work is finished’. And now we want to move on other issues... I feel that the
lobbying is there, but it was not as strong as it was when it was on chemicals
generally under REACH.”111
An interviewed policy officer of ClientEarth had similar remark, adding that the
decision to move on to other priorities was dependent not only on CSOs themselves
but also on the decisions of the funders112. Under this context, some CSOs chose to
retreat from this field and turned to address other issues. This contradictory duality—
earlier experiences in addressing REACH are both enabling and restrictive at the same
time—helps shape the specific features of EU-level CSOs that are concerned
with nanotechnology issues.
B. Approaching the communication process of EU level CSOs
The complex and technical nature of nanotechnologies requires some knowledge
and expertise in order to provide constructive input to debates. As we discussed in
Chapter II, there were only a few European CSOs which addressed the topic of
nanotechnologies during the early period. This situation started to change with the
launch of NanoCap Capacity Building Project as well as the shift of policy
development of nanotechnologies in the EU.
111 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
112 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
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Since the NanoCap Project , EEB and ETUC have begun to deal with
nanotechnologies. They coordinated the activities of environmental organizations and
worker unions at the EU level respectively. An interviewee of ETUI introduced the
context in which they started to show interest in nanotechnologies,
“the idea of ‘no data, no market’, which was not being respected with
nanomaterials, made it an interesting issue to follow. At the same time, we could
not identify some very fundamental risk management and risk assessment issues,
such as hazard and exposure. It was an interesting regulatory issue as well from
that perspective.”113
The engagement of CSOs is worth studying. Firstly, they deal with “questions of
general interest”, which bring them higher reputation and trustworthiness compared
with other stakeholders. Furthermore, CSOs possess wide base and close access to the
general public. For example, The ETUC comprises 85 national organizations from 36
countries. EEB, the largest federation of environmental organizations of Europe, has
more than 140 member organizations from 31 countries with a membership base of
more than 15 million individuals /households114. The following section will examine
the communication process of EU level CSOs, presenting their key activities, key
concerns as well as key results concerning nanotechnologies.
1. Key activities
According to Habermas,《the communication structures of the public sphere are
linked with the private life spheres in a way that gives the civil-social periphery, in
contrast to the political center, the advantage of greater sensitivity in detecting and
identifying new problem situations》(Habermas 1996, 381). CSOs, dedicated to
safeguarding ‘general interests’, have carried out wide-ranging activities to raise
public awareness, promote dialogue and transmit societal concerns into the
113 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
114 EEBWebsite: http://www.eeb.org/
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policy-making process of nanotechnologies.
EEB, for example, set up a new working group on nanomaterials at the
beginning of 2007. Since then, it has incorporated nano-related issues into its annual
report. Between 2009 and 2010, EEB had published a series of reports addressing
topics that range from the health, safety and environmental aspects to governance
issues of nanotechnologies. These reports served as capacity building tools to
empower its member organizations and other CSOs (Senjen 2009a, 2009b, 2009c;
Fedrigo and Senjen 2010). Consumer unions conducted independent surveys in order
to better inform and protect consumers. For example, the UK consumer association
Which? conducted a citizen panel to explore consumer perception and understanding
of nanotechnologies. The results revealed a low level of public awareness towards
nanotechnologies: six in ten adults had not heard of the term ‘nanotechnologies’
(Which? 2008a). Worker unions paid a specific focus towards the safety and health
issues of workers. FNV, federation of unions in the Netherlands and participant of
NanoCap project, formulated a 17-page manual for the safe handling of nanomaterials
for workers115.
Apart from publishing reports, some CSOs have created nano-specific websites
to provide background information and knowledge regarding nanoscience and
nanotechnologies. For example, based on what they have gained through NanoCap
project, Mediterranean CSOs created the website Nanovirtualium116, providing the
latest information on nanotechnologies in eight languages. French CSO Vivagora
established the Citizens Alliance on Nanotechnology Issues (L’Alliance citoyenne sur
les Enjeux des nanotechnologies) in early 2009. One of its objectives was to enhance
the capacity-building of CSOs117.
115http://www.fnv.nl/site/nieuws/webassistent/h.hubregtse/wereldprimeur_handleiding_nanodeeltjes/handleiding_o
mgaan_met_nanodeeltjes.pdf
116 www.mio-ecsde.org/_uploaded_files/nanovirtualium/
117 http://veillenanos.fr/wakka.php?wiki=PagePrincipale
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A number of CSOs (BUND 2007; Greenpeace 2007; HEAL 2008; ETUC 2008;
EEB 2009; MIO-ESCDE 2009; FNV 2009; ANEC&BEUC 2009; Legambiente 2009;
BEF 2009; AMICUS 2009) have developed their posit ion paper towards
nanotechnologies. These CSOs had been actively following and contributing to the
policy consultation and deliberation during the capacity-building phase. Coalitions
among CSOs can be examined: for example, in the Netherlands, WECF,
Milieudefensie and Stichting Natuur en Milieu decided to work together on
nanotechnologies since May 2008118. Under the coordination of Baltic Environmental
Forum (BEF), a participant of NanoCap project, a coalition of Lithuanian
environmental CSOs joined their efforts and published their position paper on
nanotechnologies (BEF 2009).
CSOs also attended or organized workshops and seminars, with some specific
questions being explored deeply. Instead of holding a decisive position towards
nanotechnologies in general, some CSOs like Practical Action focused on specific
applications or products enabled by nanotechnologies. For example, focusing on
water problems of the South, Practical Action sought to find answers to the question
with regard to whether nanotechnologies could bring real benefits in the provision of
potable water for the poor. Centered on this question, Practical Action has organized
several workshops in Zimbabwe and Peru, engaging local groups as well as scientists
from both the North and South into debates. FoE Europe published two reports in
2008 and 2010, dealing with the topic of food and agriculture, and climate and energy
respectively.
Activist groups continued to do campaigns against nanotechnologies by using
confrontational methods. On 1st June, 2006, more than 1000 people (800 people
according to the police) went to the streets of Grenoble, opposing the inauguration of
118 WECF. 2008. “Dutch NGOs keep sharp eye on nanotechnology developments”. May 12.
http://www.wecf.eu/english/articles/2008/06/nanotechnologie-netherlands.php
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Minatec and ‘the totalitarian nanoworld’ 119. The demonstration against nanotech
was reported to be the largest scale of this kind worldwide120. A provisional activist
group Opposition Grenobloise aux Nécrotechnologies was established. It has
organized about 50 activities in preparation for direct action at the national level.
Their activities included film projection, workshops, meetings, salons, etc., and they
were held in tens of cities in France, Italy and the Switzerland121.
It is also noteworthy that other CSOs like CIEL have started to ‘watch’
nanotechnologies. An interviewee introduced the context in which they decided to
address the issue,
“the idea was that nanotechnology was early enough in the development
process, which could be used as a case to study how new technology can be
integrated into society and regulated… The interest started in 2007 and 2008, but
it took some time to find necessary funding so as to start working on this.”122
To conclude, CSOs have developed wide-ranging activities (e.g. position papers,
publications, workshops, direct actions) so as to make the regulatory authorities more
‘sensitive’ to public concerns from the bottom up. Through these activities, CSOs
have developed more expertise and know-how in dealing with nanomaterials. And
these wide-ranging activities have also contributed to the increased the visibility of
CSOs’ key concerns.
119 Le Figaro. 2006. “Manifestation contre les «nécrotechnologies» .” June 02.
http://www.lefigaro.fr/sciences/2006/06/02/01008-20060602ARTFIG90204-manifestation_contre_les_necrotechno
logies.php
120 Quiret, Matthieu. 2006. Les nanotechnologies déjà condamnées? Les ECHOS, November 14.
http://www.lesechos.fr/14/11/2006/LesEchos/19793-068-ECH_les-nanotechnologies-deja-condamnees--.htm
121 http://heberg.ironie.org/ogn/ogn.ouvaton.org/calendrier.html
122 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
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2. Key concerns: both wider and narrower
Comparing with the previous period (2000-2005), the concerns that EU level
CSOs have raised during the capacity-building phase (2006-2009) were both wider
and narrower: on the one hand, CSOs tried to go beyond the traditional ‘benefits
versus risks’ framing, reflecting wider deliberation of the public dimensions of
nanotechnologies (Miller and Scrinis 2010); on the other hand, with capacity and
professionalism strengthened, CSOs were able to deal with narrower questions with
regard to the regulatory aspects of nanotechnologies, which always required
technological knowledge basis.
As Habermas puts it,《civil society has the opportunity of mobilizing
counterknowledge and drawing on the pertinent forms of expertise to make its own
translation》(Habermas 1996, 372). The present section deals in particular with the
question regarding how CSOs develop their counterknowledge and propose
alternative framing of issues around nanotechnologies.
2.1. Going beyond ‘benefits versus risks’ framing: wider concerns of CSOs
As an enabling or platform technology, nanotechnologies are assumed to bring
transformative impact to the society. How are nanotechnologies going to be deployed?
To what ends? Who controls it? Will the benefits be enjoyed by the rich and the poor
equally? The implications of nanotechnologies go far beyond the traditional ‘benefits
versus risks’ framing. Given the immaturity of nanotechnologies, CSOs endeavor
to seize the opportunity to bring more fundamental questions onto the table.
CSOs’ first concern is whether nanotechnologies could bring real benefits driven
by societal demands. Portrayed as the next technological revolution, nanotechnologies
bear potentials to bring fantastic futuristic applications: better energy storage
capability, great potential of coping with water crisis or reducing ecological footprint,
scientific breakthroughs concerning medical diagnosis, etc. However, faced with these
‘déjà vu’ promises, CSOs, with reserved enthusiasm, act in a suspicious manner.
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CSOs questioned the motives that drive the R&D of nanotechnologies (Fedrigo
and Senjen 2010; BEF 2009; MIO-ECSDE 2009). CSOs argued that the driving force
for nanotechnological innovation was ‘competitiveness’ or ‘marketability’ rather than
real societal needs. CSOs noted that nanotechnologies should provide real solutions to
more pressing problems, while many products or applications (e.g. self-cleaning
windows, odourless socks, nano-enhanced tennis racquet) were of ‘accessory’ nature,
serving merely short-term economic purpose (MIO-ECSDE 2009). A coalition of
Lithuanian CSOs adopted a tough stance, demanding that《no further market
introduction should be allowed in case of nonessential nanoproducts》(BEF 2009).
EEB proposed that societal engagement and participation should act as a starting point
for identifying real societal preferences in developing nanotechnologies (Fedrigo and
Senjen 2010).
Furthermore, the claimed benefits or promises that nanotechnologies could bring
also come under close scrutiny. Mindful of past ‘miracle’ technologies, ETUC
claimed that《putat ive benef i ts to socie ty cannot legi t imate the use of
nanotechnologies outside of all democratic control.》123 EEB examined several hot
potential applications of nanotechnologies (environmental remediation, waste
management, water treatment, etc.), identifying the commercial availability,
technological feasibility, actual benefits and EHS issues in each area. It concluded that
many solutions were still in the pilot stage or were being tested in the field and the
benefits may be years away (Senjen 2009b). In a joint report, International POPs
Elimination Network (IPEN) and EEB questioned the mismatch between claims and
reality: while benefits claimed were often over-promised and under-delivered, the
‘downsides’ to nanotechnologies were rarely acknowledged. These ‘downsides’
included greater energy demands, potentially generation of toxic waste, and the
eco-toxic behavior of many nanoparticles (IPEN and EEB 2009). EEB warned that
《deep skepticism or even a severe public backlash can be expected when it becomes
123 ETUC. 2009. “Why there must be a public debate on nanos.”Special report 30/30
https://www.etui.org/content/download/1034/9551/file/HESAmag_1_THE UK_41.pdf
９０
clear that many of those predictions are unrealistic》(Fedrigo and Senjen 2010).
During a workshop organized by Practical Action, a tentative conclusion was agreed
by the Zimbabwean community groups and scientists that《there is no real water
quality issue that cannot be solved with existing technologies》(Grimshaw, Stilgoe,
and Gudza 2006, 3).
FoE Europe paid specific focus on the issue of food and agriculture, arguing that
nanotechnologies may cause more problems that it could solve: it may entrench
reliance on chemical and fossil fuel intensive industrial agriculture, intensify existing
trends towards ever larger scale farming operations; It could also lead to a higher
overall ecological footprint due to the expansion of nanotechnologies in food
processing and packaging (FoE 2008).
Another broad set of CSOs’ concerns was about possible exacerbating of existing
inequalities between the South and the North (FoE Europe 2008; Greenpeace 2007;
IPEN and EEB 2009). FoE Europe pointed out that nanotechnologies did nothing to
redress the root cause of existing inequities in global food distribution. EEB and IPEN
had similar concerns: the deployment of nano-water treatment technologies may
increase the market access of private, profit-driven companies. Practical Action
demanded《a comprehensive capture of the complexity and inter-related issues in
relation to the presenting problem》(Grimshaw, Stilgoe, and Gudza 2006, 18),
proposing a collaborative approach and knowledge sharing with the local community.
CSOs also pointed out that developing countries should not act as a potential dumping
ground for nano waste or as an easy, not strictly regulated market124.
Lastly, some CSOs showed concerns about specific issues of nanotechnologies
according to their expertise and advocacy history. For example, Cooperate Watch
focused on monopolistic patents at the nanoscale and corporate concentration; CSOs
124 Hontelez, John . 2010. “Positions and perspectives of Environmental NGOs on Nanotechnologies and
Nanomaterials”. EEB, NanoCap Final Conference, April 2.
http://www.nanocap.eu/Flex/Site/Download74be.pdf?ID=4117
９１
that worked on animal welfare issues (e.g. the Dutch Society for the Replacement of
Animal Testing; Dr Hadwen Trust For Humane Research) actively advocated
non-animal testing in developing nanotechnologies125.
2.2. Narrower concerns: regulatory aspects of nanotechnologies
As Habermas puts it,《the structures of a vibrant civil society and an unsubverted
political public sphere must bear a good portion of the normative expectations,
especially the burden of a normatively expected democratic genesis of law》
(Habermas 1996, 461). Through various capacity-building projects, activities,
communication as well as exchange with other stakeholders, CSOs have gained more
knowledge and deeper understanding about nanotechnologies. They started to
contribute to discussions about more concrete questions, i.e. the regulatory aspects of
nanotechnologies.
During this period, a good number of CSOs have published their position paper
towards nanotechnologies, seeking to not only advocate the precautionary principle,
but also operationalize it to guide current practices. As a scholar puts it,《between
2003 and around 2007, there was a notable shift in the debate on nanotechnologies
safety away from the question of whether to apply precaution amidst uncertainty
towards the question of how best to reduce uncertainty, including through regulatory
means》(Jaspers 2012). Table 4 summarizes CSOs’ demands with regard to the
regulatory aspects of nanomaterials.
125 Submissions Scientific Hearing on Nanotechnology
http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/nano_submissions.pdf
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Table 4. Proposals of CSOs in regulating nanomaterials
EEB Lega
mbie
nte
MIO
-EC
SDE
B
E
F
E
T
U
C
AMI
CUS
B
U
N
D
F
N
V
H
E
A
L
Precaution
principle
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Nano specific
regulation
√ √
Mandatory
labeling
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Notification
and registry
√ √ √ √ √
Research
funds
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Nano
definition
√ √ √ √
Amendment
of
REACH
√ √ √ √ √
Public
participation
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Partial
moratorium
√ √
Restriction of
market
introduction
√ √ √
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3. Evolution of CSOs’ strategies and position
This dissertation argues that it is of great importance to bear a dynamic view
towards the roles that CSOs play in the debates around nanotechnologies. The
influences that CSOs exert on the policy process of nanotechnologies are evolving,
and their stances are also in constant change. Instead of finding a fixed conclusion, the
present research focuses more on the evolution of CSOs’ strategies and positions,
examining what factors may contribute or limit their roles in influencing the
policy-making process of nanotechnologies.
Close communication and exchange with scientists and regulators has helped
triggering a learning process within CSOs. With a number of new scientific findings
and policy development, CSOs also upgrade their position towards nanotechnologies.
A scholar examines the case of Swiss and the Netherlands, demonstrating that in both
of the countries, 《 increasing involvement of unions and consumer associations
partially offsets the weak mobilization of large NGOs》 (Bullich 2009, 13). Literature
based on analysis at a local or national level is well-documented (Seifert and Plows
2014; Laurent 2007; Bullich 2009). This dissertation seeks to investigate the features
of green activism at the EU level. It appears that the positions and strategies of
environmental organizations (represented by EEB, CIEL), worker unions (ETUC,
ETUI) as well as consumer associations (BEUC, ANEC, ECOS) are in continuing
flux. Here the case of ETUC is utilized to show how CSOs adapt their approaches to
keep pace with the latest development of nanotechnologies.
ETUC published two resolutions in August 2008 and December 2010
respectively. In the first report, ETUC described nanotechnologies as ‘driver of the
next industrial revolution’; and two years later, it added another term to describe
nanotechnologies: ‘a paradigm shift’. After analyzing the two resolutions as well as
other reports, meeting records, news releases, contribution to public consultation, etc.,
we could see the evolution of ETUC’s position towards nanotechnologies, which
could be illustrated from following three aspects:
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First of all, ETUC enlarged the scope of concern from human health, safety and
environmental aspects to include wider societal dimension. As Joël Decaillon, the
confederal secretary of ETUC, put it,《 after the asbestos scandal, ETUC finds it
unacceptable that products should now be manufactured without their potential
effects on human health and the environment being known》 (ETUC 2008). An
interviewed policy officer introduced the background under which ETUC started to
deal with the issue of nanomaterials,
“nanomaterials were interesting because they were starting to cross into the
wider consumer area around the year of 2007. At the same time was the change
in the EU chemical management—REACH. The idea of ‘no data, no market’,
which was not being respected with nano, made it an interesting issue to
follow.”126
In an ear l ie r period, ETUC paid more at ten t ion to EHS aspects of
nanotechnologies. ETUC, for example, asked for at least 15% of national and
European public research budgets to be earmarked for EHS aspects; it also required
that all research projects should include health and safety aspects as a compulsory part
of their reporting (ETUC 2008).
In 2010, ETUC held a seminar entitled Nanotechnologies: national and
European trade union strategy in Brussels, bringing together member organizations,
representatives of the EC, scientific community, etc. During the seminar, the
participants highlighted the need to《embed the social dimensions and personal
liberties into the nanotechnologies process》127. In the subsequent resolution, the first
and foremost demand by ETUC was “inclusion of the societal dimension of
nanotechnologies”. Regarding the issue of budget, it requested the EC to《set a
percentage commitment to allocate sufficient funding for societal and ethical
126 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
127 ETUC. 2010. “Seminar for a Trade Union strategy on nanotechnologies.” October 19
http://www.etui.org/content/download/2484/27213/file/ETUI_seminar_nanotechnology_October2010.pdf
９５
concerns, in particular those relating to social justice, privacy, human dignity,
environment, and responsibility towards future generations》(ETUC 2010). In
comparing the demands by ETUC in the two resolutions, it appears that its scope
of concerns have enlarged significantly.
Secondly, the tone of ETUC became more demanding. While the first resolution
‘CALLS ON’Member States authorities to set up a national register on production,
import and use of nanomaterials, the second resolution highlighted that Member
States ‘MUST’ develop mandatory registers of articles containing nanomaterials, with
life-cycle assessment included. ETUC also showed particular attention to
transparency and traceability of nanomaterials. To update its approach, ETUC
organized seminars with its trade union members to find strategies to address
nanomaterials together. Joël Decaillon, ETUC Deputy General Secretary, highlighted
that《trade unions cannot afford to put off action here... The trade union movement
must get involved, and soon, if it is not to store up big trouble for itself.》128
Last but not least, from the idea of ‘no data, no market’ to ‘no data, no exposure’,
ETUC further operationalized and enriched its definition of the precautionary
principle. According to ETUC, ‘no data, no exposure’ meant that《where no data on
risks are available, workers must not be exposed and processes have to be performed
in closed systems》(ETUC 2010). Both of the two reports highlighted the significance
of the precautionary principle. However, in the prior report, the precautionary
principle was more of a conception which was rather abstract and general. The latter
report, as a step further, also identified the function and scope of application of the
precautionary principle. According to ETUC, the precautionary principle, applied to
deal with issues “in an attentive, careful, reasonable and transparent manner”, could
take the form of many initiatives, including《risk reduction measures, early warning
actions with specific attention to health monitoring, and the registration of workers
128 ETUI. 2010. “ETUI seminar on nanotechnologies”. October 19-22.
http://www.etui.org/content/download/2484/27213/file/ETUI_seminar_nanotechnology_October2010.pdf
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exposed》(ETUC 2010).
In conclusion, the case of ETUC well illustrates the process during which CSOs
construct and develop their stance in response to the latest developments of
nanotechnologies. To adopt what strategies is also partly determined by the extent to
which CSOs’ advocacy being transformed into the institutionalized procedures.
4. Key Results
During the capacity-building phase, CSOs had been actively involved in the
policy-making process of nanotechnologies. They advocated that precautionary
measures should be put into place given the lack of appropriate data and assessment
methods relating to the possible adverse risks of nanotechnologies. There always
exists the ‘too early/too late’ dilemma in the risk governance of emerging
technologies. Built upon analyses about the policy debates around nanotechnologies,
we could see that major stakeholders, including the EU policymakers, industries,
scientists, CSOs, etc., held different views and preferences towards, for example, the
principle of precaution vis-à-vis innovation, information transparency vis-à-vis
confidentiality. A fierce battle was undergoing concerning how to frame and govern
nanotechnologies in the EU.
4.1. CSOs’ voices remain marginalized in nano-governance debates
The precedent section has introduced the key concerns and demands of CSOs,
both broader and narrower, regarding nanotechnologies. Based on examination of the
policy development (e.g. the Commission’s regulatory review, the FP7 program that
supports nanotechnologies, implementation reports of the EU action plan), we could
remark that CSOs’ concerns remained largely marginalized by the dominant frame
used by nanotechnology developers. This observation is in accordance with the
analyses by Miller and Scrinis (2010), who conclude that CSOs have limited political
leverage in nanotechnology debates.
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For example, CSOs advocated that more research budgets should be earmarked
for the ELS aspects of nanotechnologies (e.g. AMICUS asked for 8%, BUND 10-15%,
ETUC and EEB 15%, Natuur en Milieu 30%). Although the Community funding for
research on risk assessment and management had continued to grow (from EUR 25
million in the four-year period 2003-2006, to more than EUR 50 million in the
two-year period 2007-2008), the figure represented only roughly 5% of the total
nanotechnology funding (EC 2009c). And among the EUR 3.5 billion allocated to
nanosciences, nanotechnologies, materials and new production technologies under
FP7 (2007 to 2013), only 2.3% (around EUR 82 million) had been funded to study the
ELS impact of nanomaterials by 2011129.
With increased budget devoted into nanotechnologies innovation and growing
number of nanoproducts being poured into the market, the EU regulatory authorities,
in particular the EC, showed little willingness to slow down the rapid pace of
developing this key enabling technology. A report of the EC highlighted that《the
deployment of KETs in the EU is not only of strategic importance but is indispensible》;
effor ts should be made so as to《avoid de lays in in t roduc t ion of new
technologies in the EU》(EC 2009a). In spite of the ‘no data, no market’ principle
advocated by CSOs, the market was moving ahead of regulation. ETC Group
commented that《REACH’s guiding principle appears to have morphed into ‘no data,
no regulation’.》130 Neither the proposal of a moratorium on certain nanoproducts
(ETC Group 2003; Greenpeace 2007; HEAL 2008; BUND 2007; FoE Europe 2008;
Natuur en Milieu 2009), nor CSOs’ demand for limiting the market introduction of the
‘nonessential’ nanoproducts were incorporated into regulatory decisions. Scholars
note that CSOs’ demands for examining the ‘claimed benefits’ of nano-products
rarely figure in regulation (Miller and Scrinis 2010).
129 Foss Hansen, Steffen & Gee, David. 2014. “The EU needs more anticipatory funding of health and
environmental research”. EurActiv, September 17.
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/health-consumers/eu-needs-more-anticipatory-funding-health-and-environmental
-research
130 ETC Group(2010). The Big Downturn? Nanogeopolitics. ETC Group Communiqué # 105
９８
The EC considered the existing legislative framework sufficient to cover
nanotechnologies in its first regulatory review (EC 2008e) and proposed A code of
Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research, a soft law
instrument with non-binding feature (EC 2008a). Seven general principles—meaning,
sustainability, precaution, inclusiveness, excellence, innovation and accountability—
were provided so as to guide the actions of all relevant stakeholders. The voluntary
measures were welcomed by CSOs, but considered as with limited effectiveness.
Apart from these failures, we should bear in mind that it often requires some
time in order to transform the influences that CSOs acquire in the public spheres
into ‘communicative power’, which entails a more gradual transition. My argument is
that the capacity of CSOs to《catalyze the growth of autonomous public spheres》
(Habermas 1996, 488) should not be ignored when we evaluate their impact on formal
decision-making. CSOs, with their cooperation strengthened, hold the potential to
play a more prominent role in the subsequent phase.
4.2. Enhanced cooperation among CSOs
Generally speaking, CSOs address nanotechnologies from different perspectives,
that’s to say, green organizations pay more attention to environmental issues and the
sustainability of nanotechnologie; worker unions focus on workplace safety in dealing
with nanomaterials; and consumer associations safeguard consumers’ health, safety
and their rights to make informed choices. However, we could see growing
convergences among CSOs’ demands, in which precautionary practices, as expressed
in the ‘no data, no market’ principle of REACH, have greatly facilitated their dialogue
and cooperation.
For example, the focusing area of ETUC went beyond traditional occupational
health and safety issues and took a wider range of issues into consideration. As an
interviewee of ETUI, the research and training center of ETUC, put it,
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“we find that the views were generally the same, so the collaboration continued
to work together very closely… You can’t just focus on jobs or working
conditions. It is about the environmental impact. I think that this is a very
positive message, because if you focus purely on worker health, you are missing
half of the picture.”131
We can find similar reflection within consumer associations and environmental
organizations. Different CSOs, by putting their knowledge and expertise together,
started to compel the political system to《switch over to the official circulation of
power》(Habermas 1996, 373). As a policy officer of ANEC noted,
“it is a good thing that some CSOs take the lead of some issues and others
follow. It is quite useful in dealing with the issues and sharing sources. Everyone
has his areas, specialty and expertise.”132
Centered on nanotechnologies, EU level CSOs have developed close contact
with each other. Take EEB as example, the following figure indicates the dense
cooperation between EEB with other EU level CSOs as well as national member
organizations.
131 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
132 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
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Figure 4: EEB’s cooperation with other CSOs133
EEB showed determination to address nanotechnologies differently. As indicated
in its 2008 annual report,《as there is no official legislative process addressing
nanotechnologies or nanomaterials within the EU regulatory framework, EEB is not
employing its traditional lobbying tools and approaches in the work in this policy
area.》134 This dissertation suggests that demands for upstream engagement and close
collaboration with other CSOs are key elements of its ‘novel lobbying tools’. For
example, an interviewee from the Danish Ecological Council, a member organization
of EEB, introduced its close collaboration with EEB,
133 This picture is based on annual reports of EEB from 2007 to 2010 as well as other joint reports with CSOs.
134 EEB. 2008. “Annual Report”.
http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=9A228EB7-999F-20E3-50BD73B537201A4B&amp;showMeta=0
CSOs jointly publish reports and develop position
Members of NGO federation (e.g. Vivagora joined EEB in 2010; EEB Policy Officer is
member of ECOS task force on nanotechnologies)
Workshops, meetings and other communication activities among CSOs
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“we have annual meetings in Brussels, and we have phone conferences
regularly. Each time around ten to fifteen CSOs participated.”135
A coalition among CSOs not only enables them to share expertise and
experiences in dealing with common issues, but also to reduce costs and spending.
For example, in a joint report by the Green 10136, the issue of nanotechnologies was
put forward explicitly,《restrict the marketing and use of nano materials on the EU
market, until the environment and health implications of nanotechnologies are more
fully understood. An adequate regulatory framework based on the precautionary
principle is needed, which includes clear labeling requirements.》137 Although only
half of these CSOs had experiences in dealing with nanotechnologies, wider ‘green
forces’ were infused into the debates on nanotechnologies with the support of other
CSOs. These cooperative activities have helped improving the visibility of CSOs’
proposals and concerns. Most importantly, CSOs have won the support of the
Parliament. The regulatory landscape of nanotechnologies, with more actors stepped
in, started to shift in the EU.
4.3. The EP favors the precautionary principle in governing nano
As discussed above, CSOs have been advocating the precaution principle—‘no
data, no market’ and ‘no data, no exposure’—to be applied into the governance of
nanotechnologies. This principle could take the form of a number of initiatives and
measures (e.g. mandatory labeling, traceability and transparency, pre-market
approval). Apart from the demand for prior registration of labeled products, most of
CSOs’ proposals were backed by the EP138 in its resolution towards regulatory aspects
135 Interview with Lone Mikkelsen, chemicals policy officer of the Danish Ecological Council, 26/09/2014
136 Green 10 include: Bankwatch Network ;BirdLife International; Climate Action Network Europe (CAN) ;
European Environmental Bureau (EEB) ;Friends of the Earth Europe ;Friends of Nature International ;Greenpeace
European Unit ;Health and Environment Alliance ;European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E)
WWF European Policy Office
137 A Joint Document From The Green 10. 2008. “Environment at the heart of Europe: An environmental roadmap
for 2009-2014.”
http://www.env-health.org/IMG/pdf/9-_Green10_Environment_at_the_heart_of_Europe_-_Environmental_Roadm
ap_-_Election_document_edit_FINAL_May_2009.pdf
138 EEB. 2009. “Parliament supports NGOs' calls for stricter controls.” March 31.
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of nanomaterials on 24thApril, 2009.
Before the resolution being adopted, EEB had lobbied heavily by sending letters,
meeting advisors, rapporteur and shadow rapporteur MEPs, etc.139 EEB, together with
BEUC, ANEC and HEAL, also sent voting recommendations to MEPs before the
plenary vote, asking them to support the resolution140. Finally, among the 398 votes,
only three were against the resolution141. The final adoption was hailed by EEB as
‘a significant victory’ in the ongoing debate142.
The Parliament took a strict stance on the governance issue of nanomaterials,
noting that《the concept of the “safe, responsible and integrated approach”... is
jeopardized by the lack of information》(EP 2009b). And it questioned whether, in the
absence of explicit provisions for nanotechnologies in Community law, legislation can
be deemed adequate to cover the risks related to nanomaterials. The Commission was
thus requested by the EP to conduct a regulatory review within two years with the aim
of ensuring safety for all applications of nanomaterials. This resolution was
considered by commentators as a signal of paradigm change concerning the regulation
of nanotechnologies in the EU, which shifted from a rather reluctant government
position toward a more explicit approach143. As an interviewed DG SANCO put it,
“some of them (CSOs) certainly got some gains, which were secured through
parliamentarians. The Parliamentarians will not have been as sensitive to nano
if there had not been all these works of CSOs.”144
http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/news-events/news/parliament-supports-ngos-calls-for-stricter-controls-on-nanotechn
ology/
139 EEB. 2009. “EEBAnnual Report.”
http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=E753F629-A6F4-1B71-A3446D134F990FDB&amp;showMeta=0
140 ANEC, BEUC, EEB and HEAL. 2009. “Resolution on Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials: NGOs’ voting
recommendations for 24 April EP Plenary Vote.” April 23.
141 EurActiv. 2009. “MEPs back tougher rules for nanotechnologies.” April 28
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/meps-back-tougher-rules-nanotech-news-221703
142 EurActiv. 2009. “ ‘No data, no market’ for nanotechnologies, MEPs say.” April 02.
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/data-market-nanotechnologies-mep-news-221588
143 Widmer, Markus & Knébel,Stephan. 2009. “A change of paradigm for nanotechnologies regulation in
Europe?.” The Innovation Society, http://emergingtech.foe.org.au/329/
144 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
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Their gains are particularly notable, as scholars observe the change in the
political culture with competitiveness relationships among EU institutions and the
growing power of the EP in shaping regulatory policies on risk issues (Justo-Hanani
and Dayan 2015). An interviewed policy maker also mentioned that《the EP has been
instrumental in raising issues about governance vis-à-vis society》145. The shift in
policy development led by green MEPs further motivated EU level CSOs to continue
their advocacy on nanotechnologies.
C. Conclusion
Chapter III investigates the dynamics of CSOs that addressed nanotechnologies
issues from 2006 to 2009. The encouragement of the European regulatory bodies,
growing evidence in terms of safety and environmental risks associated with
nanotechnologies, the fact that more and more nano-enable products entering into the
market, the specific ‘timing’ that nanomaterials have arrived as well as international
CSOs’ joint action… all these factors constituted the background in which EU level
CSOs got involved in debates on nanotechnologies.
During this phase, CSOs had carried out wide-ranging activities to enhance their
professionalism and expertise so as to provide real and constructive input to the
policy-making process. On the one hand, CSOs tried to go beyond the traditional
‘benefits versus risks’ framing, promoting discussions about wider deliberation of the
public dimensions of nanotechnologies (Miller and Scrinis 2010); on the other hand,
CSOs contributed to discussions about ‘narrower’ issues, i.e. policy debates of
nanotechnologies. They advocated for the introduction of precautionary measures in
governing nanotechnologies, such as mandatory labeling, traceability and
transparency, pre-market approval of nanomaterials.
145 Interview with a DG SANCO, 28/06/2014
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Although ‘wider’ concerns remain marginalized by the dominant frame used by
nanotechnology developers, CSOs’ demands for the precautionary principle have won
the support of the EP. We could see considerable convergence between CSOs’
proposals and those of the Parliament towards regulatory aspects of nanotechnologies.
Against this backdrop, a series of nano-specific legislative amendments started to be
introduced (nanomaterials in cosmetics, food legislation, etc.), opening up more
political opportunities for CSOs. My argument is that the capacity of CSOs to
《catalyze the growth of autonomous public spheres》(Habermas 1996, 488) should
not be ignored when evaluating their impact on formal decision-making. We can
expect that CSOs, with strengthened cooperation, could play an increasingly critical
role in subsequent phases.
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Chapter IV: Alliance-forming phase (2009 onwards)
On the basis of the former two phases, CSOs have become more qualified and capable
in addressing the topic of nanotechnologies, and the regulatory landscape in the EU,
with more actors stepped in and out, continues to shift during the alliance-forming
phase (2009 onwards).
With several nano-related legislation activities gradually developed in the EU,
including the definition of nanomaterials, product-specific legislation (e.g. the
Cosmetic Directive, the Novel Food Directive, the biocides laws), regulatory reviews,
revision of REACH, etc., the activities of CSOs have entered into a new phase. CSOs
started to come up with concrete proposals and suggestions in a more organized and
coordinated way, closely getting involved in the policy-making process.
However, many interviewees share the view that not so numerous CSOs address
the topic of nanotechnologies at the EU level. Based on content analysis of CSOs’
websites, position papers, reports, etc., we could examine two different approaches of
CSOs towards nanotechnologies: while several new CSOs (e.g. CIEL, Avicenn,
HCWH Europe, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, ClientEarth) started to
participate in the policy debates, active CSOs in the precedent period (Greenpeace
UK, FoE Europe, HEAL), due to different reasons, have taken a step back and
withdrawn from this arena. This chapter seeks to illustrate the different strategies and
approaches of CSOs, examining the reasons behind their ‘moving forward’ or
‘moving back’ in the policy debates on nanomaterials.
A. ‘Moving forward’ or ‘moving back’: two approaches of CSOs
As discussed in the previous chapters, earlier controversies such as mad cow
diseases and GMOs have opened up a new window for shifting the way the
relat ionship of science with the rest of society would be thought about.
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Nanotechnologies represent a good opportunity for CSOs to be involved from the
very beginning of the R&D process. As a program officer of MIO-ECSDE put it,
《nanotechnologies field, unlike other research and development fields, offers the
opportunity to do things in a better more improved way... The operationalization of
the precautionary principle, taking into account the full life-cycle of nano-enabled
products and the involvement of CSOs is crucial towards that end》146. It is also
believed that nanotechnologies could set a blueprint for discussions about future new
technologies147.
It is interesting to see that both the political system and civil society are
determined to address the societal aspects of nanotechnologies right from the early
stage, even if there exists little bottom-up concern from the general public. The
previous chapter has introduced a series of proactive and anticipatory initiatives by
the system, which are dedicated to creating an interactive space more positive and
constructive with CSOs.
From a normative view, early involvement is widely welcomed by CSOs. For
instance, as interviewee of CFDT put it,《a proactive approach is one thousand times
better than the one under which the decision is already made》148. Another interviewee
held the same view, pointing out that《we believe that it is never too early to engage
into a policy debate! Everybody should be on board from zero point》149. Will this
positive interaction space encourage particular forms of tactics that CSOs utilize
towards nanotechnologies?
This dissertation argues that, against this backdrop, CSOs had more access to the
regulatory authorities and gained more opportunities to get involved in the
146 Interview with Dr. Thomais Vlachogianni, Programme Officer of MIO-ECSDE, 02/12/2014
147 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
148 E-mail exchange with Gérald Hayotte, in charge of activities on nanotechnologies within CFDT, member of
dialogue committee on « Nanos » of French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety
(ANSES), 14/09/2014
149 Interview with Dr. Thomais Vlachogianni, Programme Officer of MIO-ECSDE, 02/12/2014
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decision-making process. For example, CIEL, ETUC and EEB have actively
participated in the CASG-nano conferences. ETUC also occupies a seat on the
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) Management Board and sits in various
committees150. ANEC, CIEL and ClientEarth were invited to give a presentation at the
workshop on the second regulatory review on nanomaterials. Other CSOs like BEUC
have actively participated in the Nanotechnology Safety for Success Dialogue,
organized by the EC regularly since 2007.
At the Member States level, BUND has been invited to participate in the
activities organized by NanoKommission, a central dialogue body of the German
Federal Government. French CSOs have contributed to the national debates on
nanotechnologies organized by the National Commission of Public Debate (CNDP). A
Belgian CSO, IEW, received funding from the federal administration to work on
policy issues of nanotechnologies. As a policy officer of IEW noted,《this soon
involvement and the clear agenda helped us to adapt our action at the critical
moment》151.
Here, mutual dynamics between the regulatory bodies and civil society could be
examined. As an interviewee of CIEL put it,《discussions with the regulatory
authorities allow me to have a better understanding of the landscape. We try not to
stay only at the stage of criticism, but also constructive participants》152. It is worth
noting that ‘constructive’ here means that CSOs are willing to get involved in the
decision-making process and contribute to shaping the trajectory of nanotechnologies
development; their views and opinions remain critical, and in many cases oppose
official views. A scholar observes that civil society have largely refrained from
campaigning against nanotechnologies and often engaged with policy makers and
industry on a constructive and technical level (Jaspers 2012). An interviewed DG
150 WHATARE THE ETUI AND ETUC DOING?
http://www.etui.org/Topics/Health-Safety/Chemicals-and-REACH/What-are-the-ETUI-and-ETUC-doing
151 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
152 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
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SANCO also favors a proactive and inclusive approach, arguing that:
“CSOs were better informed, and sooner became part of the debate. I take the
view that it is healthier for society to have this education and communication.
And I do think that in the long run, everybody will have benefits... With the work
in nano, in a sense, we have opened up rich potential forms for better framing of
the issue.”153
While acknowledging the opportunities that they have been offered in
participating in policy discussions, an interviewee of BUND highlighted that《we
hardly see any activity really taken up into the results of this long Kommission work》
154. There are evidences suggesting that the old approach, marked by ‘business as
usual’, still persists.
Scholars claim that the true purpose of policymakers seems only to ‘manufacture
public opinion’, as《too often these forums are too restrictive... and seem to be
designed only to alleviate <groundless fears>》(Wullweber and Vlandas 2006). For
instance, the aim of the Communication Roadmap of nanotechnologies initiated by
the EC is《increasing the consensus between stakeholders, society and policymakers
on EC decision-making about nanotechnology; and strengthening the image of the EC
as an impartial, transparent and trustworthy communicator on nanotechnology》(EC
2010a), according to Herbert von Bose, Director of Industrial Technologies. This
‘consensus-oriented’ approach, with a latent exclusive nature, does not go as far as
‘genuine dialogue’ advocated by STS scholars or ‘a very broad-based debate’
proposed in the RS/RAEng report (RS/RAEng 2004, 64). The latter encourages more
options and alternatives to be discussed and deliberated. As Irwin puts it, the
government sees no contradiction between《both increased openness and a more
professional/centralized control over risk management》(Irwin 2006).
153 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
154 Interview with Rüdiger Stegemann, Policy Officer of BUND, August 2014
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This ambiguous context, marked by a blend of inclusiveness and scientism, gave
rise to two different approaches of CSOs: while some of them took advantage of the
existing windows of opportunities and addressed nanotechnology in a constructive
and cooperative manner, others lost interest in nanotech issues and withdrew from this
field for different reasons. We discuss firstly the first approach.
1. EU level CSOs: cooperation and complementation
How to take good advantage of the existing windows of political opportunities
and make CSOs’ lobbying more effective? A policy officer of HCWH Europe
provided an answer,《working together. We have a lot of E-mail groups and we share
information and studies. We also share some kind of inside information about
particular authorities that may be more favorable to us》155. The answer of ‘working
together’ illustrates well the enhanced cooperation developed among EU level CSOs
in the policy debates on nanotechnologies.
During earlier debates on REACH, European trade unions have already joined
environmentalists in arguing for strong legislation on chemicals, according to the
reportage of BBC156. This alliance continued to join their forces together to address
the issue of nanomaterials. Scholars argue that in debates around nanomaterials,
French trade unions and green organizations have overcome their tensions and
conflicts regarding technological risks, which were regularly observed in former cases
like nuclear or chemical issues (Chaskiel and Suraud 2014). Another researcher
compares the cases of two Member States—France and Germany, pointing out that
《conflicts potentials were mitigated and directed onto cooperative tracks》(Seifert
2013).
155 Interview with Laurel Berzanskis, policy officer of HCWH Europe, August 2014
156 BBC News. Q&A: Reach chemicals legislation. 28 November 2005
http://news.bbc.co.the UK/2/hi/europe/4437304.stm
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Interviews with trade unions testify to the trend towards more cooperation. For
example, an interviewed policy officer of CFDT claimed that《the interest is great to
work together, including contact with NGOs, because the field that should be taken
into consideration is wider; and we enrich the views and opinions of each other... The
work of CFDT fits well with this approach. De-compartmentalization of problems
(business, company ...) where each one brings its specialties and expertise》157.
Based on content analysis as well as interviews with different CSOs at both
national and the EU level, this dissertation argues that CSOs, by putting knowledge
and resources together, have developed a complementary and cooperative approach
towards nanotechnologies. Environmental CSOs, trade unions, consumer
associations... each CSO contributes its expertise and knowledge in a specific area.
And they also openly support each other’ demands and proposals. As scholars put it,
《at the European level, the strengthening of civic solidarity (environmental CSOs
and worker unions) alters the balance of power in the process of developing
European regulations specific to nanotechnology》(Suraud et al. 2011, 38)158.
Umbrella organizations like EEB and ETUC play an important role in educating
and raising the awareness of their member organizations. EEB has issued a series of
reports since 2009, addressing topics that range from those about health and
environmental concerns to governance issues on nanotechnologies, serving as
capacity building tools. ETUC and its research institute ETUI coordinate the action of
trade unions at the EU level. Apart from NanoCap, they are also a partner of the
157 The original text: 《l’intérêt est grand de travailler ainsi, y compris au contact d’ONG, car le champ pris en
considération est ainsi plus large; et l’on s’enrichit du regard et de l’avis de L’autre… Le travail que fait la CFDT
s’inscrit bien dans cette démarche. Le décloisonnement des problèmes (entreprises, société…) où chacun apporte
sa spécificité et son expertise》.
E-mail exchange with Gérald Hayotte, in charge of activities on nanotechnologies within CFDT, member of
dialogue committee on « Nanos » of ANSES, 14/09/2014
158 The original text:《au niveau européen le renforcement de la solidarité civique (associative et syndicale)
modifie les rapports de force dans le processus d’élaboration des règlements européens propres aux
nanotechnologies》.
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EU-funded FP7 NanoDiode project. Through wide communication with research
institutions and scientific community, ETUI conducts policy analysis on topics
including traceability of nanomaterials, workers safety, governance issues, providing
input to the two resolutions on nanotechnologies by ETUC. On the one hand, ETUC
informs and educates its member organizations; on the other, its member
organizations transform their experiences and contribute to the position of ETUC at
the EU level. As an interviewee of CFDT, a trade union based in France, noted,《the
position of ETUC is essentially the position of CFDT and vice versa! We are in close
contact with ETUC and ETUI. We know each other and we work together. CFDT has
made great contribution to the position of ETUC》159.
Believing that consumers have the right to know and to choose, consumer
associations conduct independent surveys to trigger further actions of the regulatory
authorities. For instance, BEUC and ANEC have compiled inventory of products
which claimed to contain nanomaterials, finding 151 products in 2009 and 475
products in 2010 (BEUC &ANEC 2010). Based on these findings, they called on the
ending of ‘the health and safety roulette’160. As a policy officer of BEUC put it,《if you
want to convince policymakers, you need evidence》161. Consumer associations have
used the inventory database as a policy instrument to ask for better consumer
information and prompt definition of nanomaterial.
CIEL and ClientEarth, with their expertise in legal analysis, developed an
instrument of ‘nano patch’ together with BUND, aiming at addressing the deficiencies
of REACH in governing nanomaterials. ‘Nano patch’ is used as a legal tool for other
grass-root CSOs. CIEL also establishes and chairs the nanotechnologies working
159 Original text: 《la position de la CES est pour l’essentiel la position de la CFDT et vice versa ! Nous sommes
en lien étroit avec la CES et avec son « expert » l’ETUI. Nous nous connaissons bien; nous travaillons de concert
et nous, CFDT, avons apporté une large contribution au positionnement de la CES》.
E-mail exchange with Gérald Hayotte, in charge of activities on nanotechnologies within CFDT, member of
dialogue committee on « Nanos » of ANSES, 14/09/2014
160 ANEC & BEUC. 2010. “ANEC/BEUC inventory exposes a game of roulette.” October 25.
http://www.anec.eu/attachments/ANEC-PR-2010-PRL-012.pdf
161 Interview with Sylvia Maurer, head of BEUC Sustainability and Safety, 14/07/2014
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group of IPEN, aiming at strengthening the capacities of CSOs to deal with the legal
challenges presented by nanotechnologies162. A three-year project has been launched
jointly by CIEL and ECOS with the objective of enhancing their expertise in
standardization work163. According to a policy officer of ECOS, their role is more to
provide information and expertise for other CSOs,《we do not do campaigns, and we
do not lobby directly. Whenever we find some valuable information, we try to pass the
message》164.
It is worth noting that the year of 2009 has witnessed the establishment of the
first CSO that addresses specifically the issues of nanomaterials. Based in France,
Avicenn (Association de veille et d’information civique sur les enjeux des
nanosciences et des nanotechnologies) acts as a useful platform for information
exchange and policy analysis for all interested stakeholders165.
To conclude, the ‘upstream’ nature of nanotechnologies, the political
opportunities opened up after earlier technological controversies, the unwillingness of
the EC to genuinely open up the regulatory process… all these factors have helped
triggering a learning process among EU level CSOs, which have overcome their
tensions and tended to adopt cooperative and complementary approaches in dealing
with nanotechnologies.
2. Stagnation in several CSOs’ engagement
The enthusiasm for engagement was not universally shared, as some
supranational CSOs which addressed chemical issues (e.g. WWF, Greenpeace Europe)
were absent in the debates on nanomaterials. And it is also noteworthy that some
‘early risers’ have more or less withdrawn from this field. For example, Greenpeace
UK no longer officially addressed nanomaterials since its publication of its position
162 CIEL. Annual report 2010. http://www.ciel.org/Publications/AnnualReports/CIEL_Report_2010.pdf
163 ECOS and CIEL launch a three-year project for the safe development of nanomaterials in Europe.
http://www.ciel.org/Chem/Nano_EU_Mar2014.html. Accessed March 2014
164 Interview with Dania CRISTOFARO, policy officer of ECOS, 21/10/2014
165 http://avicenn.fr/wakka.php?wiki=PagePrincipale
１１３
paper in 2007. FoE Europe, after releasing two reports, got completely out of the
discussion, standing in remarkable contrast with the active involvement of its sister
organizations located in other countries, e.g. FoE Australia, FoE U.S., or those based
in Member States like BUND in Germany, Les Amis de la Terre in France. Some
CSOs (e.g. CHEM Trust, ChemSec, Pesticide Action Network), which address
chemicals generally, consider nanomaterials as a ‘sub-topic’ together with other
substances like endocrine disruptors (EDCs), substances of very high concern
(SVHC) , chemical mixtures166.
Greenpeace UK, as one of the earliest CSOs which has involved actively in the
nanotech debates, is an example illustrative of the stagnation in CSOs’ activity. I
provide a brief review in terms of its approach in different periods. During e-mail
exchanges, its chief scientist Dr. Parr introduced the background behind Greenpeace
UK’s decision to put nanotechnologies on its agenda,
“we were using nanotech as a reason to promote a discussion in UK and EU
about what science is done and for whose benefit, in the window of opportunity
that opened up after the rejection of GM food”167.
The argument of Dr. Parr further demonstrates the high determination of
Greenpeace UK during the early period,《what marks out nanotech is that its potential
is so huge for either good or bad, getting it right is a prize worth working for.》168
From 2006 onwards, Greenpeace UK showed decreased interest in nanotechnologies
issues, and it has released only one position paper and a few articles since then. Its
change of stance towards nanotechnologies is also notable: while Greenpeace UK
claimed a moratorium on nanotech “unpractical and probably damaging” (Arnall 2013)
in 2003, it actively called for《a moratorium on the commercial and environmental
166 Joint NGO letter to Environment Ministers on 7th EAP
http://www.eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=1F87180E-5056-B741-DBE8777841C966FF
167 E-mail exchange with Dr. Doug Parr, senior scientist of Greenpeace UK, 21/05/2014
168 Parr, Douglas. 2003. “Small stuff, big questions.” NewScientist, July 26.
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17924053.500-small-stuff-big-questions.html
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release of further engineered nanomaterials》together with other CSOs in 2006169. In
its position paper which was made public one year later, Greenpeace reiterated its call
for ‘an immediate moratorium’ given the absence of any established regulatory
system (Greenpeace 2007).
According to its chief scientist, Greenpeace UK has taken a step back and
removed the topic of nanotechnologies from their agenda, which is due to the fact that
《the powers of the governing institutions of science proved to be too strong to shift》
170. Although Greenpeace no longer has official programs on nanotechnologies, they
follow and participate in the discussion on this topic occasionally. For example, David
Santillo, expert of Greenpeace Research Laboratories, participated in the 3rd
Nanotechnology Safety for Success Dialogue and delivered a presentation on the
issues of nano-particles in paints. Kevin Stairs, chemical policy director of
Greenpeace Europe, expressed his concerns about the lagging behind of legislation on
nanomaterials171. While identifying nanotechnologies as an important issue, Kevin
Stairs describes Greenpeace Europe’s approach as “on an ad hoc basis”172. Greenpeace
is no longer a leader, but a participant which addresses the topic of nanotechnologies
occasionally.
It is of necessity to point out the structural difference between ‘corporation-like’
Greenpeace and ‘network organization’ FoE: national groups of the former are
established as branches of the international organization, and the latter is more
de-centralized, with its national groups having more sovereignty and autonomy
(Doherty 2009). FoE network is an important actor, which has provided abundant
analysis and information. FoE Australia, with the establishment of the Emerging
169 Joint Letter by Greenpeace, Soil Association, Friends of the Earth, Practical Action, ETC group, Animal aid,
Corporate Watch and International Federation of Journalists. 2006. “Nanotechnology must be controlled.” The
Independent, July 12. http://www.independent.co.the UK/voices/letters/letters-the-natwest-three-407584.html
170 E-mail exchange with Dr. Doug Parr, senior scientist of Greenpeace UK, 21/05/2014
171 Weichert, S.S. & Rinaldi, L. (2013) Lack of research prevents action on tiny chemicals. Reporting EU Spring
2013.
http://reportingeuspring2013.mediajungle.dk/2013/03/19/lack-of-information-prevents-action-on-small-substances
-with-unknown-effects/
172 E-mail exchanges with Kevin Stairs, chemicals policy director of Greenpeace Europe, 29/08/2014
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Technology Project in early 2005, is particularly active. Although FoE Europe is not
as active as before, FoE Australia and BUND are still important players in nano
debates at the EU level.
Regarding the reason behind Greenpeace UK’s recoil, Doubleday provides his
explanations. As he puts it,《like Greenpeace, because they participated in the
Nanojury, they even were a major player in that, they just feel, quite instrumentally,
that the return on the investment of time is no significant enough for them... They are
very busy, very overstretched, so they expected more impact from this kind of
operation》(Bullich 2009, 79). This dissertation suggests that Greenpeace UK’s retreat
can also be explained by its discontent with the UK government’s approach in
regulating nanomaterials. The next section will provide detailed analysis regarding
the factors that influence CSOs’ compaign towards nanotechnologies.
B. Exploring reasons behind CSOs’ retreat
When reviewing the academic discussion regarding public engagement with
science and technology over the last twenty years, Irwin argues that he is less inclined
to think in ‘from… to…’ terms, as scientific governance is often 《 messy and
contradictory business where dilemmas and paradoxes abound》(Irwin 2014). Stilgoe
and coauthors also note that STS scholars should not be over-promised on what public
engagement exercises can deliver, as《for all of the changing currents on the surface,
the deeper tidal rhythms of science and its governance remain resistant》 (Stilgoe,
Lock, and Wilsdon 2014).
In the case of nanotechnologies, upstream public engagement and the
accompanying political opportunities proved to be insufficient in sustaining CSOs’
interest towards this topic. Why have the above-mentioned CSOs retreated from their
positions, especially given the fact that the potential of nanotechnology is so huge?
What are the obstacles or limiting factors in the way towards more vibrant public
spheres? Scholars explain the stagnation of activism by highlighting two aspects: low
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policy impact and low public responsiveness (Seifert and Plows 2014). This
dissertation, on the basis of interviews with representatives of CSOs as well as the EU
regulatory authorities, suggests that other factors, both internal and external, should be
taken into consideration so as to explain the shaping of the specific features and
dynamics of EU level CSOs in nanotechnologies debates. It should be pointed out that
these factors are closely linked with one another.
1. Internal factors
1.1. limitation of resources
A common challenge that most CSOs face is the lack of long-term resources and
funding, which actually constrain the scope of their activities. As a policy officer of
ECOS noted,《for a CSO, it is very difficult to continue finding funding on the same
topic for more than three years》173. Another interviewee, who has participated in the
NanoCap project, encountered the same difficulty and claimed that lack of continuous
funding posed a barrier for their activities:《there is no continuity in our efforts, and
this weakens the whole thing》174. HEAL, while drafting its position paper on
nanomaterials in 2008, stopped their activities on nanomaterials due to a lack of
dedicated funding175.
Confronted with policy-makers’ demand for more ‘sound evidence’, some CSOs
try to do independent surveys so as to make their arguments more convincing.
However, it often requires high investment and big costs. For example, as a policy
officer of BEUC pointed out,《it is extremely expensive for our members to test food
products to see whether there are ingredients at nano scale》176.
173 Interview with Dania CRISTOFARO, policy officer of ECOS, 21/10/2014
174 Interview with Dr. Thomais Vlachogianni, Programme Officer of MIO-ECSDE, 02/12/2014
175 E-mail exchanges with Lisette van Vliet, senior policy advisor of HEAL, 29/08/2014
176 EurActiv.2010. “Consumer group: Food ads still targeted at kids.” November 30.
http://www.euractiv.com/specialweek-foodandresponsiblemarketing/ruthe-veale-interview-500113
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Apart from the financial aspect, human resources also act as a constraining factor.
Many of the interviewed CSOs have less than five persons who work on
nanomaterials, and they also need to address other issues. For example, an
interviewee of ANEC argued that,
“there is one person which is in charge of service and environment. Part of
environment is chemical, and part of chemical is nanomaterials. You can say it is
ten percent of one person. We do not have good cards in this game.”177
Through contact with BUND, its head office noted that BUND was not as active
as before, as its foremost campaigner Jurek Vengels has left at the end of 2013. An
interviewee noted that《we could not even really replace him by a full-time staff,
because of constraints and limitations》178. The high turnover of personnel also poses
an obstacle for CSOs’ institutional learning about new technologies. The situation of
ETUI is not much better. According to a policy officer, there are only six to eight staff
members who work on health and safety generally, and nanomaterial is only one of
the various topics that they need to address179.
The strength of the industry stands in remarkable contrast with that of CSOs. An
interviewed DG SANCO recognized the imbalance of resources between different
stakeholders. As he put it,
“there are very different levels of education and resources for certain topics.
Industry organizations and trade associations have very large groups of people
in their companies who are highly competent and who also know politics. They
are working full-time. (There are) hundreds of people who work only on
nano-policy issues”.180
177 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
178 Interview with Rüdiger Stegemann, Policy Officer of BUND, August 2014
179 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
180 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
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For instance, Nanotechnologies Industry Association (NIA), an industry-focused
trade association in nanotechnology, was established as early as 2005. And its
membership is composed of companies from a variety of industry sectors, including
healthcare, chemicals, automotive, materials processing, and consumer products181. Dr.
David Carlander, Director General of NIA, was formerly the scientific officer of
European Food Safety Authority, who could gain access to key decision-makers of the
Commission. An article of Corporate Europe Observatory has revealed the intense
corporate lobbying on the EU policy making concerning labeling of nano ingredients
in food182. The imbalance of resources could frustrate CSOs.
1.2. Cognitive barrier: if you are CSOs, you are against nano
In 1959, C. P. Snow’s lecture The Two Cultures highlighted the split, or even
opposition between the sciences and the humanities:《the intellectual life of the whole
of western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups... Literary
intellectuals at one pole—at the other scientists... Between the two a gulf of mutual
comprehension—sometimes hosti l i ty and disl ike, but most of all lack of
understanding》(Snow 1961). When addressing the topic nanotechnologies, a similar
barrier among CSOs, industry and the government could be examined. According to
Cormick,《efforts to bring different stakeholders together to share different
perspectives have tended to lead to competition rather than cooperation》(Cormick
2012).
Firstly, industry and the government have a tendency to perceive CSOs as
anti-technology and scientifically illiterate. This argument can be corroborated by
interviews with the EU policy makers. For instance, a DG SANCO considered CSOs
as the blameworthy agent for triggering public concerns about emerging technologies.
And he questioned the motivation of CSOs in joining the policy debates:
181 http://www.nanotechia.org/about-nia
182 http://corporateeurope.org/agribusiness/2014/03/food-lobby-fights-labelling-nano-ingredients
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“It’s very easy for people like Greenpeace to ask very general questions. If you
want to bring them into specific, practical and concrete situations, you lose them.
This prevents them from making big media campaigns. That ’s very
frustrating.”183
Robert Madelin, the highest-ranked health official in the EU executive, openly
criticized CSOs for fueling confusion among the public and stoking fear of “a new
technology with significant potential”. He urged CSOs to “invest in the expertise” and
take a “more responsible and networked approach”184. However, early research shows
that these charges, which imply that CSOs purposefully act to manipulate policy and
create controversy, may misrepresent the capacity of CSOs (Grove-White et al. 2004).
In the face of such accusations, CSOs seek to re-position themselves and utilize
more argumentative and expertise-based forms of involvement, resulted from a
learning process. For instance, Greenpeace UK renounced the employment of
confrontational methods in addressing nanotechnologies. As its senior scientist put it,
《campaigning to stop things—as Greenpeace frequently does—is fundamentally
unsatisfying. We would like to see answers to problems — technology has the ability
to deliver some of these answers》(Parr 2003).
During discussions with other CSOs including CIEL and ECOS, Ian Illuminato,
a policy officer of FoE Australia and U.S., called on CSOs《not take extreme
standpoints… to be careful not to overuse media.》185 Illuminato further highlighted
the damage of sensationalism on CSOs’ credibility, noting that,
183 Interview with a DG SANCO, who is in charge of the working groups of the European Scientific Committee
on Emerging to develop risk assessment and methodologies and to develop potentially regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials,17/06/2014
184 EurActiv. 2009. “Lobbyists ‘fuelling confusion’ on nanotech, EU warns.” June 16.
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/lobbyists-fuelling-confusion-nan-news-221949
185 Strategic Workshop on Nanotechnology: Bridging the gap between policy and science Event Summary,
February 15, 2015. http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Nano_Workshop_15Feb2015.pdf
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“you have to be honest with the public. You have to tell them what you know
truthfully... Our greatest lobbying is going to be the truth, not kind of
judgment.”186
Furthermore, there exists rooted impression or stereotypes that CSOs should be
militant；‘constructive participants’ may be viewed as compromising CSOs’ critical
edge in the political battleground. This stereotype is identified by Rayner (2004) as
another obstacle for CSOs’ institutional learning about new technologies. Compared
with their traditional mode of operation, engaging in early dialogue is a new challenge
for CSOs. With limited human and financial resources, some CSOs tend to work in a
critical and eye-catching way so as to attract media attention and mobilize the wider
public to trigger policy changes. It is believed that once CSOs lose their critical
position, their appeals and accountability will also be damaged.
For instance, in 2007, green CSO Environmental Defense and chemical company
DuPont jointly released Nano Risk Framework, establishing an unusual collaboration
between ‘former foes’187. This collaboration was attacked severely by other CSOs,
who considered this cooperation as ‘public relations campaign’ in a joint letter188.
There were around twenty CSOs which have signed the letter. Scholars point out that
CSOs are afraid of being co-opted by other types of actors such as companies
(Krabbenborg and Mulder 2015). From this example, we could see that a good
number of CSOs highly value their critical position and cultivate and safeguard this
tradition. This dissertation suggests that CSOs could move beyond traditional
campaigning stances, seeking to explore new and more creative forms in contributing
to democratize the governance of science and technology.
186 Interview with Ian Illuminato, policy officer of FoEAustralia and U.S., 23/03/2015
187 EurActiv. 2007. “Former foes join forces to assess nanotech risks.” June 29.
http://www.euractiv.com/science/foes-join-forces-assess-nanotech-risks/article-164991
188 ETC Group et al. 2007. Civil Society-Labor Coalition Rejects Fundamentally Flawed DuPont-ED Proposed
Framework: Urges All Parties To Reject The Public Relations Campaign
http://www.etcgroup.org/content/civil-societylabor-coalition-rejects-fundamentally-flawed-dupont-ed-proposed-na
notechnology
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1.3. Frustration about the sterile game of token engagement
In analyzing different levels concerning the degrees that public value being taken
into consideration by the formal decisions, scholars list five types which include:
‘non-dialogue’, ‘technocratic style’, ‘public relations approach’, ‘real dialogue’
(predominated by ‘sound science’) and ‘public consultation’(Gaskell and Allum 2001).
Only the last type represents an attempt which could make the participants feel
committed to the outcome. The approach of the EC appeared to be an in-between of
the ‘public relations’ approach and the ‘real dialogue’ approach. For example,
Hagendijk observed both an ‘inclusive voice’ and a ‘scientistic’ voice in the
Commission’s report Science, Society and the Citizen in Europe, which reads《as if
two voices are struggling to be heard》(Hagendijk 2004). The authors of Demos also
noted that《the language of ‘upstream engagement’ is there, but... the motivations for
doing it are instrumental rather than substantive》(Wilsdon and Willis 2004, 49).
Through interviews undertaken with different CSOs, many of them expressed the
feeling of frustration with regard to their limited influences on the policy results.
CSOs argued that without being fed into policy results, the usefulness and value of
these engagement activities were dubious. Here are the passages from interviews with
two consumer associations:
“ i t is nice to be invi ted . But invi t ing somebody is one th ing, and
following the statement is another thing.”189
“the good point is that we are concerned, and we have possibility to give certain
comments. The problem is that the EC is not taking into account any of our
comments related to the urgent need to better regulate nanomaterials for many
years.”190
189 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
190 Interview with Sylvia Maurer, head of BEUC Sustainability and Safety, 14/07/2014
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Sue Davies, chief policy adviser of Which? , highlighted during the first
Nanotechnology Safety for Success Dialogue that it was《not enough just to engage…
must address issues raised》191. Interviewees, including those of CIEL, ClientEarth,
HCWH Europe, ETUI, etc., also expressed their frustration in this regard.
The UK is one of the earliest countries which dedicated to experimenting novel
initiatives of dialogue and public engagement in nanotechnologies. As introduced in
Chapter II, most CSOs involved in the awareness-raising phase come from the UK,
and there was rich and active civil society movement during the early phase. However,
an advisory body of the UK indicated that the leading position that the UK enjoyed at
the time of the publication of the RS/RAEng report was no longer as highly regarded
due to “a distinct lack of Government activity or funding” in research into EHS
aspects of nanomaterials (The Council for Science and Technology 2007, 5).
Furthermore, the reluctance of the UK government in introducing mandatory
regulations is another cause for CSOs’ discontent. In 2006, the UK Government
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) initiated a voluntary
reporting scheme for manufactured nanomaterials. Eight CSOs released a joint letter,
highlighting that such a scheme would further delay regulatory action and make
products containing nanomaterials “untested, unregulated and unlabelled” 192.
According to an official report presented to Parliament, the voluntary reporting plan
had received only 13 responses from the industry, and the Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution suggested that Defra should make nanomaterials reporting
mandatory193.
191 Which? 2007. “The consumer perspective on applications of nanoscience and nanotechnologies.”
http://ec.europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/events/ev_20071025_en.htm
192 Joint Letter by Greenpeace, Soil Association, Friends of the Earth, Practical Action, ETC group, Animal aid,
Corporate Watch and International Federation of Journalists. 2006. “Nanotechnology must be controlled.” The
Independent, July 12.
http://www.independent.co.the UK/voices/letters/letters-the-natwest-three-407584.html
193 UK Government Response to The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) Report. 2009.
“Novel Materials in the Environment:The Case Of Nanotechnology”
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228785/7620.pdf
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EU-level CSOs also encountered difficulties in transforming public opinions into
the institutionalized procedures. An interviewee of ClientEarth claimed that they have
invested very limited efforts into the topic of nanomaterials, which accounted for
only about 5%,
“things just do not move. And that’s can be frustrating... It is good to sit around
the table, but we’ve arrived at the stage in which we meet and we basically
repeat the same thing over and over again. So until nanomaterials will be
regulated better, these efforts are becoming a bit less meaningful.”194
Previous research has pointed out the harm of ‘empty rhetoric’ (Kyle and Dodds
2009). Without openness and real commitment, engagement activities initiative by
policymakers may risk of being transformed into endless dialogue, causing fatigue
and even suspicion of stakeholders.
1.4. Incompatible with CSOs’ priorities and agenda-setting
Re-opening REACH to address nanomaterials is incompatible with the priorities
of some CSOs. For example, Kevin Stairs, chemical policy director of Greenpeace
Europe, notes that addressing nanomaterials is not in line with their Detox Campaign,
which focuses on hazardous chemicals. As he put it,
“Only the EU has chemical legislation with the appropriate tools to phase out
hazardous chemicals… Unless the REACH implementation work is successful,
nano or any other related issues will be adequately addressed.”195
WWF, one of the major actors in earlier lobbying battle around the drafting of
REACH, no longer put any efforts into nanomaterials. An interviewee pointed out the
controversies that some CSOs faced in addressing nanomaterials:
194 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
195 E-mail exchanges with Kevin Stairs, chemicals policy director of Greenpeace Europe, 29/08/2014
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“WWF does not deal with chemicals anymore. WWF, which protects animal
welfare, realizes that finding out if chemicals are dangerous means testing a
chemical, and testing a chemical means killing or experiencing animals. It is a
big dilemma for organizations. There are a lot of controversies, especially for
bigger organizations.”196
An interviewee of HEAL observed that these big organizations closed down their
large chemicals campaigns at certain points—which had been running to get REACH
enacted . They decide to close or continue for reasons of political strategy and
funding.197
1.5. Lack of public responsiveness
Scholars indicate that public responsiveness is a critical factor in deciding
whether to pursue or abandon certain campaigns (Seifert and Plows 2014). Early
literature has demonstrated low public awareness on nanotechnologies (Satterfield et
al. 2009). According to the 2010 Eurobarometer survey, the majority (54%) of
Europeans has never heard of nanotechnologies (EC 2010c). Thus, there exist little
bottom-up concerns from the general public and member organizations towards
nanotechnologies, which makes it less interesting and, considered to be less urgent,
compared with other topics. For example, it was not until the year of 2010, when the
issue of nanomaterials traceability was put highly on the policy agenda by the Belgian
EU Presidency and other regulatory authorities, did Belgian CSOs start to intensify
their activities on nanotechnologies. As a policy officer of IEW put it,《we have
limited funding and we can’t follow everything. Our lobbying is more ‘reactive’ than
‘proactive’.》198
196 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
197 E-mail exchanges with Lisette van Vliet, senior policy advisor of HEAL, 29/08/2014
198 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
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One of the reasons behind low public awareness is the technical and enabling
nature of nanotechnologies, which makes it quite difficult to turn nanotechnologies
into a public issue. Different from GMOs or nuclear, nanotechnologies is something
that people can not experience one with the other, which, according to Doubleday, is
《not as a physical product but as a social process》(Bullich 2009, 81). Under this
context, the general public as well as CSOs may lack interest and know-how to get
involved in the policy-making process. Here are the quotes from interviews with two
CSOs:
“The debate now has become extremely technical, which requires a lot of
background work. In order to well position and propose something that really
makes sense, we need to invest time to read all the background information and
all the emerging development in order to participate constructively.” 199
“Nanotechnology is a very complex topic, which requires a lot of organizations
to be able to first understand and to influence. I see CSOs involved but I also see
the difficulties.”200
Ecotoxicology and toxicology background are often required in addressing the
risk governance of nanotechnologies. CSOs generally have more expertise in
addressing policy and regulatory issues. As an interviewee of ECOS noted,《this is so
new, and very few people have the knowledge. Since the policy did not develop very
much, there was not very much motivation for them to lobby.》201 Scholars observed
that German trade unions were reluctant to get involved in a new and highly
specialized subject against the backdrop in which《an overload of tasks set against a
backdrop of shrinking resources》(Schomberg and Davies 2010, 97). With limited
resources, CSOs have to adjust their agenda-setting to prioritize certain issues and
topics. Operating in a centrally-coordinated way, CSOs, especially supranational ones,
199 Interview with Dr. Thomais Vlachogianni, Programme Officer of MIO-ECSDE, 02/12/2014
200 Interview with Dania CRISTOFARO, policy officer of ECOS, 21/10/2014
201 Ibid.
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tend to address topics which could have higher public visibility.
2. External factors
2.1.Persistence of ‘deficit model’
There is an abundance of research into how the deficit model is continually
reinvented (Rayner 2004; Bauer et al 2007). Through analysis of the EU policy
documents and interview materials, we could also find that ‘deficit model’ prevails
among some regulatory authorities towards the governance of nanoscience and
nanotechnologies. This is the first external factor that prevents stakeholders from
constructive dialogue and mutual learning towards more democratic governance of
emerging technologies.
One manifestation of ‘deficit model’ is that CSOs and the general public are
routinely labeled by some interviewees as ‘lack of knowledge’ and ‘scientifically
illiterate’. For example, an interviewed DG SANCO boiled down the failure of
stakeholder dialogue to the lack of CSOs’ expertise in addressing nanotechnologies.
As he put it,
“CSOs do not have the necessary knowledge to cope with the topic. Everybody
recognized that the expertise was not there and there was no point continue... Too
much political involvement, too many people want to play politics and who
do not understand science.”202
Against this backdrop, there is only minimal scope for CSOs’ interventions. A
scholar observes that the only role that CSOs could play is to serve as ‘watchdog’, as
《there is little else at stake for CSOs during an innovation trajectory than expressing
concern about things that might go wrong》(Krabbenborg 2013, 96). The findings of
FP7 research project CONSIDER also indicate that the prevailing model of science—a
202 Interview with a DG SANCO, who is in charge of the working groups of the European Scientific Committee
on Emerging to develop risk assessment and methodologies and to develop potentially regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials,17/06/2014
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traditional top-down approach based on the knowledge and advice of experts—
dominates in FP7 research projects. CSOs seem to be considered by project
coordinators as ‘end user representatives’ rather than equal partners203.
It is worth noting ‘system’ is not a homogeneous entity. Chapter II has
introduced the commitment among some EU regulatory bodies to engage the public
more proactively. The Parliament’s supports for CSOs’ proposals also demonstrate
that CSOs are capable of influencing the beliefs and decisions of authorized members
of the political system. According to Habermas,《the parliamentary complex is the
most open for perceiving and thematizing social problems, but it pays for this
sensitivity with a lesser capacity to deal with problems in comparison to the
administrative complex》(Habermas 1996, 355). The readiness of some open-minded
policy-makers could act as a kind of ‘counter balance’ to those guided by ‘deficit
model’.
2.2. A stereotypical division of labor
In reviewing the continuity and change around the practice of public engagement
with science over the past two decades, Stilgoe and coauthors note that《for all of the
changing currents on the surface, the deeper tidal rhythms of science and its
governance remain resistant》(Stilgoe, Lock, and Wilsdon 2014). There is a common
belief that the realm of risk governance of emerging technologies is an exclusive
affair which should be left to experts and scientists. ‘Sound evidence’ occupies a
privileged position in providing legitimacy in the policy-making process of
nanotechnologies. As a scholar puts it,《science is not simply one activity or aspect of
society, but has become the primary culture of legitimation for modern society》
(Rayner 2004).
203 CONSIDER (Civil Society Organisations in Designing Research Governance)
http://ec.europa.eu/research/swafs/pdf/pub_other/optimising_civil_society_participation.pdf
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In spite of STS scholars’ efforts in opening up the black box of science and the
considerable political willingness to engage the public, scholars note that most
projects and endeavors are still guided by traditional methodological approaches, with
the expert/lay division persists (Kurath and Gisler 2009). Literature indicates that
more importance has been attached to ‘back-end’ questions (e.g. ‘benefits versus
risks’ discussion, regulation), while ‘front-end’ questions (visions, direction of
innovation, alternative options, etc.) remain less addressed (Doubleday 2007a; Miller
and Scrinis 2010). The statements of an interviewed DG Employment reflect the
government thinking driven by ‘deficit model’. As he put it,
“I would still be inclined to believe that it is essentially a technical scientific
manner... If you accept the principle that nanotechnologies are complex technical
area, you have to leave it to the scientists and their expertise to decide what is
sound or not. When it comes to risk management measurement, I disagree
fundamentally with those who believe that concerns should be elements in
decision-making. I am always in favor of informing the public, but I’m not in
favor of opening the decision-making process to the public. If early engagement
is to mean influencing the process, I am not in favor.”
During the interview, the DG EMPL cited above repeatedly insisted that different
people with different roles contributed their knowledge and skills in copying with a
sophisticated world. He further questioned the mode of operation of CSOs, which use
political statements, beliefs or concerns to develop their stance. As he put it,《what is
your evidence to support (your point of view)? We do not discuss principles.》The
argument of Dick Taverne, the Chair of ‘Sense About Science’, House of Lords, also
manifests the prevalence of the traditional division of labor. Faced with rising
demands for ‘upstream public engagement’, Taverne (2004) claimed that《the fact is
that science, like art, is not a democratic activity. You do not decide by referendum
whether the Earth goes round the Sun》.
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The above arguments are largely driven by a deeply entrenched ‘simplistic
contrast structure’ , which《opposes science and the public as two self-contained,
antagonistic social entities》(Kurath and Gisler 2009). Under this view, only
‘one-dimensional realist risk framework’ (Wynne 2002) holds value, while other
fundamental questions (e.g. the legitimacy, driving aims and direction of
technological development) should not be open to the public. The division of
responsibility is problematized and has been questioned by a considerable amount of
literature. Scholars call for ‘a new social contract’ with science, with the focus shifted
from ‘reliable’ to more ‘socially robust’ knowledge (Gibbons 1999; Lubchenco 1998;
Jasanoff 2005).
As a senior scientist of Greenpeace UK put it,《in the end, the traditional
approach that prioritized the role of senior scientists thinking and their priorities...
proved to be too strong to shift.》204 This situation renders the voice of CSOs even
smaller. A policy officer of BUND also expressed his frustration with regard to the
narrow definition of ‘science’,《what is mainly regarded as ‘science’ is only certain
sectors related to government and academic institutions... Re-designing and opening
‘science’ is one aspect coming forward.》205
2.3. ‘Paralysis by analysis’
The lack of government action is always justified by the requirement for more
‘sound evidence’. Policy makers, especially those of the Commission, have frequently
used the argument such as “want more evidence of the ri sks posed by
nanomaterials”206 as groundings to prolong the regulatory process. For example,
researchers indicate that the Commission requested SCENIHR to provide scientific
opinion with a purpose of delaying decisions on regulatory measures on nanosilver:
《by initiating one review after the other, regulators have created an unfortunate
204 E-mail exchange with Dr. Doug Parr, senior scientist of Greenpeace UK, 21/05/2014
205 Interview with Rüdiger Stegemann, Policy Officer of BUND, August 2014
206 Chemical Watch. 2014. “Sweden presses European Commission on nano proposals: Further delays on
amendment of REACH annexes.”
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situation of ‘paralysis by analysis’》(Hansen and Baun 2012). A scholar alarms the
danger of a new ‘deficit model’ , which assumes that the difficulties in regulating
nanotechnologies under uncertainty are due to a deficit of scientific information on
the health and environmental impacts of manufactured nanomaterials, and this deficit
can only be solved by obtaining more scientific facts (Brown 2009). Instead, an
adaptive governance regime is advocated.
As pointed out by EEB, the insistence on ‘evidence-based’ risk governance
seems to be based pre-dominantly on corporate and economic values (Fedrigo and
Senjen 2010). CSOs represent ‘common goods’ or ‘universalizable interests’ in the
Habermasian sense. Faced with uprising demands by CSOs to apply the principle ‘no
data, no market’ and ‘no data, no exposure’ to regulate nanomaterials, a DG SANCO
argued that《nanomaterials were in the market for a long time. People say in principle,
but do in practice.(We can only) make a list of the whole cases, and start to get data
on them.》 This government thinking actually gave nanotechnology industries a green
light to continue introducing nanomaterials into markets with little testing. Here is
another example. As early as 2004, proposals like the lowering of the registration
threshold and labeling products of nanotechnologies have been identified by
participants as options for future policies during Mapping out Nano Risks workshop207.
Ten years later, the same proposals are still under discussion, and labeling only
applies to several sectoral regulations (e.g. in cosmetics, food, biocides). An
organizer of the workshop admitted that,
“part of the frustrations that occur is that the dialogues that we had with
stakeholders did not go anywhere. They served information, awareness, etc., but
they did not touch the law-making. Neither did they become an institutional
reality nor a piece of law.”208
207 EC. 2004. “Nanotechnologies: A Preliminary Risk Analysis on the Basis of a Workshop Organized in
Brussels.” March 1-2. http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/documents/ev_20040301_en.pdf
208 Interview with a DG SANCO, June 2014, Brussels
１３１
Regardless of various efforts to promote dialogues, deliberation, public
consultations and debates, which makes nanotechnologies an interesting ‘test case’ in
STS studies, it appears to be long and complicated to turn ‘dialogue’ into further
‘action’.
2.4. The ‘inertia’ of administrative power
There are scholars who investigate the factors which have led to a kind of
‘scientific inertia’, for instance, the requirement for high levels of proof via well
replicated studies, the conservative approach of research funders (Hansen and Gee
2014). Analysis of risk governance of nanotechnologies directs our attention to
‘administrative inertia’, which poses another obstacle for CSOs to achieve further
democratic impetus.
The ‘inertia’ lies first of all in the ideological aspect. As we will discuss in
Chapter V, the Commission has been disregarding the callings of the ‘green alliance’
(composed of CSOs, green MEPs and tens of Member States) for stricter regulation of
nanomaterials, prioritizing competitiveness and innovation over precautionary
approaches. A campaigner of FoE Australia shows concerns that apart from intense
lobbying pressure from the powerful industries, there are deeper ‘systemic problems’,
that is,《the institutionalized belief that social progress is the same thing as continuous
technological advancement.》209 A policy officer of CIEL argues that it is widely
believed among the Commission that technology innovation is equal to progress, and
progress worth taking risks. This poses a real challenge for the involvement of CSOs,
《you can discuss as much as you want, but if you are really challenging this ideology,
then you are laying behind.》210 Other interviewees also boil down the lack of action
to the ideological flaws that exist in the mind of the EU regulators, especially those of
the Commission. A green MEP advisor concluded two factors: on the one hand, the
209 Sales, Louise. 2014. “Corporate influence over nanotechnologiesregulation. ”
http://www.foe.org.au/corporate-influence-over-nanotechnology-regulation
210 Interview with David Azoulay, Managing Attorney of CIEL, August 2014
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industry does not want to provide any information; on the other hand, several DGs
ENTR hold their own mindset, believing that nano-specific provisions are not
necessary211. ETUI also mentioned two points,
“I think the approach taken by the Commission is about not threatening or
putting in danger issues of competitiveness or economic growth. The other thing
is that the Commission does not want to over-regulate new technologies.”212
When standing in the dilemma of regulating ‘too early / too late’, the
Commission appears to pay less attention to the possible negative consequences in the
latter case, which may take tens of years to emerge and to be proved. According to a
report drafted by the European Environment Agency (EEA),《there remains a
developmental environment that hinders the adoption of precautionary yet socially
and economically responsive strategies in the field of nanotechnology》(EEA 2013,
530). New technologies are assumed to hold great potentials in pulling the economic
development and helping the EU to get out of the financial crisis, which is considered
to be a more urgent issue.
With various actors pulling and pushing in different directions, which hold
diverse policy preferences and interests, it may take long time to reconcile those
differences and come up with an ambitious change as envisaged by STS scholars.
C. Conclusion
Chapter IV provides analysis about the dynamics and key features of EU level
CSOs during alliance-forming phase (2009 onwards), presenting two approaches of
CSOs in addressing nanotechnologies issues: on the one hand, ‘upstream public
engagement’ employed for nanotechnologies enables CSOs to be better informed, and
sooner become part of the policy debates. A good number of CSOs portrayed
211 Interview with a Green MEPs adviser, June 2014, Brussels
212 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode Project Coordinator within ETUI, December 2014
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themselves as ‘constructive participants’, which have abandoned radical and
confrontational tactics and refrained from conducting anti-nanotech campaigns. These
CSOs have developed enhanced cooperation and played participative and
complementary roles in nano debates. On the other hand, some CSOs, including
Greenpeace UK, FoE Europe and HEAL, have quit this field in frustration at the
tokenistic engagement and out of fatigue after the intense lobbying battle for REACH.
The stagnation of CSOs’ activities renders STS scholars’ assumptions such as
‘ongoing deliberation’ (Wilsdon, Wynne and Stilgoe 2005) or ‘a continuous flow’
(Mohr 2007) untenable.
Some encouraging signals towards more democratic governance of nanotech
can be examined, and there is research suggesting that《public thematization of
“nanos” reveals a turning point in the way along which scientific research fall within
society》(Suraud 2013). By contrast, others point out that the endeavors and research
results of social scientists could easily get lost in institutional translations (Joly and
Kaufmann 2008). Just as the discrepancies between laboratory and real-world results
that often happened in the studies of natural sciences, many unexpected factors could
influence the translation process from theories into practice. This chapter investigates
the factors which may contribute or limit CSOs’ involvement in policy debates.
There are scholars who have explained the reasons behind the stagnation of
CSOs’ engagement, for instance low policy impact, low public responsiveness (Seifert
and Plows 2014), broader institutional and cultural contexts (Krabbenborg and
Mulder 2015). The present dissertation, on the basis of extensive interviews with
CSOs and policy-makers, provides a detailed analysis of the factors, both internal and
external, that should be taken into consideration in order to track the dynamics of
green activism at the EU level. It concludes that the ‘upstream’ nature of
nanotechnologies can be ‘boost’ for certain CSOs, while proved to be ‘irrelevant’ or
‘unattractive’ for the others. Given the persistent obstacles to institutional learning
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about new technologies, this dissertation holds the view that, at least in the EU, the
governance of nanotechnologies represents a ‘shift’ rather than a ‘turning point’.
CSOs are considered as important dialogue partners, and their responses could to
some extent indicate the effectiveness of public engagement initiatives. A good
understanding of different CSOs’ approaches towards nanotechnologies could act as a
first step to better formulate the structures and arrangement of engagement activities
in the future.
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Chapter V: The interplay between CSOs and system
This chapter investigates the process of transformation from ‘influence’ into
‘communicative power’ in the Habermasian sense. It seeks to explore whether and
how CSOs could succeed in bringing some policy outcomes and how they attempt to
do this. A close look at the policy-making process around nanomaterials enables me to
loosely divide the main actors involved into two advocacy coalitions: the pro-industry
alliance (which is composed of DG ENT, DG Employment, industries, etc.) vis-à-vis
the green alliance (which is composed of environmental ministers of ten Member
States, CSOs, green MEPs, DG ENV, etc.). Table 5 summarizes the members of the
green alliance.
Table 5. Composition of the green alliance
Main actors at
the EU level
DGs Environment; Green MEPs (Hiltrud Breyer, Caroline Lucas, etc.)
CSOs:
CIEL, EEB, BUND, ETUC, BEUC, ANEC, ClientEarth, and ECOS
National competent authorities:
Henrik Eriksen (Norway), Paul Magnette (Belgium), Ida Auken (Denmark),
Norbert Roettgen (Germany), Ségolene Royal (France), Alexander Zilberszac
(Austria), Joop Atsma (the Netherlands), Carl Schlyter (Sweden)
Supportive
actors at
the EU level
EU Member States:
Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, and Croatia
CSOs:
FoE Europe, WECF, MIO-ECSDE, and HCWH Europe
International
supportive actors
CSOs:
FoE Australia and the U.S.
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A good number of examples will be employed to fully elucidate the role of CSOs
in the process of alliance-forming. My argument is that CSOs, with their closer
proximity to the grassroots constituencies and higher sensibility to societal problems,
could add vibrancy to the public spheres and build up a modest level of
counter-expertise vis-à-vis the powerful industries.
In the following sections, I will first introduce CSOs’ advocacy in monitoring
three layers of legislation on nanomaterials (i.e. product-specific legislation, registry
of nanomaterials, nano in REACH), specifying what gains CSOs have achieved and
what remain disregarded. Specific attention will be paid to the role of CSOs in
inspiring and mobilizing a good number of actors to support their demands. I will then
turn to discussing how public spheres, “a sounding board for problems”, amplify the
pressure of problems and exert influences on the economic system. I conclude with a
synthesis and some suggestions for the studies of ‘upstream public engagement’ in
emerging technologies.
A. CSOs’ influences on the political system: three layers of legislation
Since 2009, various nano-related legislation activities ave been developed in the
EU, including the definition of nanomaterials, the specific provisions on
nanomaterials in sectoral regulations (e.g. the Cosmetic Directive, the Novel Food
Directive), national initiatives in France, Belgium and Denmark to adopt national
mandatory nano registers, etc. Otto Linher, Deputy Head of the Chemicals Industry
Unit of the EC, identifies three layers of legislation on nanomaterials, which include:
· legislation for specific products which contain nanomaterials;
· the registry of nanomaterials;
· and REACH to deal with nanomaterials as substances or mixtures213.
213 Köster, V. (2013). The Challenges of Regulating Nanomaterials. ChemViews.
http://doi.org/10.1002/chemv.201300093
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The regulatory landscape of nanotechnology in the EU continues to shift and is
marked by increasing divergence between the Commission, the Parliament, Member
States, CSOs, industries, and other stakeholders. As previous literature indicates, the
main actors in the EU are《pulling and pushing in different directions》(Castillo 2013).
In this light, some important questions come to the fore: what does this institutional
divergence imply for the maneuvering space of CSOs? How does ‘administrative
power ’ and ‘communicative power ’ interplay in the regulatory process of
nanomaterials? The dissertation explores these questions by firstly drawing on
Habermas’s thought on law to investigate the communication process.
1. Law: a transformer between system and lifeworld
As Habermas puts it,《the legal code not only keeps one foot in the medium of
ordinary language… It also accepts messages that originate there and puts these into
a form that is comprehensible to the special codes of the power-steered administration
and the money-steered economy》(Habermas 1996, 81). Thus, Habermas uses the
language of law as a ‘transformer’ circulating between system and lifeworld. The
question with regard to whether and to what extent communicative power actually
underlies the administrative power of the government becomes operationalized. We
need to track the lawmaking process in order to answer this question.
According to Habermas, CSOs, through resonant and autonomous public spheres,
could influence the political system “in a siege-like manner”:《public influence is
transformed into communicative power only after it passes through the filters of the
institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion- and will-formation and enters
through parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking... Not influence per se, but
influence transformed into communicative power legitimates political decisions.》
(Habermas 1996, 371). Habermas’s thoughts offer a theoretical entry point for looking
at how CSOs actively seek to access and embed themselves in the policy network
relating nanotechnologies so as to improve the effectiveness of their involvement and
to transform ‘influence’, via the medium of law, into ‘communicative power’.
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Given the fact that there is no nano-specific provision within the EU regulatory
framework, CSOs have been closely following the lawmaking process of
nanomaterials through various means, such as lobbying, releasing position paper and
joint letters. They have also been actively participating in public consultation, on
invitation or at their own initiatives. Based on analyses of CSOs’ reports, position
papers, as well as semi-structured interviews with campaigners, we could observe a
cooperative and complementary approach among CSOs in dealing with the
above-mentioned three layers of legislation:
EEB and BEUC closely fol lowed the food and cosmetic legislat ion
revision—two sensitive sectors that the public showed high concerns; HCWH Europe
focused specifically on nanomaterials in health care sectors214; ANEC addressed
nanomaterials in articles, e.g. toys, textiles; CIEL, ClientEarth and BUND proposed a
stand-alone ‘nano patch’ to address the loopholes of REACH in dealing with
nanomaterials (Azoulay and Buonsante 2012); ETUC highlighted the issue of
transparency and traceability of nanomaterials in its resolution (ETUC 2010). Besides,
CSOs expressed common interest in the definition issue as well as nano registry. They
called for the establishment of a mandatory reporting system of nanomaterials at the
EU level, or at national level during the transitory period. As an interviewed policy
officer of BEUC put it,
“we have in different CSOs experts focusing on different areas relevant for
nanomaterials. We have worked with them together. All CSOs in Brussels put
their expertise and knowledge together on nanomaterials.”215
214 HCWH Europe. 2012. “Nanomedicine new solutions or new problems?”
https://noharm-europe.org/sites/default/files/documents-files/2462/HCWH%20Europe%20Nanoreport.pdf
215 Interview with Sylvia Maurer, head of BEUC Sustainability and Safety, 14/07/2014
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The following sections review the recent evolution of policy debates regarding
the above-mentioned three layers of legislation. It will be examined with regard to
how and to what extent CSOs’ demands were integrated into the regulatory process,
and how CSOs’ involvement contributed to shifting the power distribution among the
EU governing institutions and Member States.
2. Product-specific legislation
The resolution of the Parliament called for《a multi-faceted, differentiated and
adaptive body of law based on the precautionary principle》to cover nanomaterial in
the EU (EP 2009b). The EC was urged to conduct a review of all relevant legislation
within two years. Since then, several pieces of sectoral regulations started to
incorporate specific provisions on nanomaterials. Discussions around the definition
of nanomaterials also speeded up.
Among CSOs which address product-specific legislation, we could find more
consumer associations (e.g. BEUC, ANEC, Which?, ECOS) and a few environmental
organizations (EEB, FoE Europe, BUND, etc.). They have been calling for the
incorporation of nano-specific requirements, which include the introduction of a
nanomaterials definition, labeling of nano-products, bans of certain nanoparticle,
specific risk assessment, etc. Nano-applications and products intended for direct
consumer use, for instance in food or cosmetic, have received particular attention.
Besides, they have also been advocating to drive the innovations of nanotechnology
applications in line with real societal needs and sustainable development.
Various strategies have been used by CSOs to make their voices and concerns
heard by the EU regulatory bodies. For example, three consumer associations,
including ANEC, BEUC and the Austrian Standards Institute Consumer Council, have
organized two conferences in 2011 216 and 2013 217 respectively, calling for
216 http://www.anec.eu/attachments/Conference%20on%20chemicals%20in%20products.htm
217 http://www.anec.eu/attachments/ANEC%20ASI%20CC%20Conference%20Home.htm
１４０
strengthening the legal framework for chemicals in products. Nanomaterial was also
on the agenda of the two conferences. Regulatory authorities from Member States,
which include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, have
participated in the conferences. According to an interviewed policy officer of ANEC,
“the basic message is that with regard to chemicals in articles, REACH is not an
appropriate instrument for doing this. Therefore we need an effort to better
regulate chemicals in products by using product regulations… When we did
the conference, we had the support of a number of authorities from some
Member States.”218
With the objective of addressing chemicals in products in mind, consumer
associations have been closely following the regulatory process in developing several
pieces of legal instruments that incorporate nanomaterials. The policy debates around
the following areas will be introduced: cosmetics, food, electrical and electronic
equipment, biocide. I’ll also discuss the heated debate around the definition of
nanomaterial. A close look at what happened in the ‘political battleground’ enables us
to see how different stakeholders try to defend certain interests and frame an issue
from different perspectives. We’ll see how CSO ‘distill’, ‘transmit’ and ‘problematize’
societal concerns in amplified form to the public sphere.
2.1. Nanomaterial in cosmetics: CSOs’ first success
The New Regulation for Cosmetic Products (EC/1229/2009), which replaces the
former 1976 cosmetics Directive, is the first European legal tool that provides specific
provisions for nanomaterials used in consumer products. It is also for the first time
that a piece of law in the EU contains a legislative definition of nanomaterial. Green
MEP Hiltrud Breyer commented the revision of cosmetics legislation as ‘a radical
departure’ from the previous EU position219, in which the Commission has stated in its
218 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
219 Hiltrud Breyer Press Release.2009. “A lift for cosmetics legislation as Greens secure nanomaterial safeguards.”
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first regulatory review that《current legislation covers to a large extent risks in
relation to nanomaterial and that risks can be dealt with under the current legislative
framework》(EC 2008e). During the process in revising the cosmetic legislation, CSOs,
with the support of the EP, have been struggling to push forward the integration of
nanomaterial in cosmetic regulation. The final adoption can be considered as the first
success of CSOs in product-specific legislation .
Caroline Lucas, Green party MEP for the south-east of England, has shown her
concerns about nano-enabled cosmetics since 2003220. As she put it, with everyday
health and beauty nano-products being introduced into markets,《thousands of women
are acting as unwitting ‘guinea pigs’ for the cosmetics industry.》221 And she called for
a moratorium on products applied to the skin222. In 2006, the EC estimated that 5% of
cosmetic products contained nanoparticles223. The PEN nanomaterial database made
by Wilson Center indicates that ‘Health and Fitness’ has been the largest main
category since its first inventory in 2006 (See Figure 5) . Most experts of RIVM panel
shared the view that《personal care products and cosmetics are expected to lead to
high possible exposure》(RIVM 2009, 5).
http://hiltrudbreyer.eu/en/ct/488-A-lift-for-cosmetics-legislation-as-Greens-secure-nanomaterial-safeguards
220 Written Question by Caroline Lucas (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. 1 July 2003
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:92003E002248
221 Press release of Green Party. “Women face greater exposure to ‘grey goo’ science.” May 22.
https://www.greenparty.org.the UK/archive/news-archive/568.html
222 Cordis News. 2003. “Nanotechnology: Opportunity or Threat?”
http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/20401_en.html
223 ObservatoryNANO.2010. “Nanotechnology in Cosmetics.”
http://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/3405965/nanotechnology-in-cosmetics-observatorynano
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Figure 5: Number of nanotechnology consumer products
Source: Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies224
At the EU level, it is mainly the consumer associations which follow this issue.
For example, consumer association Which? wrote to 67 cosmetics companies and
asked for information with respect to the use of nanotechnology in their products,
getting very poor response (Which? 2008b). FoE Europe has not made as much as
effort compared with its sister organizations located in Australia or the U.S., which
called for《a moratorium on the further commercial release of personal care products
that contain engineered nanomaterial》until they proved to pose no harm to
safety and environment (Miller 2006).
Faced with rising concerns from civil society, accompanied by industry’s
reluctance to share information, the Scientific Committee on Consumer Products
(SCCP) was requested by the EC to provide a scientific opinion in this regard. Its
224 Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies. 2013. “Consumer Products Inventory.”
http://www.nanotechproject.org/cpi
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report indicated ‘insufficient knowledge’ in various key areas (hazard identification,
exposure assessment, possible health effects, etc.) as well as methodological
difficulties in assessing the safety of cosmetics containing nanoparticles (SCCP 2007).
Subsequent to this opinion, a DG Enterprise sent a letter to one representative of
cosmetic industry, highlighting the urgent need to provide more information:《without
these gaps being closed, it will, in the medium term, be hardly defendable for industry
and authorities to assert that cosmetic products containing nanomaterial are safe.》225
However, when we examine the EC’s proposal for a Cosmetic Regulation, which was
initiated on 5th February, 2008, we found no specific rules relating to nanomaterial
(EC 2008c ).
According to green MEP Hiltrud Breyer, it was through the initiative of the
Greens/European Free Alliance that nanomaterial finally appeared on the policy
agenda226. A policy officer of BEUC introduced the role that they have played in this
process:
“we looked into specific types of legislation and we tried to make sure that
policymakers took the consumer interests into account... When cosmetic
legislation was revised, we managed to trigger amendments, (which were)
adopted by the EP.”227
During the Parliament’s Environment Committee meeting, nanomaterial became
a topic which has triggered heated debate. The greens held very strict stance and
proposed banning all nanomaterial except those which could gain specific approval228.
During the debate around the recast version of cosmetic products, Green MEP
225 Chemical watch. 2008. “EU gets tough on data gaps for nano in cosmetics.” September 11.
https://chemicalwatch.com/1079/eu-gets-tough-on-data-gaps-for-nano-in-cosmetics
226 Debates on Cosmetic products, 23 March 2009, Strasbourg
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090323+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+
V0//EN&language=hr&query=INTERV&detail=1-110
227 Interview with Sylvia Maurer, head of BEUC Sustainability and Safety, 14/07/2014
228 Chemical Watch. 2008. “MEPs battle over amendments to EU cosmetics Regulation.” December 03.
https://chemicalwatch.com/1433/meps-battle-over-amendments-to-eu-cosmetics-regulation
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Margrete Auken noted that《this has been a tough fight. It is as though the industry
has tried to stifle the debate on the safety of nanomaterials.》229 Although the banning
proposal was defeated, MEPs reached agreements on other amendments like labeling
on nanomaterials. Finally, the EP voted and adopted the proposed Regulation for
Cosmetic Products in March 2009 (EC 2009b). This result was applauded by CSOs,
which claimed that《we are pleased that our campaigning on nanomaterial has
finally reaped some rewards.》230
The new Cosmetic Regulation came into effect in July 2013, which included
several provisions that dealt with nanomaterials specifically. Firstly, a definition of
nanomaterial was for the first time provided, which went as:《an insoluble or
biopersistant and intentionally manufactured material with one or more external
dimensions, or an internal structure, on the scale from 1 to 100 nm》(Ibid.). This
definition was considered as “a step in the right direction”, but the scope of definition
was considered by CSOs and green MEPs as too narrow. The new regulation of
cosmetic products also highlighted the need to assess and label nanomaterials. For
example, the article 16 demanded that《cosmetic products containing nanomaterials
shall be notified to the Commission... six months prior to being placed on the market》,
and the article 19 required that《all ingredients present in the form of nanomaterials
shall be clearly indicated in the list of ingredients. The names of such ingredients
shall be followed by the word ‘nano’ in brackets》(Ibid.). However, the labeling on
cosmetics was resisted by Germany, which believed that a product contained
nanomaterial could be viewed by consumers as a warning231.
As a consequence, the EU became the first region in the world that adopted
nano-specific provision. This made CIEL believe that there were more opportunities
229 Debates on Cosmetic products, 23 March 2009, Strasbourg
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090323+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+
V0//EN&language=HR
230 BEUC(2009) nanomaterial in Cosmetics: BEUC cautiously welcomes new regulation.
231 EurActiv. 2009. “Germany opposed ‘nano’ label for cosmetics.” November 24
http://www.euractiv.com/enterprise-jobs/germany-opposed-nano-label-cosmetics/article-187583
１４５
for CSOs to get involved in the EU232. Thus, the achievements not only lay in concrete
policy uptake, but also represented in《the ambition of changes have been linked》233.
More CSOs started to join the debate and to assume the role of watchdog
to monitor the implementation of the cosmetic regulation.
BEUC has utilized different occasions to advocate their demands. For example,
during the 3rd Nanotechnology Safety for Success Dialogue, its policy officer used
NanoTiO2 in sunscreens and cosmetics as a case study to show their concerns over
the loopholes in the new cosmetics regulation, e.g. restrictive definition, enforcement,
doubt over the control system for existing products234. When the Commission released
the recommendation on the definition of nanomaterial, BEUC came up with a
proposal to align the two differing definitions, highlighting several elements that
should be taken into account, for instance, lowering down the number of particles to
0.15%, including nano-particles below 1 nm such as fullerenes, covering
by-products and so forth (BEUC 2012).
While the regulation requires that《by 11 January 2014, the Commission shall
make available a catalogue of all nanomaterial used in cosmetic products placed on
the market... indicating the categories of cosmetic products and the reasonably
foreseeable exposure conditions》(EC 2009b), there is already more than one year
overdue. And such a catalogue is not established yet. CSOs expressed their
dissatisfaction with regard to the delay and the inadequate information that have been
allocated by the EC (EEB et al. 2015).
According to the EC, this delay was caused by ‘erroneous notifications’ provided
by the cosmetic industries235. A DG SANCO was reported to encourage the cosmetics
232 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
233 Interview with a DG ENV, in charge of incorporating nanomaterials in REACH and CLP Regulation, June
2014, Brussels
234 3rd annual nanotechnology Safety for Success Dialogue Workshop, 3-4 November 2009
http://ec.europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/docs/ev_20091103_co06_en.pdf
235 Chemical Watch. 2015. “Anomalies in notifications behind nanomaterial inventory delay.” March 05.
https://chemicalwatch.com/23044/anomalies-in-notifications-behind-nanomaterials-inventory-delay
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industry to take the rules regarding nanotechnology ‘seriously’ to avoid the
stigmatization of nanomaterials236. Industry association Cosmetics Europe identified
several ‘loose ends’ in the implementation of the EU cosmetics regulation, with
nanomaterial being《the biggest open end of all》237. According to him, this was
because the regulation was enacted when little was known about nanotechnologies,
but political anxiety was high. A review with regard to the provisions concerning
nanomaterial in cosmetics will be undertaken by 11 July 2018.
2.2. The definition of nanomaterial
A clear and overarching definition is the cornerstone for further regulatory
activities. After the first version of definition adopted in the New Regulation for
Cosmetic Products (EC/1229/2009), more and more stakeholders started to pay
specific attention to questions regarding how nanomaterial should be defined and how
to incorporate such a definition in different pieces of law.
As early as in its first resolution, ETUC has highlighted the “urgent need” of a
standardized terminology for nanomaterials. And it proposed that the definition of
nanomaterials should not restrict to objects below 100 nanometers in one or more
dimensions (ETUC 2008). The EP called for the EC to introduce ‘a comprehensive
science-based definition of nanomaterials’ (EP 2009b). Under growing pressure
calling for a clear definition, the EC issued its draft recommendation of nanomaterials
definition in 2010. During the public consultation period, a total of 195 stakeholders’
responses were received238. Great divergences can be remarked among CSOs,
industries and different DGs in several aspects , among which the size range and
number distribution threshold triggered most disagreements.
236 Chemical Watch. 2014. “EU cosmetics industry must address nano perception, says Commission.” June 11.
https://chemicalwatch.com/20114/eu-cosmetics-industry-must-address-nano-perception-says-commission
237 Chemical Watch. 2015. CosmeticsEurope highlights Regulation’s ‘loose ends’. April 20.
https://chemicalwatch.com/23583/cosmeticseurope-highlights-regulations-loose-ends
238 Public consultation on the definition of nanomaterials
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/consultations/pdf/Nano_Consultation%20comments.pdf
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According to DG ENV Henrik Laursen,《it is easy to agree it should be based on
science... we will have to make a policy decision.》239 After the release of the draft
definition drawn up by DG ENV, discussions have heated up. And there existed
antagonistic opinions among different DGs of the Commission, representing their
respective interests and values240. According to Chemical Watch, DG ENTR called for
‘mass’ to be used as the measuring unit for nanomaterials, while DG SANCO insisted
a particles-based way. Regarding the 1% size distribution percentage proposed by DG
ENV, DGs ENTR considered it as too strict and demanded a dramatic increase to 50%,
while DG SANCO asked for the percentage to be lowered to 0.15% to be in
accordance with the recommendation of SCENIHR241. DG ENV Karl Falkenberg
noted that the definition issue is《triangular—we have to put together environmental,
trade and health perspectives》242.
Regarding the definition issue, CSOs have united their forces to contribute to the
public consultation. They also invited international partners to participate in the
debate. As a result, a coalition of 46 global CSOs was established under the
coordination of EEB and CIEL, which favored a “cautious and broad” definition of
nanomaterial243. An interviewed policy officer of CIEL described the rationale behind
this coalition:
“they (e.g. FoE Australia) have lots of technical knowledge, and we have lots of
institutional knowledge about the EU. So we put forces together to bring more
expertise into the process.”244
239 Chemical Watch. 2011. “EU Commission expects legal nano definition before mid year.” March 31.
https://chemicalwatch.com/7119/eu-commission-expects-legal-nano-definition-before-mid-year
240 Chemical Watch. 2011. “Nano definition continues to divide European Commission. Questions remain on
adequacy of REACH for nano.” September 23.
241 Chemical Watch. 2011. “EU Commission directorates argue over nano definition.” April 6.
https://chemicalwatch.com/7163/eu-commission-directorates-argue-over-nano-definition
242 Chemical Watch. “EU Commission directorates argue over nano definition.”
243 CIEL et al. 2010. “Reply form for the public consultation on Proposal for a Commission definition of the term
‘nanomaterial’”. http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Nanomaterials_ReplyForm_Nov10.pdf
244 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
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The coalition of CSOs argued that the recommended size range of 1 nm-100 nm
was too restrictive, and they pointed out their favor for a larger size range (i.e. 0.3 to
300 nm2) to define nanomaterial. ANEC further reminded the EU policymakers the
necessity to take into account the specific features of nanomaterials used in medical
applications, which were in the size range of 1000 nm245. FoE Australia criticized the
draft proposal of nanoscale upper limit of 100nm advised by International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), claiming that《the ISO definition will in turn
cite this (SCENIHR) review… This cycle of self-referencing could continue and
infinite》246.
By contrast, industries represented by European Chemical industry Council
(CEFIC) urged that the definition should be in line with international organization like
ISO and OECD so as to “avoid barriers to, or distortions of trade”247. CEFIC proposed
using weight based size distribution instead of number based size distribution. And it
also objected to the inclusion of aggregate and agglomerate. Its demands actually
went against the recommendation of CSOs and DG ENV. For fear of certain
nanomaterials escaping the scope of further legislative regulation, CSOs preferred a
broader definition so as to better protect health and environment. An interviewed DG
SANCO pointed out the dilemma in fixing a definition of nanomaterials,
“the problem is if you offer too broad, then you can take plenty of
nanomaterials which do not require any specific handling. If you are too
restrictive, you miss so many cases that you should take care of.”248
245 ANEC Statement. 2011. “The European Commission needs to define what nanomaterials are in order to offer
consumers effective protection.” March 29. http://www.anec.eu/attachments/ANEC-PR-2011-PRL-008.pdf
246 Public consultation on the definition of nanomaterials. pp116.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/consultations/pdf/Nano_Consultation%20comments.pdf
247 Public consultation on the definition of nanomaterials: Compilation of responses. pp123.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/consultations/pdf/Nano_Consultation%20comments.pdf
248 Interview with a DG SANCO, who is in charge of the working groups of the European Scientific Committee
on Emerging to develop risk assessment and methodologies and to develop potentially regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials,17/06/2014
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On 18 th October, 2011, the EC adopted the definition of nanomaterial:
《‘nanomaterial’means a natural, incidental or manufactured material containing
particles, in an unbound state or as an aggregate or as an agglomerate and where,
for 50 % or more of the particles in the number size distribution, one or more
external dimensions is in the size range 1 nm-100 nm》(EC 2011). The following
table provides a summary of different stakeholders’ preference towards the elements
of nanomaterial definition.
Table 6. Different views towards nanomaterial definition
Measuring
unit
Size
range
Number
distribution
threshold
Inclusion of
aggregates and
agglomerates
Draft
version
Particle numbers 1-100 nm 1 % Support
CSOs Particle numbers 0.3-300 nm 1% Support
Industry Mass
concentration
1-100 nm 50% Against
Adopted version Particle numbers 1-100 nm 50% Support
As a scholar put it,《nanotechnology is not a definite technology, but an empty
signifier and a political project that serves certain interests and strategies》
(Wullweber 2008). An interviewed DG SANCO also noted that《it is sometimes
difficult to reconcile politics with science.》249 The recommended definition was
questioned by industries as too broad (e.g. CEFIC), while considered by CSOs as too
narrow (e.g. EEB, CIEL). Industries reaffirmed their opinion that weight
249 Interview with a DG SANCO, who is in charge of the working groups of the European Scientific Committee
on Emerging to develop risk assessment and methodologies and to develop potentially regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials, 17/06/2014
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concentration instead of particle number distribution should be used to determine the
cut-off criterion for nanomaterials250. CSOs pointed out that it was remarkable to see
the 50% number distribution threshold finally adopted was 50 times greater than 1%
suggested in the draft proposal, and 333 times greater than 0.15% recommended by
SCENIHR. FoE Australia argued that the finally adopted definition reflected intense
industry lobbying251. In spite of the ongoing tension, the EU is the only jurisdiction
with a horizontal legal definition of nanomaterials in place252, which represents a
significant step forward.
To summarize, discussions about the definition of nanomaterial become an
intense trade-off among stakeholders who stick to different values and interests. As a
scholar puts it《uncertainty and risk are no longer seen strictly as matters of
science(what do we know or not know), but of pre ference, cul ture and
value (what should we do or not do)》(Pidgeon 2008).
2.3. EP: to ban certain nanomaterials in electrical and electronic equipment
(EEE)
The debate on nanomaterial in EEE is worth studying, as it demonstrates the
ambitious and precautionary stance of the Parliament as well as the intense resistance
of industries and other stakeholders. Similar with the Cosmetic Regulation, the
original proposal of the Commission to revise the Restriction of Hazardous
Substances Directive (RoHS Directive) did not contain any specific provisions on
nanomaterials (EC 2008b). Green MEP Jill Evans was appointed as rapporteur to draft
a report, which noted that《proposals for specific provisions on nanomaterials will be
added in January 2010 following further evaluation of the situation》(EP 2009a).
250 Chemical Watch. 2011. “Industry, NGOs comment on EU Commission's nanomaterial definition.” October 18
https://chemicalwatch.com/8751/industry-ngos-comment-on-eu-commissions-nanomaterial-definition
251 FoEAustralia. 2010. “European Commission caves to industry pressure on nano definition, leaves people and
environment at risk.” October 19.
http://emergingtech.foe.org.au/european-commission-caves-industry-pressure-nano-definition-leaving-people-and-
environment-risk/
252 CIEL, ECOS & Öko-Institut. 2014. “Nanomaterials definition fact sheet.” November 02.
http://ecostandard.org/wp-content/uploads/Nano_definition.pdf
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CSOs seized this opportunity and lobbied the Council and the EP to submit additional
amendments to restrict the use of nanosilver in EEE products, arguing that its ionic
form has《environmentally damaging properties and is acutely toxic to
aquatic organisms at very low concentrations》(EEB, HEAL, and WECF 2010).
In reviewing a set of amendments to the RoHS Directive in EEE, MEPs held
different views with regard to whether or not to ban new substances. Rapporteur Jill
Evans proposed in the Amendment 97 to prohibit the use of nanosilver and certain
carbon nanotubes in EEE on the grounds that some uses of nanosilver were
‘superfluous’, and carbon nanotubes could have asbestos-like properties (Evans
2010a). Orgalime, the European Engineering Industries Association, considered this
proposed amendment《lacks any scientific evidence and justification》253. And it urged
the committee to reject it. Other MEPs (Kathleen Van Brempt, Judith A. Merkies and
Åsa Westlund) noted in Amendment 317 that《further research remaining necessary,
labelling would be a first step to support careful handling of these substances》(Evans
2010b).
On 15th June, 2010, MEP Jill Evans finalized the report tabled for plenary, with
several rigorous and ambitious measures concerning nanomaterials introduced:
labeling of EEE that contains nanomaterial (Amendment 15), definition of
nanomaterial (Amendment 37), notification (Amendment 52), prohibiting the use of
certain hazardous substances (i.e. nanosilver and long multi-walled carbon nanotubes)
in EEE (Amendment 88), etc. (EP 2010). The Parliament justified these amendments
related to nanomaterials by highlighting the risks that nanomaterials could pose to
health and environment. For example, Amendment 6 stated that《some carbon
nanotubes may behave like asbestos fibres》and《nanosilver particles… may
have severe impacts on soil, aquatic and terrestrial organisms》(Ibid.).
253 Orgalime Position Paper. 2010. “COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DRAFT REPORT OF
RAPPORTEUR JILL EVANS ON THE PROPOSAL FORA RECAST RoHS DIRECTIVE 2002/95/EC
2008/0240(COD) .” February 17.
http://www.orgalime.org/sites/default/files/position-papers/PP_Comments_Rapporteur_Evans_RoHS_report_Feb1
0.pdf
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This report is considered by scholars as《a remarkable step towards making
Europe the first region to ban certain types of nanomaterial》(Nasu and Faunce 2012).
Industries commented the initiative of the Parliament《with strong language and a
heavy hand.》254 The proposals of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health
and Food Safety (ENVI) triggered fierce opposition from the industry. For example,
NIA considered the demand for labeling proposal ‘nonsensical’, as 《every transistor
in a computer chip would...include a hazardous substance.》255
Partly owing to the strong opposition from the industry as well as the
divergences within the EP, the approved RoHS Recast Directive, which was adopted
in June 2011, represented ‘a significant setback backwards’ from the original draft
report. Various ambitious proposed amendments regarding nanomaterials were
removed. And only the following commitment was made,
“as soon as scientific evidence is available, and taking into account the
precautionary principle, the restriction of other hazardous substances, including any
substance of very small size or with a very small internal or surface structure
(nanomaterial) which may be hazardous due to properties relating to their size or
structure, and their substitution by more environmentally friendly alternatives which
ensure at least the same level of protection of consumers should be examined.”
(Official Journal of the European Union 2011a, preamble paragraph 16)
Although the precautionary principle was acknowledged, no new substances
were added to the existing blacklist. In response to the result, green MEPs and CSOs,
while preferred stronger legislation, considered the compromise as an improvement.
254 NIA. 2010. “European Parliament approaches nanomaterial in Electrical and Electronic Equipment with strong
Language and a heavy Hand.” April 27.
http://www.nanotechia.co.theUK/news/news-articles/european-parliament-approaches-nanomaterials-electrical-an
d-electronic-equipment
255 NIANews. 2010. “’Hazardous Substance inside?’NIA comments on Demands for Labelling of Electronics.”
June 14
http://www.nanotechia.org/news/nia-press/hazardous-substance-inside-nia-comments-demands-labelling-electronic
s
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Rapporteur Jill Evans noted that nanomaterial, which would be subject to a priority
review under RoHS,《will no longer escape the oversight of the regulator.》256 To
conclude, the legislative discussion about nanomaterials in EEE products started with
ambitious proposals and ended up with limited take-up, illustrating the different
interpretation of the precautionary principle among the Parliament, the Council, CSOs
and other stakeholders.
2.4. Nanomaterials in food: an intense lobbying battle
Health and safety scandals over the past decade have triggered the enhancement
of the EU food regulation, e.g. the creation of European Food Safety Agency (EFSA)
as an independent European agency (Breggin et al. 2009, 64). These new institutional
settings further influenced the policy debates about nanomaterials in food regulation.
A close look at the policy-making process enabled us to see how scientific opinions
were finally translated (or not) into policy outcomes and what factors, in practice,
affect the translation process.
In January 2008, the Commission adopted a proposal to revise the Novel Foods,
acknowledging that《novel food should therefore include … foods modified by new
production processes, such as nanotechnology and nanoscience》(EC 2008d). The
recognition made by the EC signaled the beginning of a new lobbying battle: on the
one hand, CSOs advocated to put into place precautionary measures so as to better
protect health, safety, environment as well as consumers’ right to make informed
choices in choosing food; on the other hand, food industries like FoodDrinkEurope
highlighted the unnecessary administrative burden that new regulation related to
nanomaterials in food would bring257.
256 Chemical Watch. 2010. “European Parliament votes in favour of RoHS recast.” November 24.
https://chemicalwatch.com/6043/european-parliament-votes-in-favour-of-rohs-recast
257 Corporate Europe Observatory.‘Hard-core’ lobbying: a sample of “voting recommendations”sent by lobbyists
to MEPs on the new EU food labeling regulation.
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/files/article/voting-recommendations.pdf
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Among the CSOs involved, FoE Europe reacted quickly and held a tough stance
towards the use of nanotechnologies in the food sector. In April 2008, it published a
well-documented report concerning nanotechnologies in food and agriculture,
serving as a useful tool for other CSOs. This report identified 104 products that have
entered into the food chain, alarming possible new risks that nanotechnologies could
bring to human health, environment as well as broader challenges to the development
of more sustainable food and farming systems. In light of these risks and uncertainties,
FoE Europe called for《a moratorium on the further commercial release of food
products, food packaging, food contact materials and agrochemicals that contain
manufactured nanomaterial》(Miller and Senjen 2008) until new legislation
established. An interviewed policy officer of FoE Australia and U.S. pointed out
specifically their concerns over the influences that nanotechnologies could bring to
food culture, noting that,
“we could be eroding certain food culture with nanomateirals...Food is going
to be manipulated by technologies, and people have the right to give their
input.”258
With increasing demand for regulatory measures for the applications of
nanomaterials in the food sector, the Austrian Ministry of Health called for a
‘moratorium within a European context’ (Zilberszac 2008). EFSA was requested by
the EC to provide scientific opinions, with its result revealed great knowledge gaps.
EFSA’s opinions stated that available data on oral exposure to specific engineered
nanomaterial was ‘extremely limited’ and《any individual risk assessment is likely to
be subject to a high degree of uncertainty》(Barlow et al. 2009).
258 Interview with Ian Illuminato, policy officer of FoEAustralia and U.S., 23/03/2015
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Faced with great uncertainties and the fact that a growing number of food
products enabled by nanotechnologies entered into the EU market, more CSOs joined
the policy debate and demanded precautionary measures to be put into place. Their
proposals included mandatory labeling of nanomaterials in food, pre-market risk
assessment and approval. These CSOs closely followed the regulatory process by
releasing reports and position paper, sending letters to MEPs, participating in public
consultation (BEUC 2008; 2010; Which? 2010; EEB and MIO-ECSDE 2010). EEB
put nano-labeling in food as one of its top ten priorities in the first half of 2011259.
Following the organic farming association Naturland’ decision to remove all
nanomaterial from its products, BUND called for the exclusion of nanomaterial from
the organic food industry260.
According to an interviewed policy officer of BEUC,《in food and in cosmetics,
we have contacted policy advisors of the EP to create network.》261 CSOs’ constant
efforts have gained some results: on 25 th October, 2011, the EP and the Council
adopted the Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to
consumers, stating that《all ingredients present in the form of engineered
nanomaterials shall be clearly indicated in the list of ingredients. The names of such
ingredients shall be followed by the word ‘nano’ in brackets》(Official Journal of the
European Union 2011b, Article 18, paragraph 3).
The dust appeared to be settled. However, with the EC coming up with a
delegated act to amend the definition of ‘engineered nanomaterials’ in food, a new
round of debate started, with the divergence between the EC and the EP intensified. In
December 2013, the EC proposed that food additives should not be covered by the
definition of engineered nanomaterials in order not to ‘confuse the consumer’ (EC
259 Chemical Watch. 2010. “Tough rules for nano food ingredients top prioirity for H1 2011, says EEB.” Dcember
23.
260 Chemical Watch. 2011. “BUND recommends exclusion of nanomaterial from organically approved food.”
August 18.
https://chemicalwatch.com/8212/bund-recommends-exclusion-of-nanomaterials-from-organically-approved-food
261 Interview with Sylvia Maurer, head of BEUC Sustainability and Safety, 14/07/2014
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2013a, preamble paragraph 12). It also added a 50% nano-particles threshold to
qualify as nanomaterials (Ibid., article 1). This move fuelled anger of green MEP Carl
Schlyter, who argued that《the EP has repeatedly called for proper nano-labelling and
it is highly surprising that the Commission even tried to weaken what has been
decided by both Parliament and the Council.》262 According to the observation of
Corporate Europe Observatory, a non-profit group dedicated to exposing the impact of
corporate lobbying on the EU policy making, industry lobbyists from industries, for
instance ELC, FoodDrinkEurope and CEFIC, have managed to win their most
important demands263.
Believing that the justification provided by EC ‘erroneous and irrelevant’, the EP
rejected the delegated regulation, stating that the blanket exemption violated
consumers’ right to make informed choices. The EP also pointed out that a threshold
of 10% was more appropriate, as it was in line with the recommendation of EFSA (EP
2014). The tough stance of the EP was welcomed by BEUC, which sent a letter to
Committee members and urged them to support the Motivation of resolution (BEUC
2014). At the Assembly’s plenary session in Strasbourg, most MEPs voted for
rejecting the EC’s proposal, sending it back to the drawing board264.
In November 2014, the EP took a step further and voted to propose a moratorium
on the use of nanomaterials in food265. The committee report tabled for plenary stated
that foods for which production processes required specific risk assessment
—including nanomaterials— should not be authorized until they are approved by
EFSA (Nicholson 2014, 42). It was also noted that《only nanomaterials entered in a
262 European Parliament News. 2014. “Nanofoods: MEPs object to new labelling rules.” March 12.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140307IPR38125/html/Nanofoods-MEPs-object-to-
new-labelling-rules
263 Corporate Europe Observatory. 2014. “Food lobby fights labelling of nano ingredients.” March 10.
http://corporateeurope.org/agribusiness/2014/03/food-lobby-fights-labelling-nano-ingredients
264 EurActiv. 2014. “Parliament rejects draft EU law allowing nanomaterials in food.” March 12.
http://www.euractiv.com/health/parliament-opposes-commission-na-news-534093
265 ENVI Press release. 2014. “Novel foods: MEPs call for moratorium on nano-foods and labelling of cloned
meat.” November 25.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20141125IPR80424/html/Novel-foods-MEPs-call-for-
moratorium-on-nano-foods-and-labelling-of-cloned-meat
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list of approved substances should be present in food packaging》(Ibid., 25). MEPs
insisted on the 10% nano-particles threshold in the report (Ibid., 36). These measures
were considered by BEUC as “a wise move”266.
In light of the tough stance of the Parliament, the Commission made a
concession and decided to remove the exemption for the so-called ‘old’ food additives.
But the EC still maintained the originally-described 50% nano-particles threshold in
defining ‘engineered nanomaterial’267. At the time of writing, the negotiation is still
undergoing among major policymakers. The following diagram summarizes the
evolution of their position.
Table 7. Negotiation between the EC and the EP on nanomaterials in food
Particle distribution threshold Exempting certain food additives
EC proposal
(Dec 2013)
50% Support
EP resolution
(Feb 2014)
10% Against
EP report
(Dec 2014)
10% Against
EC revised proposal
(Dec 2014)
50% Against
266 BEUC. 2014. “EU Parliament upgrades novel food laws.” November 25.
http://www.beuc.org/publications/beuc-web-2014-028_eu_parliament_upgrades_novel_food_laws.pdf
267 Chemical Watch. 2014. “EU Commission revises nano food additives proposal.” December 01.
https://chemicalwatch.com/22100/eu-commission-revises-nano-food-additives-proposal
EC proposal: https://members.wto.org/crnattachments/2014/TBT/EEC/14_5251_00_e.pdf
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2.5. Nanomaterial in biocides
The Biocidal Product Regulation is the first piece of the EU legislation which
incorporates the Commission’s 2011 definition of nanomaterial. It is also described as
“the most ambitious piece of nanospecific legislation”268 given its stringent provisions
on nanomaterials. Various CSOs have joined their efforts and closely followed the
policy-making process.
Considering the fact that the original proposal of the EC contained no specific
provisions on nanomaterials, the EP became the driving force in advancing regulatory
action. ENVI released a draft report, suggesting several amendments related to
nanomaterial in biocide products (Klaß 2010). According to VeilleNanos, several
MEPs (e.g. the rapporteur Christa Klaß, Michèle RIVASI) have played ‘a role of
motor’ in preparing the text269. During this process, CSOs (e.g. PAN Germany, UK
and Europe, HEAL, EEB, WECF, HCWH Europe, BUND, IEW) have lobbied
heavily MEPs and the Council by sending a series of joint letters (e.g. in February270,
April271, June272, October273, December 2010274, and September 2011275).
These CSOs showed concerns about the wide use of nano-biocides and their
possible negative impact on human health and environment, alarming that 17 tonnes
268 Chemical Watch. 2014. “The biocides market for nano actives.” Global Business Briefing, May.
https://chemicalwatch.com/19748/the-biocides-market-for-nano-actives
269 VeilleNanos: Quel encadrement des nanomatériaux dans les biocides en Europe?
http://veillenanos.fr/wakka.php?wiki=ReglementationBiocidesEurope
270 Joint NGO Position on Draft report of EP – Rapporteur Christa Klaß (EPP) in view of the Commission
proposal for a regulation concerning the placing on the market and use of biocidal products – COM (2009) 267
final. 22-02-2010
http://www.env-health.org/IMG/pdf/NGO_Position_EPEnvi_KLASSReport_22_02_10_final.pdf
271 NGO recommendations in view of the considerations in the ENVI-Committee on the amendments to the
Commission’s proposal for a biocide regulation (COM 267) 27-04-2010
http://www.pan-germany.org/download/biocides/NGO_ENVI_recommendation_biocides_20100427.pdf
272 Joint NGO recommendations on the European Parliament ENVI Committee’s vote on amendments to the
Commission’s proposal for a biocide regulation (COM (2009) 0267), Brussels 22 June 2010
http://www.pan-germany.org/download/biocides/NGO_Position_EPEnvi_vote_biocides_100615.pdf
273 Joint NGO recommendations for the forthcoming considerations of Council Working Group for Environment
concerning the biocide regulation (COM (2009) 267) 12-10-2010
http://www.pan-germany.org/download/biocides/NGO_Council_biocides_20101012_final.pdf
274 Urgent recommendations concerning the biocide regulation. 14-12-2010
http://www.pan-germany.org/download/biocides/Biocides_Jointletter_Council_20101214.pdf
275 Joint NGO recommendations for EP ENVI Committee’s 2nd reading on the biocide regulation (COM (2009)
267) 06-09-2011
http://www.env-health.org/IMG/pdf/11006_NGO_recom_biocide-regulation_ENVI_2nd_reading.pdf
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of nano silver were released every year in water due to the machine washing of
anti-odour socks containing nano silver in France only276. On the one hand, there were
more and more biocidal products containing nanosilver (BEUC&ANEC 2012); on the
other, the information available was very limited: according to the reportage of
Chemical Watch, no data on nanosilver has been produced in the registration dossiers
until the 2010 REACH deadline.277
The Regulation was finally adopted in May 2012, with several requirements
tailored specifically to nanomaterials being introduced (Official Journal of the
European Union 2012):
· integrate the Commission’s new definition on nanomaterial (Article 3 (1)(z))
· the approval of an active substance not cover nanomaterial (Article 4(4))
· separate risk assessment for nanomaterial (Article 19(1)(f))
· exclusion of nanomaterial from the simplified authorization procedure (Article
25)
· mandatory labeling, with the word “nano” in brackets(Article 58 (3)(d))
· When test methods are applied to nanomaterial, an explanation shall be
provided of their scientific appropriateness for nanomaterial, and where applicable, of
the technical adaptations/adjustments that have been made in order to respond to the
specific characteristics of these materials (Annex III(5)) (Official Journal of the
European Union 2012).
As a policy officer of EEB put it,《MEPs have shown once again that
nanomaterials cannot be given a free ride until specific safety methods are
developed.》278 The revised Biocidal Product Regulation, which entered into force in
September 2013, was applauded by CSOs as “a definite step forward”279. Apart from
276 Recommendations from the « Agence française de sécurité sanitaire de l'environnement et du travail » (Afsset),
24 March 2010, http://www.afsset.fr/index.php?pageid=452&newsid=546&MDLCODE=news#
277 Chemical Watch. 2010. “REACH 2010 deadline will not yield data on nanosilver.” Global Business Briefing,
November https://chemicalwatch.com/5973/reach-2010-deadline-will-not-yield-data-on-nanosilver
278 Press release. 2010. “European Parliament Committee strengthens draft biocides law, but concerns remain.”
HEAL, PAN Germany and EEB. June 23. http://www.env-health.org/IMG/pdf/23062010_Biocides_ENVI.pdf
279 HEAL Press release. 2012. “EU biocides law considered a ‘standstill’ by NGOs.” January 19
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the above pieces of law, CSOs also advocated that all relevant product legislation
should incorporate nano specific requirements (EEB et al. 2014; ANEC 2014). For
example, ANEC demanded for banning the use of nanomaterials in toys, unless
endorsed by a scientific committee280.
To conclude, various amendments in sectoral regulations that incorporate
nanomaterials have been proposed and debated, ranging from labeling, bans,
moratorium, notification, specific safety assessment, etc.. This reflects the different
positions that regulatory authorities, CSOs and industries hold. In a letter sent to the
Commission, green MEP Carl Schlyter highlighted that it was the Parliament which
《drove the insertion of specific provisions on nanomaterial into various laws under
review… The Commission has not made use of its right of initiative.》281 A review of
the policy-making process regarding product-specific legislation made it clear that the
Parliament has been the most ambitious and proactive actor in enhancing the
regulatory framework on nanomaterials, and《the Council is in general a little
more reluctant to include specific provisions on nanomaterial.》282
3. Towards an EU nano register: a conflicting process
The EP firstly introduced the idea of an EU-wide nano register in its 2009
resolution. It called upon the EC《to compile before June 2011 an inventory of the
different types and uses of nanomaterials on the European market》(EP 2009b, 6).
This issue continued to be discussed widely during the EC’s consultation for
Nanotechnology Action Plan 2010-2015, which showed an ‘overwhelming demand’
for such an inventory (EC 2010b). The subsequent years have witnessed several
important events at national as well as the EU level, during which the issue of
nanomaterials register was put highly on the policy agenda of regulatory authorities.
http://www.env-health.org/resources/press-releases/article/eu-biocides-law-considered-a-1367
280 ANEC Position paper. 2014. “On the application and effectiveness of Directive 2009/48/EC on the safety of
toys.” http://www.anec.eu/attachments/anec-child-2014-g-064%20final.pdf
281 Carl Schlyter. 2012. “Second regulatory review of nanomaterials. To Mr. J.Potočnik.” European Parliament.
282 Axel Singhofen. 2012. “Towards an effective governance of nanomaterial: Overview of European Parliament’s
position on how to regulate nanomaterial.” Nanomaterial Policy Conference, The Hague
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3.1. Member States’ demand for an EU nano register
The EC has been hesitated for adopting an EU-wide nano register or reporting
system in spite of the fact that a growing number of nano-products continued to be
introduced into the EU market. For example, the inventory that RIVM conducted
regarding the number of nano-products on the European market witnessed a six-fold
increase from 143 products in 2007 to 858 products in 2010 (RIVM 2011). Against
this backdrop, a number of Member States have come up with their proposals and
impelled the EC to adopt stricter control on nanomaterials.
Among these Member States, France has played a role of ‘locomotive’ at the
European level283. According to Chemical Watch, the French government started the
discussion about nanomaterial reporting plan as early as 2007. It adopted the
‘Grenelle Law I’ in 2009, which made its commitment to introducing a mandatory
reporting scheme for the manufacture, import and placing on the market of
nanomaterials and products containing them within two years284.
The proactive action of France motivated other Member States to adopt further
action to regulate nanomaterials, either through establishing national mandatory
reporting system (Belgium and Denmark), or by pushing forward an EU-wide nano
registry (e.g. the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany). Through various activities, which
include organizing high level conferences, initiating joint letters, supporting the work
of CSOs, etc., several competent authorities of Member States have successfully put
the transparency and traceability issue of nanomaterials highly on the policy agenda
of the EU. As observed by NIA,《a small Working Group of like-minded European
Member States has formed, consisting of Belgium, Italy And France as ‘Core
Members’, and Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Austria as
283 France Nature Environnement. 2010. “Pour répondre aux 5 questions qui nous sont le plus souvent posées dans
ce débat public sur les nanotechnologies.”
http://www.fne.asso.fr/fr/nos-actions/sante--environnement/nanotechnologies.html
284 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Legal Spotlight: French nano firms must file annual declarations.” Global Business
Briefing, November.
https://chemicalwatch.com/12931/legal-spotlight-french-nano-firms-must-file-annual-declarations
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‘Observer Members’, in order to push forward the creation of a Europe-wide
database on nanomaterials.》285 Together with green MEPs as well as CSOs, a ‘green
alliance’ has been developed and shaped.
In September 2010, the Belgian Presidency organized a high-level event on
nanomaterial traceability, which brought together top level representatives of
regulatory bodies from twelve Member States, Norway and the EU. During this event,
the industry went strongly against the proposal to improve information transparency.
For example, Lena Perenius, executive director of CEFIC, claimed that《REACH is the
mandatory reporting system that we need.》286 An a policy officer of CIEL commented:
《their main arguments are: we do not need the information; then, anyway, REACH
can deliver the information.》287 Against this backdrop, CIEL actively advocated the
urgency of this issue,《if we ask nicely, we do not get the answers. We have to put
something compulsory.》288
In the conclusion of the conference, the Belgian Presidency highlighted the need
for a mandatory register of nanomaterials as well as a traceability mechanism. This
conclusion sent out a clear signal to the European and national authorities about their
determination to《dispel doubts...at the earliest.》289 According to the news release of
NIA, the Presidency also encouraged Member States to《draw up integrated national
strategies and concrete measures in favour of risk management, information and
monitoring》during a transitory period.290
285 NIA. 2010. “Advances towards a European Database on nanomaterials: Towards harmonization of national
databases for nanomaterials on the market.”
http://www.nanotechia.org/news/members-alerts/nia-exclusive-update-advances-towards-european-database-nano
materials-towards
286 Chemical Watch. 2010. “EU Presidency proposes nanomaterials register.” September 15.
https://chemicalwatch.com/4940/eu-presidency-proposes-nanomaterials-register
287 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
288 Ibid.
289 The Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 2010. “Regulation of products containing
nanomaterial: Traceability, a pre-condition to acceptability.” September 14.
http://www.eutrio.be/pressrelease/regulation-products-containing-nanomaterial-traceability-pre-condition-acceptab
ility
290 NIANews. 2010. “Belgian Presidency proposes Register for Supply-Chain Traceability of Nanomaterials.”
September 16.
http://www.nanotechia.org/news/news-articles/belgian-presidency-proposes-register-supply-chain-traceability-nan
omaterials
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The impact of this event is far-reaching. Firstly, the initiative of the Belgian
Presidency has struck ‘overwhelming resonance’ amongst Member States. An
increasing number of regulatory authorities were convinced about the importance and
necessity of a nano register. For example, Norbert Roettgen, Environment Minister of
Germany, openly claimed that《I strongly support stepping up research into risks and
establishing a European nanoproduct register.》291 According to the summary of the
7th Meeting of Competent Authorities for REACH and CLP, an ‘informal taskforce’
has been set up among five Member States:《Italy, France and Belgium and experts
from the Competent Authorities of Germany and the Netherlands are presently
studying the content for national databases of nanomaterials as substances on their
own, contained in mixtures and or in articles and in consumer products, and working
towards a harmonized common basis for those databases so that exchange on
information is easy.》292 As David Azoulay, Managing Attorney of CIEL, put it,《the
lack of progress in CASG-nano forward with future decisions resulted in the EU
Member States to become more involved in its meetings.》293 The alliance among
Member States continued to expand.
Secondly, the conference provided motivation and momentum for Belgian CSOs
to get involved. They started to coordinate their efforts to address the topic of
nanomaterials. An interviewee introduced the context in which they decided to put
nanomaterials onto the agenda,
“after that conference, the Minister of Environment asked the Federal Council
for Sustainable Development to provide advice of what should be done
concerning nanomaterials in Belgium. Our funding from federal administration
covered the participation of the federal council sustainable development. And we
291 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety Press Releases. 2011.
“Röttgen: We should use the opportunities of nanotechnology”. Berlin, February 02.
http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/press/press-releases/detailansicht-en/artikel/roettgen-we-should-use-the-opportunitie
s-of-nanotechnology/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1892&cHash=d5c0e76881868f88277ea69991e19d1b
292 EC. “Summary Record: 7th Meeting of Competent Authorities for REACH and CLP 7-8-9 February 2011”.
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/caracal/minutes-110207-09_en.pdf
293 Chemical Watch. 2011. “Wrangling over substance ID hits REACH nano project.” January 14.
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started at that time to work on nanotechnologies.”294
According to this interviewee, since then, Belgian CSOs have been participating
in public consultation, meeting and lobbying the Minister of Environment and
Employment, advocating their demands so as to keep the topic on the policy agenda.
Besides, the initiative of the Belgian Presidency was also welcomed by ETUC295 and
EEB, who acknowledged its efforts to《bring crucial issues...on the agenda of the
European Council and of the EU as a whole.》296
Thirdly, this conference informed and mobilized the European Council to include
the challenges of nanotechnologies as one of its priorities in the second Action Plan
on Environment and Health at the end of 2010. The European Council provided a
mandate and called upon the EC to《evaluate the need for... further development of a
harmonized database for nanomaterials.》297 These issues continued to be kept on the
policy agenda during the next Council meeting in mid-June, during which the Dutch
delegation put forward a paper and identified three steps to improve the regulation of
nanomaterials: to adopt definition of nanomaterials; to ensure traceability of
nanomaterials (e.g. through mandatory registration system); and to develop an
adequate risk assessment system (Netherlands Delegation 2011). This proposal won
the support of ten Member States298 as well as (the then) candidate country, Croatia.
Under the coordination of Joop Atsma, the Dutch State Secretary for Infrastructure
and the Environment, these countries sent a joint letter to the EC, calling for the
adoption of urgent measures with regard to legislation on registration or market
surveillance of nanomaterials (Joop 2012).
294 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
295 ETUC News. 2010. “The Belgian Presidency calls for nanomaterials register.” September 27.
http://www.etui.org/Topics/Health-Safety/News/The-Belgian-Presidency-calls-for-nanomaterials-register
296 EEB. 2010. “EEB’s assessment of the environmental results of the Belgian Presidency of the EU.”
http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=04B91438-F0FF-E662-08A29E376FD713BF&showMeta=0
297 3061st Environemnt Council meeting. 2010. “Improving environmental policy instruments: Council
conclusions.” http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/118646.pdf
298 They are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, and
Sweden.
１６５
These new developments triggered urgent action of industries, which paid close
attention to the new dynamics and developments and adapted their approaches at
critical moments. Arguing that nanomaterial specific regulations initiated by these
Member States would be ‘the worse-case scenario’ for industries, NIA called for
《immediate (pro)action by the Nanotechnology Industries in working with the
regulators.》299 Industries’ lobbying proved to be effective: regardless of uprising
demands for more information and transparency of nanomaterials by the EP, some
Member States, as well as CSOs, the only proposal that the EC provided was to
《create a web platform with references to all relevant information sources》(EC
2012b). This proposal was considered by the ‘green alliance’ as of limited added
value and cannot overcome the existing deficits of the regulatory framework in
governing nanomaterials. In the subsequent workshop on the second regulatory
review of nanomaterials, DG ENTR Antti Peltomäki noted in the opening speech that
《we want to use tools which deliver results quickly and effectively and we do not
want to create new regulatory burdens where we are not convinced that this is
justified.》300 The EC’s approach in governing nanotechnologies was taking on the
form of a cautious and incremental manner. In this light, some Member States started
to speed up their pace in initiating national actions.
3.2. Belgium and Denmark follow France to introduce national register plan
Discontented with the pro-industry stance of the Commission, green MEP Satu
Hassi urged Member States to《take action preferably in a diverging manner to trigger
EU action.》301 More and more Member States started to search for their own paths in
improving the transparency of the use of nanomaterials.
299 NIABreaking News. 2010. “NIA’s proactive Initiative regarding regulatory Action on Nanomaterials.”
September 21.
http://www.nanotechia.org/news/nia-press/nia-breaking-news-nias-proactive-initiative-regarding-regulatory-action
-nanomaterials
300 EC. 2013. “Workshop on the Second Regulatory Review on Nanomaterials.” January 30.
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/docs/events/nano-rev-ws-peltomaki_en.pdf
301 Satu Hassi. 2013. “Initial reactions and planning in the Parliament.” Workshop on the Second Regulatory
Review on Nanomaterials, January 30.
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/8128/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native
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Belgium and Denmark, following the footstep of France, notified their proposal
to adopt a national register on nanomaterials to the EC in July 2013 and November
2013 respectively. Several regulatory authorities held a strong commitment to the
regulatory issues of nanomaterials, such as the Danish Environment Minister Ida
Auken, the Belgian Ministry Juan Piñeros Garcet, the Belgian Green MP ThÉrÈse
Snoy302, just name a few. As the Danish Environment Minister Ida Auken put it,《I
want a green transition, where both the environment and growth go hand in hand.》303
The strong commitment of these regulatory authorities motivated Belgian and Danish
CSOs to join the debates, which in turn provided grassroot support.
In Brussels, we could see the rising momentum of civil society movement. In
May 2013, six Belgian CSOs released a joint letter, calling for the establishment of a
Belgian register of nanomaterials304. As an interviewed policy officer of IEW put it,
《the EC did nothing about nano register. It helped us to put some pressure to drive
for national register… We had really good alliances between three of us (trade unions,
consumer associations and environmental organizations) about this topic.》305
In Denmark, the proposal regarding a mandatory nanomaterials product database
could be traced back to September 2012. According to the reportage of Chemical
Watch, the idea was largely sparked by the Danish Environment Minister306. Such a
proposal received rapid responses from the industry, which highlighted the heavy
administrative burden the plan could bring and asked the Ministry to perform an
impact assessment307. Although the result of impact assessment indicated that the
product database could《reduce the competitiveness and innovation of Danish
302 Chemical Watch. 2011. “Belgian MP calls for better regulation of nanomaterials.” September 30.
https://chemicalwatch.com/8550/belgian-mp-calls-for-better-regulation-of-nanomaterials
303 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Denmark plans mandatory nanomaterials product database.” September 18.
https://chemicalwatch.com/12363/denmark-plans-mandatory-nanomaterials-product-database
304 IEW et al. 2013. “Etablir un registre Belge des nanomatériaux: lettre ouverte.” May 07.
http://www.iewonline.be/spip.php?article5581
305 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
306 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Denmark plans mandatory nanomaterials product database.” September 18.
https://chemicalwatch.com/12363/denmark-plans-mandatory-nanomaterials-product-database
307 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Nano industry responds to Danish database plan.” October 29.
https://chemicalwatch.com/12753/nano-industry-responds-to-danish-database-plan
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companies》308, a proposal regarding a mandatory product database was finally
approved by the Danish government. The dissertation suggests that the activities of
Danish CSOs constitute a kind of counterbalance vis-à-vis the forces of industry
during the policy-making process. For example, Danish Consumer Council and
Ecological Council, in collaboration with Roskilde University and Technical
University of Denmark, developed a product database with the objective of ensuring
consumers’ rights to make informed choices. Their database identifies more than
1,200 products that may contain nanomaterials309. Danish CSOs were invited by the
Danish Environmental Protection Agency to participate in meetings and fellow groups.
According to an interviewed policy officer,《we would like to make their focus
change.》310 After long negotiation and discussion, Belgium and Denmark ratified
their national mandatory register on nanomaterials in February and June 2014
respectively.
Other Member States carried out studies to investigate the feasibility of
alternative plans. For example, Germany contributed to the discussion by publishing
an impact assessment of an European nanomaterials register. This study,
commissioned by the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), concluded that《the
creation of a horizontal European register of products containing nanomaterials... is
preferable to a separate register》(Hermann et al. 2013, 5). In a CASG-nano meeting,
a UBA spokesperson claimed that《if the EC does not propose such a measure,
Germany is likely to discuss having its own nano registry.》311 Dick Jung, Deputy
Director Safety and Risks of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the
Environment, plead for an EU-wide inventory rather than national initiatives312. Other
Member States like Italy and the UK adopted voluntary information gathering
308 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Denmark publishes nano product database impact on companies.” December 04.
https://chemicalwatch.com/13150/denmark-publishes-nano-product-database-impact-on-companies
309 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Denmark publishes nano product database impact on companies.” December 04.
https://chemicalwatch.com/13150/denmark-publishes-nano-product-database-impact-on-companies
310 Interview with Lone Mikkelsen, chemicals policy officer of the Danish Ecological Council, 26/09/2014
311 Chemical Watch. 2014. “European Commission, Member States weigh options for nano inventory.” March 27.
https://chemicalwatch.com/18891/european-commission-member-states-weigh-options-for-nano-inventory
312 Workshop on the second regulatory review of nanomaterials
http://www.euromines.org/sites/default/files/content/files/h8-nanomaterials/2013-01-30-ec-workshop-2nd-reg-revi
ew-nano.docx
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schemes. In Norway, the Pollution Control Authority also introduced a voluntary
scheme, which asked the businesses to report their use of nanomaterials in chemical
products. It also added a ‘NANO box’ that registrants should mark if the chemical
contains nanomaterials313. More elaborated analyses concerning the actions of
different Member States towards nano register are provided by VeilleNanos314. As an
interviewee put it,
“what is for my surprise, however, I must say is that they could implement such
instruments despite the fact that there is no big public concerns about all this.
That’s really remarkable about these nano discussion.”315
The proactive and foreseeing measures of the green alliance represent
encouraging steps towards a more precaution-oriented governance culture in
addressing emerging technologies. As a Dutch regulatory authority put it,《in the
Netherlands, we learn and work to be honest about uncertainties. We try to be as open
as possible. I think it is import to admit that you do not know.》316 CSOs, which have
been actively advocating under the slogan ‘no data, no market’, have played an
important role in contributing to such a culture shift. Next section addresses
specifically how CSOs succeeded in winning the support of a number of regulatory
authorities.
3.3. CSOs’ advocacy
From the very outset of debates, CSOs have been calling for the transparency of
information and traceability of nanomaterials. These measures are believed to be of
great importance in monitoring possible environmental and healthy contamination,
313 Nanotech News. 2009. “Businesses asked to declare use of nanomaterials”. June 25.
http://nanotech.law.asu.edu/Documents/2009/08/norway%20sft%20reportng_213_2010.pd
314 http://veillenanos.fr/wakka.php?wiki=LesDifferentsRegistresNanoEchelleNationale
315 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
316 Interview with Monique Bosman, national coordinator of the NANoREG Project, Ministry of Infrastructure
and the Environment, 22/12/2014
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boosting consumer confidence and trust, etc. When we examine the dynamics in the
public sphere during the past decade, it is notable that CSOs’ approaches have been
well-adapted according to the political agenda in different periods. This enabled their
advocacy to be more effective and well-focused. For example, IEW has changed its
stance regarding nanomaterials from the original proposal regarding a ‘moratorium’
on nanomaterials to the calling for a mandatory register plan. As an interviewed
policy officer put it,
“we did not ask for a moratorium any more, because we understood it was
asking too much. Having a register is already a big step.”317
As discussed above, the high level event that the Belgian EU Presidency
organized in 2010 showed the determination of participant regulatory authorities in
addressing nanomaterials issues, which actually opened up political opportunities for
CSOs to get involved. During this event, the Belgian minister Paul Magnette claimed
that ‘no data, no market’, which meant a de facto moratorium, would be too restrictive.
Instead, he considered the proposal of a nano registry as an endeavor to《strike a
balance between calls for a moratorium on nanomaterials based on the precautionary
principle and arguments from industry groups.》318. His argument sent a clear signal to
Belgian and EU level CSOs with regard to the direction of policy development. IEW,
which maintained good relationship with regulatory authorities, highlighted the
importance of ‘adaptation’,《this soon involvement and clear agenda helped us to
adapt our action at critical moments.》319
It is the same case with EEB. The original demand of EEB, noted in its 2009
position paper, was to create《a pre-market registration and approval framework...
before further market penetration occurs》(EEB 2009). Five years later, EEB actively
317 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
318 EurActiv. 2010. “REACH register to ensure traceability of nanomaterials.” September 15.
319 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
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advocated the establishment of an EU-wide nano registry as well as nano-labeling or
declaration requirements for all nano-containing products together with other CSOs
(EEB et al. 2014).
Based on analyses of the two resolutions released by ETUC in 2008 and 2010,
we could see that the tone of ETUC became more demanding: from ‘CALLS ON’ to
the statement that Member States ‘MUST’ develop harmonized mandatory registers of
articles containing nanomaterials (ETUC 2008; 2010). ETUI also prepares a
‘lobbying training manual’ for trade unionists, summarizing the best practices which
include:《negotiating, convincing, mobilizing, organizing, establishing alliances,
disseminating knowledge, raising awareness and participation, planning campaigns,
and elaborating strategies.》320 This manual is not specific to nanomaterials, but it
reflects the approach that ETUI adopts in monitoring and influencing the EU
decision-making process.
The present dissertation concludes three roles that CSOs have played in the
debates on nanomaterials transparency and traceability issue: Firstly, CSOs played an
important role in awareness-raising and education. For example, MIO-ECSDE
updated their position paper in 2012, providing a useful instrument for more than 120
Mediterranean CSOs (MIO-ECSDE 2012). CIEL and ClientEarth, mainly composed
of lawyers, provided legal analyses that have been used to empower other CSOs. As
an interviewee put it,《we use law to trigger changes... The role of us is to support the
demands of more campaigning organizations and bring some intelligence and
knowledge.》321
320 Pennella, Silvana. 2013. “How to monitor and influence the EU decision-making process from a trade union
perspective.” ETUI.
http://www.etui.org/Publications2/Guides/How-to-monitor-and-influence-the-EU-decision-making-process-from-a
-trade-union-perspective
321 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
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ETUI, by introducing national and European initiatives, offered timely and
updated policy analysis on issues regarding nanomaterial traceability322. During the
public consultation period, EU level CSOs (e.g. CIEL, ECOS) and national ones (e.g.
IEW) prepared template of answers so as to mobilize more CSOs and the wider public
to get involved and contribute their input323. HCWH Europe joined the debates in
2012. It contributed its expertise by publishing reports and fact sheets on
nanomedicine in healthcare, highlighting that《patients and health workers are already
exposed to nanomaterials》324. Two years later, it published a position paper to support
the creation of an EU nanomaterials registry325.
Secondly, CSOs seized political opportunities and lobbied regulatory authorities
through both informal and institutional channels. They participated in high level
meetings, stakeholder conferences, public consultation; and they also met and spoke
with regulatory authorities about their demands for establishing an EU wide nano
register. As an interviewee of CIEL put it,
“we spoke and disseminated ideas in conferences. The question of traceability
came up in formal discussion with Belgium government, and this was how the
Belgium government started to push for the idea of an EU registry.”326
I’ve tried to contact Belgian authorities (e.g. the minister Paul Magnette) so as to
confirm whether CSOs have contributed to the agenda-setting. But it was extremely
difficult to have access to national policy-makers. Several consumer associations have
developed nanomaterials database to support their demands for urgent regulatory
322 ETUI Policy Brief. 2011. “Nano governance: how should the EU implement nanomaterial traceability?” Issue
2/2011. http://www.etui.org/content/download/2646/29689/file/Policy_Brief_Social_Policy-Issue2-2011_EN.pdf
323 CIEL& ECOS. 2014. “Impact Assessment on Possible Measuresto Increase Transparency on
Nanomaterials on the Market: Public Consultation— Non-industry Stakeholders.”
http://ciel.org/Publications/Nano_Public_25Jul14.pdf
324 HCWH Europe. 2012. “Nanomedicine new solutions or new problems?”
https://noharm-europe.org/sites/default/files/documents-files/2462/HCWH%20Europe%20Nanoreport.pdf
325 HCWH Europe. 2014. “Comments on the Impact Assessment on Possible Measures to Increase Transparency
on Nanomaterials on the Market.”
https://noharm-europe.org/sites/default/files/documents-files/2798/Nano%20Register%20Position%20Paper.pdf
326 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
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action, for example the database developed by EU level consumer associations
(BEUC & ANEC 2010), BUND327 and Consumer Council and Ecological Council
located in Denmark328. These databases served as useful tools for the public as well as
policy-makers. For instance, the online database run by BUND has received roughly
90,000 views in the year of 2014 (EEB et al. 2015). ANEC and BEUC presented their
2010 inventory to John Dalli, the European Commissioner for Health & Consumer
Policy329. According to an interviewed adviser to green MEPs,《the consumer
associations have played an active role in trying to alert the Commission.》330 EEB
also invited Member States (France, the Netherlands, Denmark, etc.) as well as DG
ENV to participate in their discussion at the bi-annual working group on
nanomaterials in December 2012331.
Last but not least, CSOs protect workers, consumers, and the wider public by
triggering bottom-up alertness. For example, one of the objectives of Avicenn is to
《promote the development of a collective vigilance together with all concerned
stakeholders.》332 Under the ‘Nesting Nano’ project, WECF provides information
about the risks of nano-particles for women and babies. It suggests consumers to
search for labels of products which contain nano-particles, asking the retailer or
manufacturer for additional information333. ETUI contributes to cultivating such
alertness though the FP7 NanoDiode project. As the ETUI coordinator of this project
puts it, as the information that is meant to be legally provided along the supply chain
is not available, ETUI aims to provide capacity building tools in the workplace, which
could《help worker representatives to develop the logic required to ask the right
questions to get necessary information.》334 These activities could enhance the
327 http://www.bund.net/themen_und_projekte/nanotechnologie/
328 http://nano.taenk.dk/
329 ANEC Press release. 2010. “ANEC/BEUC inventory exposes a game of roulette.” October 25.
http://pr.euractiv.com/pr/anecbeuc-inventory-exposes-game-roulette-90292
330 Interview with an adviser to green MEPs, 22/06/2014
331 EEB. Annual Report 2012.
http://www.eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=E6EF9887-5056-B741-DB89351B012180C6
332 Original text: 《favoriser le développement d'une vigilance collective par l'ensemble des acteurs concernés》.
http://avicenn.fr/wakka.php?wiki=ObjectifsActions
333 http://www.projectnesting.org/nano/long
334 ETUI. 2014. “NanoDiode: Start-up meeting Community of Practice.”
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engagement from the bottom up and to empower consumers, workers and the wider
public to develop a vigilance towards nanomaterials.
3.4. Primary result: an EU nano register rejected by the EC
At the time of writing, it has been six years since the EP urged the EC to
establish an inventory of nanomaterials. In spite of rising demands by the ‘green
alliance’, the EC has been slow and reluctant to introduce further action in this regard.
DGs ENV contributed to the discussion by commissioning a study to assess the
feasibility of an EU-wide database, concluding that《an EU-wide database could be
useful if there was new legislation requiring companies to declare which products
contain nanomaterials.》335 According to an interviewee, there exists a constant split
among different DGs within the EC regarding nano registry issue,
“the DG ENTR will do its best to say we do not need a registry. DG ENV is a
weak counterpart, but it is a counterpart.”336
According to the reportage of Chemical Watch, different DGs have not been able
to reach an agreement《due to the complexity of the issue.》337 An interviewed
regulatory authority of the Netherlands boiled the split down to “a conflict of
Interests”338. Under this context, the EC launched a public consultation on
transparency measures for nanomaterials on the market between May and August
2014, setting out five policy options:
http://www.etui.org/content/download/16162/126096/file/NanoDiode+projetct+-+A.+Ponce+(ETUI).pdf
335 Wijnhoven, S.W.P. et al. 2012. “Development of an inventory for consumer products containing nanomaterials:
Final Report.” http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/nanotech/pdf/study_inventory.pdf
336 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
337 Chemical Watch. 2014. “Sweden presses European Commission on nano proposals.” March 26.
https://chemicalwatch.com/18852/sweden-presses-european-commission-on-nano-proposals
338 Interview with Monique Bosman, national coordinator of the NANoREG Project, Ministry of Infrastructure
and the Environment, 22/12/2014
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· to remain with the status quo;
· to create a ‘soft law’ approach by providing recommendation on best practices;
· to collect all available information in a nano observatory at the EU level;
· to create an EU nanomaterials registry focused on substances, similar to the
French model;
· to create an EU nanomaterials registry focused on use (including substances,
mixtures and articles), inspired by the Belgian and Danish model339.
The consultation was considered by an interviewee of CIEL as a way to defer the
attention:《after so much pressure from everyone, they have to show that they are
doing something.》340 After various studies, consultations, debates, negotiation, etc.,
the EC disregarded the demands of non-industry stakeholders, claiming that《a
register is not an appropriate way to provide consumers with relevant information on
nanomaterials》at the CASG-nano meeting in December 2014341. Three CSOs —EEB,
CIEL and BUND— released a joint letter to express their dissatisfaction with such a
conclusion (EEB et al. 2015). FoE Australia also criticized the strong pro-industry
bias of the Commission342. ETUC does not have any official response yet, but a policy
officer notes that《it is just another manifestation for me. The EC’s approach is about
not to jeopardize development or competitiveness.》343 Shortly, the Sweden Ministry
of the Environment came up with a decision, asking Swedish Chemical Agency Kemi
to develop a proposal for a national register for nanomaterials in products344.
339 Chemical Watch. 2014. “European Commission, Member States weigh options for nano inventory: the French
experience being considered”. March 27.
340 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
341 Chemical Watch. 2014. “EU nanomaterials register looks unlikely.”
https://chemicalwatch.com/22241/eu-nanomaterials-register-looks-unlikely
342 FoEAustralia. 2015. “European Commission appears determined to scupper nano-register.” March 10.
http://emergingtech.foe.org.au/european-commission-appears-determined-to-scupper-nano-register/
343 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
344 Chemical Watch. 2015. “Swedish chemicals agency to draft nanomaterial registry.” May 28.
https://chemicalwatch.com/23958/swedish-chemicals-agency-to-draft-nanomaterial-registry
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Until then, CSOs’ advocacy regarding a nano register failed to generate
substantial results at the EU level. The industry lobbying proved to be intense and
effective. However, CSOs have succeeded in triggering uprising national actions. And
many actors agreed that a harmonization of nano register at the EU level could
provide more benefits in the long run. As an interviewee put it,
“it does not make things easier. It just means you multiply the processes. And
industry will be under pressure anyway. It does not get rid of the demand.”345
The industry was reported to be《increasingly concerned about EU Member
States putting in place their own requirements for data collection.》346 It can be
anticipated that CSOs’ demands for more information and transparency will continue.
3.5. Explaining CSOs’ failure: lack of bottom-up public resonance
A review of the long and conflicted policy-making process enable us to see both
the gains and failure of CSOs. Although they have won the support of the Parliament
and a good number of Member States, which in fact facilitated the forming of a ‘green
alliance’; but CSOs failed to transfer ‘influence’ into ‘communicative power’ at the
EU level, as the EC rejected an EU register of nanomaterials. As an interviewed
policy officer of ANEC put it,
“there are in fact a number of authorities who have strong commitments. That’s
quite fine, but it’s not enough to bring changes... It is still a small proportion.”347
The dissertation suggests that apart from external factors (e.g. strong lobbying
from the industry), a major reason behind CSOs’ failure lies in the fact that their
activity has not or little touched upon the broad mass of the wider population.
345 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
346 Chemical Watch. 2013. “Nanotechnology association opposes Danish register.” August 20.
https://chemicalwatch.com/16106/nanotechnology-association-opposes-danish-register
347 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
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Compared with the enormous efforts devoted to the previous lobbying battle for
REACH (for example, a wide range of CSOs—environmental, consumer, health and
women’s groups— have mobilized 22,000 citizens in signing the Declaration for a
Toxics-Free future in 2003348), only a relatively small number of CSOs continued to
address nano-related issues. An interviewee noted that,《(registry) was more consumer
issues. So consumer associations work on it more than environmental CSOs.》349
Lacking of bottom-up support and mobilization,《a movement remains rudimentary
and fails to build up the bargaining power required to have any substantial impact》
(Seifert and Plows 2014).
4. Nanomaterials in REACH: a long and unfinished story
REACH, the EU flagship chemical regulation, has entered into force on 1st June,
2007. Whether and how REACH could appropriately address nanomaterials has been
heatedly debated over the past decade. CSOs have been united under the slogan ‘no
data, no market’, as envisaged by REACH.
4.1. CSOs: a ‘nano patch’ to address the loopholes of REACH
Invited to take part in the CASG-nano, CIEL had the opportunity to closely
communicate with other stakeholders. It came to realize that《there were issues not
only in implementation, but also in the main text of REACH.》350 Other CSOs also
showed concerns about the inadequacy of the REACH provisions, for example, the
absence of a definition in the REACH text, inadequacy of tonnage thresholds,
inadequate implementation of phase-in rules for the vast majority of nanomaterials,
etc. However, no concrete solution has been put forward. This situation enabled CIEL,
and later ClientEarth and BUND, to drive the discussion into a new phase. It was
against this backdrop that the idea of adding a ‘nano patch’ to REACH developed.
According to an interviewed policy officer of CIEL,
348 Greenpeace. 2003. “Protect us from hazardous chemicals: European coalition presents Declaration for a Toxics
Free Future.” July 8. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/coalition-presents-declaration/
349 Interview with Dania CRISTOFARO, Policy Officer of ECOS, 21/10/2014
350 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
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“we need to go beyond just asking more to be done. It is not enough to identify
the gaps. It is important to propose the solution.”351
The year of 2012 has witnessed the publication of several well-documented
reports by CSOs (EEB & ClientEarth 2012; Azoulay 2012). These reports identified
the loopholes of REACH in regulating nanomaterials and put forward concrete
proposals to bridge the regulatory gap. Believing it to be the simplest and most
efficient way to adapt REACH to the specificity of nanomaterials, and to make
existing regulation ‘nano fit’, CSOs actively disseminated the idea of ‘nano patch’.
That’s to say, to add a stand-alone legislation for the registration of nanosubstance to
existing REACH legislation (Azoulay and Buonsante 2012). This proposal was
welcomed and supported by other CSOs, such as EEB352, the Danish Ecological
Council, and Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Azoulay and Tuncak 2014;
The Danish Ecological Council 2012).
CSOs have joined their efforts in spreading the idea of ‘nano patch’. CIEL and
ClientEarth played the role of providing legal knowledge and analyses. According to
the interviewed policy officers of the two CSOs put it,
“We do not have the capacity to do big campaigns. We give other organizations
something to focus on, then they can use it to do communication...By being
useful to all of the players, that is something which makes us very strong.”353
“(We) use law to trigger changes... The role of us is to support the demands of
campaigning organizations and provide some intelligence and knowledge.”354
351 Ibid.
352 EEB (2014) Annual report 2012.
http://www.eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=E6EF9887-5056-B741-DB89351B012180C6.
353 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
354 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
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CSOs like EEB and BUND, who have wide networks with their member
organizations, provide grassroot support to disseminate the idea of ‘nano patch’355. For
example, EEB claimed to have intensified its work on nanomaterials within REACH
in 2012356. By organizing workshop, phone conferences, annual meetings, etc., EEB
nano working group bring together interested CSOs, which greatly facilitate and
enhance their coordinated action.
4.2. Some Member States support the proposal of ‘nano patch’
After searching the database, 13 articles provided by Chemical Watch contained
the key word ‘nano patch’. A brief review of these articles enables me to see the
different reaction of stakeholders towards this proposal. On the one hand, ‘nano patch’
has received criticism of industries. For example, NIA accused CSOs of trying to《fix
something that is not broken.》357 The EC believed that it was more important to get
REACH work instead of drawing up a new co-decision legislation, which may
take a long time (at least five years)358.
By contrast, the proposal of ‘nano patch’ received the support of other CSOs359. It
also provided inspiration to the EP360 and other agencies. For example, Kemi released
a draft proposal to amend REACH, which resembled CSOs’ proposal. 361 An
interviewee of ClientEarth introduced that《after the ideas of ‘nano patch’, more and
more we started to have Member States come forward with their own ideas and
355 EEB 2012 annual report
http://www.eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=E6EF9887-5056-B741-DB89351B012180C6
356 EEBWork Programme & budget 2013
http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=959FBCF1-5056-B741-DB956F815688ACED&showMeta=0&aa
357 Chemical Watch. 2012. “DG Enterprise, industry deny REACH unable to regulate nanomaterials.” November
14. https://chemicalwatch.com/12903/dg-enterprise-industry-deny-reach-unable-to-regulate-nanomaterials
358 Detailed comments on the justification given for a ‘nano-patch’ legislation. Ref. Ares(2013)16575 - 08/01/2013
359 For example, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) claims to fully support the ‘nano patch’
approach to adjusting REACH to nanomaterials
360 Green MEP Satu Hassi proposed a ‘mini-REACH’ at the workshop on the second regulatory review on
nanomaterials
361 Chemical Watch. 2013. “Sweden wants REACH to be adapted for nano: Kemi draft proposal introduces 10kg
threshold”. April 10. https://chemicalwatch.com/14442/sweden-wants-reach-to-be-adapted-for-nano
１７９
proposals to change legislation.》362 David Azoulay, a policy officer of CIEL, argued
that《it would not be a crazy NGO idea, but also supported by other stakeholders.》363
Most importantly, some competent authorities of Member States considered
‘nano patch’ to be a workable policy option. As a reportage of Chemical Watch put it,
《the idea (‘nano patch’) has the support of some Member States.》364 Norway
Climate and Pollution Agency highlighted the necessity to adapt REACH to address
nanomaterials365. In March 2012, the Dutch environment ministry organized a
nanomaterials policy conference entitled Choices for Safety in The Hague. This
conference brought together delegates from 14 Member States and other stakeholders
to consider the roadmap for EU nano policy. The Chairs’ conclusions identified two
complementary ways forward: (1) amending the relevant annexes and guidance
documents of REACH in 2012 and (2) considering a nano patch in parallel and
referring to REACH before 2014366.
One month later, regulatory authorities of Norway sent a letter to the EU
regulators, singling out for explicit mention that《the possibility to add a ‘nano patch’
to the regulation would specify how REACH tools and provisions should be applied
with respect to nanomaterials.》367 Such a suggestion was in conformity with the
proposal of CSOs. The official press release of Norway considered the ideas
expressed in the letter as a sign of “offensive nano-politics”368. CSOs have
successfully transformed ‘nano patch’ into a workable policy option, wining
resonance among national regulatory authorities who share similar priorities and
362 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
363 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
364 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Which way now for nanos and REACH?” Global Business Briefing, July/August
2012. https://chemicalwatch.com/11693/which-way-now-for-nanomaterials-and-reach
365 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Norway suggests adaptation of REACH to address nanomaterial risk.” January 18.
https://chemicalwatch.com/9680/norway-suggests-adaptation-of-reach-to-address-nanomaterial-risk
366 Nanomaterials Policy Conference Choices for Safety – RIVM. 8-9 March 2012.
http://rivm.nl/dsresource?type=pdf&disposition=inline&objectid=rivmp:119609&versionid=&subobjectname=
367 Royal Norwegian Ministry of the Environment. Effective regulation of nanomaterials--Comments by Norway.
23 April 2012.
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/europaportalenimages/2999/innspill_nanomaterialer_23april2012.
pdf?id=2314582
368 https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/norge-tar-til-orde-for-offensiv-nano-p-2/id693342/
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policy goals. The convergence of interests has contributed to the forming of a ‘green
alliance’, which pressed the Commission to introduce more stringent proposals on
nanomaterials.
4.3. The second regulatory review triggers new momentum of debates
Tensions were brought to a head in 2012 when REACH and the regulatory
aspects of nanomaterials came under review. Discussions have gained new
momentum and have taken several steps forward.
Before the EC published the second regulatory review of nanomaterials, the
conference held in the Hague had seen broad support among participants for ‘urgent
action’ on the regulation of nanomaterials369. Later in June 2012, under the
coordination of Joop Atsma, the Dutch Secretary of Infrastructure and the
Environment, a joint letter was initiated together with other ten Member States and
(the then) candidate country, Croatia, urging the Commission to fill the regulatory gap
《either through an amendment of REACH or through supplementary legislation》
(Joop 2012). As an interviewed official of the Netherlands put it,
“Member States have tried over and over again to persuade the Commission to
adapt the legislation. We saw the ongoing split between DG Enterprise and DG
Environment, and we hope our actions could help find a solution.”370
According to the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra), the UK did not sign this letter as it believed that the demand for regulatory
adaptations《was not based on evidence of risk.》371 Shortly, Green MEP Carl Schlyter
sent a letter to the Commission and echoed the demands of ten Member States. He
369 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Which way now for nanomaterials and REACH?.” Global Business Briefing,
July/August 2012. https://chemicalwatch.com/11693/which-way-now-for-nanomaterials-and-reach
370 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
371 Chemical Watch. 2012. “Dutch lead call for urgent EU action on nanomaterials: Ten Member States, Croatia
and key MEP call for action ahead of Commission’s.” July 11.
https://chemicalwatch.com/11720/dutch-lead-call-for-urgent-eu-action-on-nanomaterials
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highlighted that the EC failed to meet the expectations of the Parliament, alarming
that the EC《risk to seriously jeopardize public confidence in nanomaterials.》372 A
green alliance has been gradually taking shape, which has been putting pressure on
the Commission to enhance the regulatory framework for nanomaterials.
Despite repeated demands to remedy the shortcomings of REACH, the
Commission’s second regulatory review drew the conclusion that《REACH sets the
best possible framework for the risk management of nanomaterials》(EC 2012b). But
the EC made a compromise by proposing modifications in some of the REACH
Annexes and asked ECHA to revise guidance documents. This conclusion, while
supported by industry373 and Member States such as the UK, was subject to
opposition from the ‘green alliance’.374
A joint letter of ten CSOs, which included environmental organizations,
consumer associations, trade unions and women’s organizations, criticized the
Commission for putting the interests of industry ahead of the well-being of society
(EEB et al. 2012). An interviewee of ANEC described the background of this joint
action,《That was an opportunity that we joined forces and we together (drafted a
letter) with a number of organizations. Generally our views were very much in line.》
375 In 2013, another two joint letters of CSOs were released: one letter was sent to the
ENVI to echo CSOs’ concerns regarding the second regulatory review376; Another one
questioned the conclusions of a letter by Titanium Dioxide Manufacturers association,
asking the EC to《review the Classification and Labelling notifications...
classifying ultrafine/nano TiO2 as a possible carcinogen by TiO2 producers.》377
372 Carl Schlyter. 2012. “Second regulatory review of nanomaterials. To Mr. J.Potočnik.” European Parliament.
373 Industry associations (2013) Europe needs safe and innovative nanotechnologies and nanomaterials.
http://www.cefic.org/Documents/PolicyCentre/Nanomaterials/Industry-messageson-nanotechnologies-and-nanoma
terials-June2013.pdf. Accessed: 27 June 2013
374 Chemical Watch. 2012. “NGOs, industry split over EU nano regulatory review.” October 3.
https://chemicalwatch.com/12514/ngos-industry-split-over-eu-nano-regulatory-review
375 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
376 EEB et al. 2013. “NGO joint letter to ENVI Committee.” January 09.
http://www.anec.eu/attachments/ANEC-ML-2013-0005.pdf
377 EEB et al. 2013. “Stakeholders’Response to Titanium Dioxide Manufacturers association’s letter on Titanium
dioxide.” September 17.
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A policy officer of ETUI further expressed her concerns about the future
generations of nanomaterials:《the complexity, the legal, the ethical issues of the future
generations are not even considered... They have gone beyond the regulatory
capacities.》378 While the Staff Working paper acknowledged that these future
generation of nanomaterials《are either at research or development stage or at an
early stage of market development》(EC 2012a, 10), no corresponding measures or
planning have been introduced in that regard. This interviewee continued by pointing
out that《the engagement was there. But the EC’s reaction did not meet the demands of
worker protection, safety products on the market, and environmental protection.》379
CSOs intensified their activities to press the Commission to take their demands into
consideration.
The Parliament reacted to the second regulatory review by sending a letter
through the chairman of ENVI. It welcomed the proposal regarding the modifications
of Annexes but considered such measures “insufficient”. The EC was urged to
《initiate complementary legislation to overcome intrinsic limitations of the REACH
regime with regard to nanomaterial.》380 Green MEP Satu Hassi compelled the EC to
fix the deficiencies of REACH with a stand-alone ‘mini-REACH’ for nanomaterials
during the workshop on the second regulatory review of nanomaterials381.
Several Member States expressed their doubts as to whether amendments to the
REACH annexes would suffice, regretting that the Commission had not responded
more substantially to their previous letter382. These Member States reclaimed that two
solutions should be taken into account in order to fill the regulatory gap: either to
introduce new legislation on nanomaterials, either through changes to REACH main
http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=24F72BC7-5056-B741-DBBA37E87CAC5E30
378 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
379 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
380 ENVI Chairman: letter to the Commission. lPOL-COM-ENVI D (2013) 36547
http://veillenanos.fr/wakka.php?wiki=NanoComEnviSept2013/download&file=20130718-Com-ENVI.pdf
381 Hassi S. 2013. “First reaction to the second regulatory review on nanomaterials.” European Commission
workshop, Brussels. January 30
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/8128/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.
382 European Commission.2013. “11th meeting of competent authorities for REACH and CLP.” January 16
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/caracal/minutes-121128-29_en.pdf.
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text383. Considering the need to maintain the legal stability, the German federal
authorities inclined to support the latter solution. Three German federal agencies
published a report in January 2013, proposing adapting the main legal text of REACH
as well as its annexes. Such a proposal was considered to be the third possible
solution.
The proposal of Germany includes a series of amendments, including
modification of the tonnage thresholds of REACH with the creation of simplified
registration for all nanomaterials produced above 100 kg and more detailed
registration requirement for all nanomaterials produced over 1 tonne per year, and a
new annex detailing the quantity-dependent, and specific data requirements needed
for nanomaterials384. This proposal was appraised by Austria’s environment ministry
as “a very good basis” for future discussions with regard to adaptations of REACH in
regulating nanomaterials385. Considering the lack of progress, Member States
attempted to influence the pace-setting of EU nano policy.
As a policy officer of ANEC puts it,《the EC ran a little bit risk to upset a
number of Member States. It was for the first time that I met a number of Member
States attack the EC in a joint action (e.g. through releasing joint letter).》386 The
dissertation suggests that such a new phenomenon can be explained by the good
network and cooperation established in previous debates on REACH, as well as the
prominent stance that several proactive national competent authorities have adopted
towards the topic of hazard chemicals and nanomaterials.
383 Chemical Watch. 2013. “EU countries question Commission’s stance on nanomaterials regulation.” March 19.
https://chemicalwatch.com/14178/eu-countries-question-commissions-stance-on-nanomaterials-regulation
384 The Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA), the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment
(BfR) and the Federal Environment Agency (UBA). 2013. “Nanomaterials and REACH Background Paper on the
Position of German Competent Authorities.” http://www.bfr.bund.de/cm/349/nanomaterials-and-reach.pdf
385 Chemical Watch. 2013. “Member States consider road for EU nano policy.” Global Business Briefing, March.
https://chemicalwatch.com/14159/member-states-consider-road-for-eu-nano-policy
386 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
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4.4. The EC proposes six policy options to modify REACH annex
At the press conference in Brussels which was to reveal the REACH 2013
registration deadline results, it was stated that among the 9084 registration dossiers,
four substances have been registered as nanomaterials in 80 dossiers based on the
preliminary assessment387. Six months later, the head of evaluation at ECHA openly
asked companies to update their REACH dossiers to incorporate nanomaterials, as
《only around ten substances in our database that are indicated by registrants as
nano.》388 In light of the poor results gathered by REACH as well as mounting
pressure from the ‘green alliance’, the EC launched a consultation on the modification
of REACHAnnexes on nanomaterials between June and September 2013. The public
consultation proposed six policy options:
Option 1: a baseline position, to remain with the status quo;
Option 2: clarity option, aimed at clear description of the information required in
the registration dossier for substances in nano form;
Option 3: soft law based on voluntary measures and guidance;
Option 4: additional measures, e.g. changes to the REACH annexes;
Option 5: changing the annexes to lighten the compliance burden in order to
‘focus on competitiveness and innovation’;
Option 6: full implementation of the measures in Option 2 and Option 4389
In response to the consultation, we could find the divergence between the
industry and CSOs: while the former, represented by NIA and CEFIC, favored the
fifth option, CSOs expressed their strong preference to Option 6390. EEB held a
pessimistic view, arguing that the consultation focused more on costs and the
387 Follow this link to view the press conference (nanomaterials are mentioned from 38:01 until 38:37)
http://webcast.streamdis.eu/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=839e6802f828453896391d6e9ec7474a1d.
388 Chemical Watch. 2013. “ECHA calls for nano data in REACH dossiers.” November 28.
https://chemicalwatch.com/17437/echa-calls-for-nano-data-in-reach-dossiers
389 Chemical Watch. 2013. “EU nano group debates REACH annex options: NGOs concerned about proposal to
reduce compliance for nanomaterials.” April 24.
https://chemicalwatch.com/14579/eu-nano-group-debates-reach-annex-options
390 http://veillenanos.fr/wakka.php?wiki=NanoReach
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effectiveness rather than safety and the urgency to register nanomaterials:《little action
will follow... As there is not enough political will for this to happen.》391 A policy
officer of ANEC predicted that《the real situation is probably either nothing or a lean
version. Regarding REACH reviews, I believe the changes will be kept to the
minimum. I do not think this would be a jump forward.》392 France supported an
‘ambitious’ regulation of nanomaterials, which went further than mere amendments of
REACHAnnex, with the precautionary principle applied393.
In the following years, the Commission has been dragging its feet in presenting
proposals to amend the REACH annexes. The debates were brought into another
stalemate. Member States voiced their anger over the long delay and “apparent lack of
progress” during the CASG-nano meeting in March 2014394. A Swedish representative
commented that the EC had “bad and disappointing track record”395. CSOs asked for
the REACH thresholds to be lowered to 10 kg/year for registering nanomaterials
(EEB et al 2014.).
Environment Ministers of some Member States (including Austrian, Belgian,
Danish, German, French, Dutch and Swedish delegations, and Norway, and supported
by the Croatian and Luxembourg delegations)396 recalled the letter that they sent in
July 2012. They urged the new EC to beef up the regulation of nanomaterials under
REACH397, through《adaptations of REACH and other EU legislation to take account
391 Chemical Watch. 2013. “Guest column: nano & REACH, Tatiana Santos, EEB.” Global Business Briefing,
July/August 2013. https://chemicalwatch.com/15813/guest-column-nano-reach-tatiana-santos-eeb
392 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
393 Réponse des autorités françaises à la consultation publique de la Commission européenne relative à la révision
éventuelle des annexes du règlement REACH pour les adapter aux nanomatériaux.
http://www.sgae.gouv.fr/webdav/site/sgae/shared/04_Consultations_publiques/Reponse_FR2013/20130916_Repon
seFR_REACH_nanomateriaux.pdf Septembre 2013.
394 Chemical Watch. 2014. “Sweden presses European Commission on nano proposals.” March 26.
https://chemicalwatch.com/18852/sweden-presses-european-commission-on-nano-proposals
395 Chemical Watch. 2014. “European Commission presents ‘non paper’ on nano.” May 15.
https://chemicalwatch.com/19677/european-commission-presents-non-paper-on-nano
396 These Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden,
supported by those from Norway, Croatia, Luxembourg and Greece
397 ENDS Europe. 2014. “Ministers tell Brussels to strengthen chemical regulation.” October 30.
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of nanomaterials, as well as the development of an EU database on nanomaterials.》
398 The executive director of ECHA also asked the Commission to “speed up nano
work” before the 2018 registration deadline of REACH399.
More recently, the EU Environment Commissioner Karmenu Vella, under
growing demand for addressing chemicals-related issues, claimed that《new rules
providing clarity on the registration requirements for nanomaterials will be ready for
adoption early in 2015 and will enter into force.》400 Interviewed CSOs like ECOS
and the Danish Ecological Council claim that they will continue their work to make
the modification of Annex as effective as possible. For example, as a policy officer of
ECOS puts it,《we have enough understanding about how to improve the current
situation. We know something that we did not know three years ago. We are well
placed to push the EC to do this, and also we are back up by the EP.》401
Communication and debates have actually contributed to ‘an intellectualizing effect’
among CSOs and other stakeholders.
A comparison of two regulatory reviews on nanomaterials drafted by the EC
enables us to see how the regulatory framework on nanomaterials has developed and
advanced in the intervening years. From noting《current legislation covers in principle
the potential health, safety and environmental risks in relation to nanomaterials》(EC
2008e) to《the EC envisages modifications in some of the REACH Annexes》(EC
2012b), it is clear that some achievements have been achieved by CSOs. At the time
of writing, the negotiation is still going on, and it remains to be seen how far-reaching
the REACH annex changes will be and to what extent the new rules will meet the
expectation of Member States, CSOs and the Parliament.
398 Chemical Watch. 2014. “EU environment ministers tell Commission to prioritise chemicals actions.”
December 18.
https://chemicalwatch.com/22347/eu-environment-ministers-tell-commission-to-prioritise-chemicals-actions
399 Chemical Watch. 2014. “Dancet asks EU Commission to speed up nano work.” December 4.
https://chemicalwatch.com/22158/dancet-asks-eu-commission-to-speed-up-nano-work
400 Chemical Watch. 2014. “REACH nano registration rules coming next year, says Vella.” December 18.
https://chemicalwatch.com/22345/reach-nano-registration-rules-coming-next-year-says-vella
401 Interview with Dania CRISTOFARO, Policy Officer of ECOS, 21/10/2014
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4.5. Innovation vis-à-vis precaution: different rationales behind actors’
stance
During interviews with regulators, a DG ENTR and a DG ENV held similar
opinion about the necessity to maintain the legal stability during current stage. They
showed concerns that opening up REACH could bring serious negative consequences.
For example, as a DG ENTR noted,
“making a proposal to amending REACH to the Council and the Parliament, it is
likely to trigger a very big discussion. It is much easier to have discussions after
2018. Now is a critical period and stability is needed. That’s why we did not
accept ‘nano patch’... We are not excluding it, but not at this moment, that is
kind of policy choices.”402
ADG ENV shared with this view, arguing that,《if we open REACH, we will not
close it for the next five or ten years. What comes out is everyone’s guess.》403 These
arguments reflect a logic which favors economic development and competitiveness
over precaution and safety.
To conclude, in the discussions to make REACH “nano fit”, CSOs have been
instrumental in putting forward concrete proposals, inspiring and mobilizing a good
number of regulators to support their advocacy. An interviewed DG ENTR claimed
that《CIEL was very much behind the calls of ten Member States.》404 According to a
DG ENV,《these consistent pressure helped us to progress. We have not really taken
something up directly. Certainly we got inspirations... These would not even happen if
there was no pressure from Member States, as well as from the EP and CSOs.》405
Although the Commission did not finally adopt ‘nano patch’, CSOs’ activities have
402 Interview with a DG ENTR, 19/06/2014
403 Interview with a DG ENV, 20/06/2014
404 Interview with a DG ENTR, 19/06/2014
405 Interview with a DG ENV, 20/06/2014
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provided important grassroot support, acting as a ‘pool of reasons’ for the regulatory
authorities. After years of debate and negotiation, the positions of different
stakeholders are becoming clearer. And it now turns to the Commission to make a
balance and put forward new plans.
B. Examining CSOs’ influences on the economic system
1. Beyond the hype: claims of benefits more realistic
‘Nano’ was reported to be an advertising buzz word or a selling point for funding
agencies (Brumfiel 2006). However, such an effect of ‘bandwagon’ did not last long.
Before long a scholar observed that 《gloss is already beginning to fade》(Gewin
2006), which was partly due to the incident of Magic Nano. A scientist of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies
noted that《some controversy surrounding nanotechnologies has led manufacturers to
remove any mention of nanomaterials from their products》, even driving the R&D of
nanotechnologies ‘going underground’406. This was true particularly for some
sensitive sectors. For example, a scholar observes that some industries have been
holding back the introduction of nanofood for fear of being targeted by consumer
advocacy groups (Duncan 2011).
Three DGs SANCO highlighted in a report that《the first signs of public anxiety
have appeared… We have reached a critical time which makes or breaks
nanotechnology. Now is the time for building public trust》(Garkov, Bontoux, and
Martin 2010). For fear of a potential consumer boycott or negative public perception
towards nanotechnologies, industries act in a more cautious manner.
A reports indicates that nanotechnology is still in the pre-industrialization phase.
According to the coverage of Le Monde, Robert Plana, the former Nanotechnologies
Program Director of National Agency for Research, France, pointed out that,《the
406 EurActiv. 2009. “Nanotech claims ‘dropped’ for fear of consumer recoil”. June 15.
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/nanotech-claims-dropped-fear-con-news-221915
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expected big boom is continually delayed... The announcements were a little bit rapid
and the major economic impact of nanotechnologies would not be achieved before
2020.》407 Similarly, the second resolution of ETUC noted that《the development of
nanotechnologies in a number of areas has taken considerably longer than initially
claimed by its proponents》(ETUC 2010). According to an interviewee of ETUI,
although there is still development in terms of research on different potential uses of
nanotechnologies,《it is much slower or much less than what it appeared to be
from the early ‘hype’ stage.》408
2. Industries assume corporate responsibilities
As awareness raising activities have been carried out by CSOs since the initial
stage of the R&D process of nanotechnologies, ‘alertness’ could be developed bottom
up among workers, consumers, and the wider public. This ‘alertness’ holds the
potential to render the industry more self-aware and accountable. As an interviewed
DG SANCO put it,
“there are some companies who are actually proactive about the risks of
nanomaterials. They do more than what the regulation requires. In a sense, by
having this debate, by basically framing the issues differently by saying, ‘we
want benefits with a minimum of certainty about the innocuity of nanomaterials
and nano-products.’We actually create a more levelled playing field.”409
One typical example is the decision of Dunkin’Donuts, an American global
doughnut company, to remove titanium dioxide from its powdered donuts for fears
that it might contain toxic nanomaterials410. Such an announcement was committed as
407 Original text: 《le grand boom espéré est sans cesse retardé... les annonces ont été un peu rapides et l'impact
économique majeur des nanotechnologies n'est pas attendu avant 2020》.
Plana, Robert. 2013. “Les nanotechnologies, une filière entre pro-messes et interrogations.” LeMonde, April 10
http://www.lemonde.fr/sciences/article/2013/04/10/les-nanotechnologies-une-filiere-entre-promesses-et-interrogati
ons_3151370_1650684.html
408 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
409 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
410 The Guardian. 2015. “Dunkin’ Donuts to remove titanium dioxide from donuts.” March 11.
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part of a reaction to the intense pressure by the civil society. A coalition of CSOs from
U.S. and other regions (e.g. CIEL from Geneva) jointly released a recommendation,
suggesting companies《avoiding or reducing the risks from nanomaterials in food
products and packaging.》411 An interviewed policy officer of FoE Australia and U.S.
noted that it was one success that they’ve gained after conducting a lot of
communication and engagement activities with nanotechnology companies412.
According to the reportage of The Guardian, only a handful of commercial food
products contain artificial nanoparticles to date413. And the use of nanotechnology in
food has been very limited, in part due to《people’s reluctance to see technology
tampering with what they eat.》414 French scholars note that《the expansion of the
economic system, especially that of the industry, confronts a limitation415》; and
decision makers have been hesitating to promote an over rapid development of
nanotechnologies faced with an increasingly demanding civic sphere (Chaskiel 2014;
Chaskiel and Suraud 2014). In this respect, both nanotechnologies itself and the
influences of CSOs are ‘evolutionary’ rather than ‘revolutionary’.
C. Conclusion
CSOs have opportunities in mobilizing counterknowledge and drawing on the
pertinent forms of expertise to make its own translations (Habermas 1996, 372). The
fifth chapter centers around the question with regard to whether, how, and to what
extent the considerations of EU level CSOs, as kind of ‘counterknowledge’, have
been incorporated into the institutionalized procedures. As Habermas considers ‘law’
as a transformer between system and lifeworld, and between administrative power and
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/mar/11/dunkin-donuts-to-remove-whitening-agent-from-d
onuts
411 Coalition of NGOs Releases Nanotech Recommendation Reflecting Concern About Use of Nanotech In Foods.
March 12, 2015. http://www.iatp.org/files/Nano%20Policy%20Press%20Release%2020150309%20final.pdf
412 Interview with Ian Illuminato, policy officer of FoEAustralia and U.S., 23/03/2015
413 The Guardian. 2013. “Nanotechnology offers small food for thought.” April 26.
http://www.theguardian.com/what-is-nano/nanotechnology-small-food-for-thought
414 The Guardian. “Nanotech’s role in feeding the planet.” October 22.
http://www.theguardian.com/what-is-nano/nanotech-feeding-the-planet-nanotech-s-role-in-feeding-the-planet
415 Original text: 《l’expansion du système économique, plus particulièrement de l’industrie, se heurte à une
limitation》.
１９１
communicative power, this chapter pays more attention to the influences that CSOs
have on the political system. Their impacts on the economic system have also been
briefly introduced.
Section A provides a detailed review of the policy developments regarding three
layers of legislation on nanomaterials at the EU level: product-specific legislation,
register of nanomaterials and nanomaterials in REACH. Some concrete results (e.g.
nano-specific provisions in sectoral legislation, several Member States’ initiatives of
national nano register, the EC’ decision to modify REACH annex) have been achieved
by CSOs. These new developments, to a varying degree, have offered an interesting
entry point for us to look at the process of transformation from ‘influence’ into
‘communicative power’.
In the first layer of legislation, various nano-specific regulatory amendments
have been inserted into several pieces of law (e.g. cosmetics, food, biocide), ranging
from labeling, inclusion of a nanomaterial definition, notification, specific safety
assessment, etc. A review of the policy-making process enables us to see the different
policy preference and commitment of the EU regulators: while the Commission
played a pro-industry approach and failed to make good use of its right of initiative,
the Parliament held an ambitious and precautionary stance towards nanomaterials. For
example, green MEPs had tried to ban certain nanomaterial in EEE and the use of
nanomaterials in food, which was in conformity with CSOs’ advocacy. CSOs not only
participated in the policy-making process, but also watched and scrutinized the
implementation and enforcement of existing provisions on nanomaterials in sectoral
regulations.
When it comes to the second layer of legislation, the proposal regarding an
EU-wide register has been rejected by the EC at the end of 2014. In despite of the
active roles that CSOs have played in awareness-raising, education and mobilization,
the pressure that they exerted on the Commission has turned out to be insubstantial.
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Previous academic analyses highlighted the ‘weakness’ of CSOs, noting that low
public responsiveness explained to a large extent why CSOs lacked the ‘bargaining
power’ required to trigger a new momentum (Miller and Scrinis 2010; Seifert and
Plows 2014). To push reflection a step forward, the present dissertation suggests that
the capacity of CSOs to《catalyze the growth of autonomous public spheres》
(Habermas 1996, 488) should not be ignored when evaluating their impact on formal
decision-making. Considering the uprising national initiatives introduced by France,
Denmark and Belgium, as well as other Member States’ inclination for an EU nano
register (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden), the involvement of CSOs has to
some extent contributed to shifting the power distribution among the EU governing
institutions and Member States.
With regard to the debate surrounding “nanomaterials under REACH”, CSOs
have been actively advocating the idea of adding a ‘nano patch’ to fix the loopholes of
REACH. Although the EC has been dragging its feet in introducing more ambitious
proposals ( e.g. introducing a new piece of law, adding a ‘nano patch’ to REACH, or
changing the main texts of REACH), EU level CSOs have succeeded in mobilizing a
wide range of regulatory authorities, which include tens of Member States and the
Parliament, to support their demands. A ‘green alliance’ is taking shape, which pushes
for more stringent regulation on nanomaterials under the precautionary principle.
In Section B, the spotlight is directed toward CSOs’ influences on the economic
system. As the above-mentioned examples demonstrate, CSOs, through resonant and
autonomous public spheres, could exert an influence on the political and economic
system “in a siege-like manner”. Their gains are better secured by other influential
members of the green alliance who share similar policy beliefs. For example, Sweden
has been actively promoting its “non-toxic environment” goal at the EU level. We are
still short of knowledge about the specific national context of nanotechnology in the
above-mentioned ten Member States. In this regard, some extended studies could be
valuable.
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‘Upstream public engagement’ could actually add vibrancy to the public spheres
and facilitate the formation of communicative power. We should not bear a too narrow
view on the effectiveness and value of engagement exercises, which is not confined to
direct output on short-term policy results. Indirect ones, such as its value of
cultivating a culture of external scrutiny in science and technology governance,
should also be taken into consideration. Scholars highlight the necessity to consider
the wider performative character of such forms of engagement:《what they bring into
being and how they are productive (but also reflective) of social and institutional
arrangements》(Horst and Irwin 2010). Jasanoff also underlines that《political culture
must be seen not only as resilient and resistant to change, but also as constructed,
flexible and subject to renewal》(Jasanoff 2005, 22). The specific dynamics in the
public sphere around nanotechnologies are both shaping and shaped by the EU
governance on emerging technologies.
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Chapter VI: Moving ahead: challenges & opportunities
This chapter attempts to move ahead to explore the challenges as well as opportunities
that CSOs could have in contributing to future debates on nanotechnologies and risk
controversies. As discussed in the previous chapter, the regulatory landscape of
nanotechnology in the EU continues to shift and is marked by the increasing
divergence between the ‘green alliance’ and the ‘pro-industry alliance’.
As Peterson puts it,《highly politicized environmental policy debates ... can be
viewed as battles between competing advocacy coalitions—broadly advocating
environmental protection vs. industrial interests— for influence within EU
environmental policy networks》(Peterson 2004, 110). It is worth noting that the
boundaries between the two coalitions are not clear cut when we examine the case of
nanotechnologies. It is dependent on the issues and topics discussed. For example,
Germany opposed labeling nanomaterials for cosmetics and played a role of
‘foot-dragging’ in the debates on the EU cosmetic regulation416. Meanwhile, Germany
acted as a ‘pace-setter’ in pushing for an EU-wide nano register. Norbert Roettgen,
Environment Minister of Germany, openly supported the establishment of a European
nanoproduct register.417 The blurring of boundaries illustrates well the changing
dynamics and flow of power distribution among the EU governing institutions and
Member States.
As Habermas puts it,《 in periods of mobilization, the structures that actually
support the authority of a critically engaged public begin to vibrate. The balance of
power between civil society and the political system then shifts.》 (Habermas 1996,
379). In the case of nanotechnologies, CSOs’ gains are better secured by other
416 EurActiv. 2009. “Germany opposed 'nano' label for cosmetics.” November 24.
http://www.euractiv.com/enterprise-jobs/germany-opposed-nano-label-cosmetics/article-187583
417 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety Press Releases. 2011.
“Röttgen: We should use the opportunities of nanotechnology”. Berlin, February 02.
http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/press/press-releases/detailansicht-en/artikel/roettgen-we-should-use-the-opportunitie
s-of-nanotechnology/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1892&cHash=d5c0e76881868f88277ea69991e19d1b
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influential members of the green alliance who shares similar policy beliefs and values.
This chapter seeks to explore the prospects for CSOs’ engagement in future debates.
A. ‘Green alliance’ puts nano high on the policy agenda
Apart from following the regulatory process of nanotechnologies, CSOs have
also worked to mobilize regulatory authorities to bring and maintain nanomaterials on
the EU policy agenda. The 7th Environment Action Programme (EAP) Living Well
within the limits of our planet will be guiding the EU environmental policy to be
achieved until 2020. CSOs have seized the opportunity and lobbied regulatory
authorities to integrate nanomaterials and other chemical substances into this
programme.
The Commission launched the Consultation on the EU Environment Policy
Priorities for 2020: Towards a 7th EU EAP between March and June 2012.
Competent authorities of Member States as well as CSOs provided their input,
identifying chemical issues as policy priorities. German Federal Environment Agency
pointed out that nanomaterials and nanotechnologies, given little knowledge about its
exposure to humans and the environment, should be addressed in the new EAP. It
further stressed that not only the first generation, but also advanced nanomaterials
need to be taken into consideration418. Competent authorities of Norway suggested
that《a prioritized area should be to work towards a toxin-free environment.》419
418 Commission Consultation on the EU environment policy priorities for 2020: Towards a 7th EU Environment
Action Programme. German Federal Environment Agency: Additional comments to our replies to the questions of
the Commission’s questionnaire. 31 May 2012
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/pdf/Position%20Papers%20received/DE%20-%20Federal%20Environme
nt%20Agency.pdf
419 Commission Consultation on the EU environment policy priorities for 2020: Towards a 7th EU Environment
Action Programme. Submission from Norway.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/newprg/pdf/Position%20Papers%20received/Norway.pdf
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Apart from independent contribution to the consultation (EEB420, ANEC421, etc.),
twelve CSOs identified nanomaterial as one of the four cases of concerns (the other
three cases are: EDCs, chemical mixtures and SVHC) in a joint letter, asking the EU
Environment Ministers to introduce measures in the 7th EAP422. Before the EU
Environment Council Meeting on 17th December, 2012, BEUC wrote a letter to the
Danish Environment Minister Ida Auken423; EEB wrote a letter to the Environment
Ministers of EU Member States, demanding them to take the safety concerns from
nanomaterials into account424. As a policy officer put it,
“we also lobbied, together with environmental CSOs, the EP to make changes in
the draft of the 7 th EAP. When it was adopted, there were also some
specifications on what has to be done with regard to nanomaterials. So we can
use this reference to call on the Commission for further activities in the next five
years.”425
Adopted in November 2013, the final version of the 7 th EPA dealt with
nanomaterial specifically, defining it as one of the issues that should be addressed
with priority:《the safety and sustainable management of nanomaterials and materials
with similar properties will be ensured as part of a comprehensive approach involving
risk assessment and management, information and monitoring》(Official Journal of
the European Union 2013). The programme also envisaged an Union-wide database to
increase the transparency and regulatory oversight of nanomaterials.
420 EEB. 2012. “Position on the 7th Environmental Action Programme ‘Staying within ecological boundaries’.”
May 31. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/newprg/pdf/Position%20Papers%20received/EEB.pdf
421 ANEC. 2012. “ANEC on crucial goals for the 7th Environmental Action Programme.” June 01.
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/newprg/pdf/Position%20Papers%20received/ANEC%20-%20Consumers
%20in%20Standardisation.pdf
422 EEB et al. 2012. “Joint NGO letter to Environment Ministers on 7th EAP.” April 05. WECF, EEB, HEAL,
PAN-Europe, ClientEarth, HCWH Europe, ChemSec, CHEM Trust, RES, CCOO, Swedish Society for Nature
Conservation, The Danish Ecological Council.
http://www.eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=1F87180E-5056-B741-DBE8777841C966FF
423 BEUC. 2012. “letter to Ida Athe UKen og Martin Lidegaard.” December 13.
http://taenk.dk/sites/taenk.dk/files/brev_om_7._miljoehandlingsprogram.pdf
424 EEB. 2012. “Input to the EU Environment Council Meeting, Brussels.” December 17.
http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=F7FE0E37-5056-B741-DB8B8008BAA57F1C&showMeta=0&a
425 Interview with Sylvia Maurer, head of BEUC Sustainability and Safety, 14/07/2014
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1. Member States: ‘pace-setters’ in governing nanomaterials
Scholar summarizes three categories in describing the different roles that
Member States play in Europeanization: pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting
(Börzel 2002). And he lists six Member States in the category of ‘pace-setters’ in
dealing with European environmental policies: Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, Austria, Finland. We can see that these six countries are also members of the
‘green alliance’ discussed above which have been actively engaged in policy debates
on chemical issues as well as nanomaterials. Previous literature examines the trends to
《institutionalize and professionalize public engagement with science》(Chilvers 2012)
in some European countries. During this process, the Danish Board of Technology of
Denmark, the Rathenau Institute of the Netherlands, and the Center for Technology
Assessment of Switzerland, etc., have played important roles.
Apart from general commitment to environmental issues, each Member State
started to get involved in nano policy debates under different contexts. Scholars call
for a more sophisticated, often case specific, flexible understanding of the social
context of a given issue (Cutcliffe, Pense, and Zvalaren 2012). This section will
introduce the activities of several pace-setting Member States, exploring how CSOs’
involvement, together with other factors (governance culture, political priorities, etc.),
contribute to shaping the specific feature of the dynamics in each country.
1.1. France
With regard to policy debates on nanomaterials, France has set several
precedents: the French government took a leading role to launch a nationwide debate
on nanotechnologies during October 2009 and February 2010426; Avicenn is the first
CSO worldwide that addresses specifically the issues of nanomaterials; France is also
the first EU Member State which adopted a mandatory reporting scheme on
nanomaterials, which has entered into force in January 2013. And it is also interesting
426 See the website of CNDP: http://cpdp.debatpublic.fr/cpdp-nano/debat/cndp.html
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to see that campaigns against nanotechnologies led by activist groups have also been
the most severe. France is at the forefront in governing nanomaterials. Is there
probably a link with the activities of CSOs?
While it is not difficult to pose the question, efforts to answer it lead to analytic
difficulties: due to the complexity of demonstrating causality, it is hard to examine
influences or impact, as there are so many interrelated factors that could actually play
a role. We can’t draw a direct link between PMO’s campaigns with the proactive
initiatives that the French government has taken. However, the dissertation suggests
that the anti-nanotechnology activities led by PMO act as a kind of ‘spark’, which
brings the debates on nanomaterials to the forward and thus receive higher visibility.
For example, the militant stance of PMO activists is one of the reasons behind
Grenoble authorities’ decision to invite social scientists to help preparing local public
debates (Joly and Kaufmann 2008). Furthermore, PMO’s intervention also mobilizes
other CSOs to address this issue. As an interviewee of CFDT noted,
“CFDT has put nanotechnology in the agenda since it emerged in the
workplace and that militants started to show interest in this subject.”427
CSOs acknowledge the effectiveness of PMO’s approach in awareness-raising428.
But some of them do not favor its strategies and techniques, which actually shut down
the possibility of debates and aggravate the cognitive barrier: if you are CSOs, you are
against nanotechnologies. More CSOs move from the stage of “raising questions” to
“trying to find solutions together”, acting in a cooperative and non-confrontational
way. For example, a French CSO VivAgora claimed to《go beyond scaremonger’s and
427 Original text: 《la CFDT a pris ce sujet des nanotechnologies en charge dès lors qu’il est apparu dans le milieu
professionnel et que des militants ont commencé à s’y intéresser》.
Interview with Gérald Hayotte, in charge of activities on nanotechnologies within CFDT; member of dialogue
committee on « Nanos » of ANSES, 14/09/2014
428 For example, David Azoulay of CIEL argues that《they (i.e. PMO) raise the profile more than I have been doing
in the past 5 years》.
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transhumanist’s speeches》and considered nanotechnologies as an opportunity to
“mettre la science en culture (put the science in culture)”429. A policy officer of CFDT
highlighted that,
“we work in the spirit of exchange, of confrontation of points of view. We favor
de-compartmentalization. At this point, the topic of nanotechnologies is
interesting.”430
When the government initiated the national debate on nanotechnologies, a good
number of French CSOs have made their contribution to the process (e.g. Sciences et
Démocratie, Vivagora, Avicenn, Association Sciences et Démocratie, CFTC, CFDT
and consumer association CLCV431). Claudia Neubauer, a policy officer of Fondation
Sciences Citoyennes(Citizen Science Foundation), noted that《just as governments
and debates about risk are moving upstream, so civil society is now moving upstream》
(Wilsdon, Wynne, and Stilgoe 2005, 42). Although their emphasis and positions are
sometimes different and diverging, which range from《a total moratorium on the
research and commercialization of nanotechnologies》(e.g. Les amis de la terre;
Fondation Sciences Citoyennes) to《a partial moratorium on the non-medical use of
nano-objects and those that are in contact with the human body》(e.g. France Nature
Environnement) and also the range of in-betweens (Suraud et al. 2011), civil society
movements have contributed to more vibrant public spheres in France.
429 Vivagora. 2012. “Vivagora’s experiment: shaping a ‘nanotrustnet’.” February 24-25.
http://www.philso.uni-augsburg.de/lehrstuehle/soziologie/sozio6/partizipative-governance/Download/Presentation
_ViVagora.pdf
430 Original text: 《nous travaillons dans cet esprit de l’échange, de la confrontation des points de vue. Nous
sommes pour le décloisonnement. Et de ce point de vue, le dossier nano est intéressant》.
E-mail exchange with Gérald Hayotte, in charge of activities on nanotechnologies within CFDT, member of
dialogue committee on « Nanos » of ANSES, 14/09/2014
431 http://cpdp.debatpublic.fr/cpdp-nano/documents/liste-cahier-acteurs.html
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Based on the French corpus nano, a scholar draws the following figure to track
the discussions on nanotechnologies in France. We could see that CSOs (e.g. PMO,
Vivagora) have played an important role in improving the visibility of nano issues.
And the national debate organized by CNDP represents the peak of mobilization
around nanotechnologies.
Figure 6: Trajectory of nano issues in public arenas, France
Source: Chateauraynaud 2010
As an interviewed policy officer of CIEL put it,《CSOs in France have done
great education work: all these rich and active civil society movement in France
definitely helped define the position of the French government.》432 The efforts of
these CSOs represent valuable attempts to build more socially accountable technology
policy in France.
432 Interview with David Azoulay, managing attorney of CIEL, 06/08/2014
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1.2. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, several factors have jointly contributed to the specific
governance model on nanomaterials, which distinguish it from other EU Member
States. The first factor, according to an interviewed regulatory authority, is its
industrial scale of nanotechnologies. As she put it,《we do not have very large
producing industries for nanomaterials like France and Germany. Neither do we have
many well-organized small and medium sized enterprises like in the UK.》433 Thus,
industry lobbying in the Netherlands is likely to be less intense compared with other
Member States.
Secondly, the Netherlands has long been dealing with chemical substances and
promoting an European regulatory framework —REACH— under the initiative of
several determined regulatory authorities (e.g. Dick Jung, Joop Atsma). It also
processes knowledge backup provided by research institutes (e.g. RIVM) . These
experiences and resources have also been applied into the governance of
nanomaterials. For example, in the workshop on the second regulatory review of
nanomaterials, Dick Jung, Deputy Director Safety and Risks of the Ministry of
Infrastructure and the Environment, called for urgent EU actions, arguing that《when
we do not act properly and timely, the balance will off-balance. The longer we wait,
the public distrust will grow.》434 According to an interviewed official of the
Netherlands,《we still have excellent policymakers who were educated in chemistry
and toxicology and were active for a long time in addressing this subject. They have
very good network.》435
Thirdly, Dutch social scientists also play an active role in addressing the societal
aspect of nanotechnologies. Their research has contributed to empowering CSOs and
433 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
434 Workshop on the Second Regulatory Review on Nanomaterials, January 30, 2014.
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/reach/events/index_en.htm#h2-10
435 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
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shifting the science-technology-society relationship. For example, FP6 funded
NanoCap Project and FP7 funded NanoDiode Project have been coordinated by Dutch
scholar Pieter van Broekhuizen, a researcher of RIVM. FNV, the largest worker union
in the Netherlands, has participated in the NanoCap project and called on the minister
to make a strong voice to the EC to amend REACH (FNV 2009). Natuur & Milieu,
another participated CSO in the NanoCap project, has commissioned a laboratory to
conduct independent research, with the result revealing significant negative effects
from nanosilver usage in textiles436. In despite of these efforts, a report indicates that
Dutch CSOs’ involvement in the governance of nanotechnologies is “in general very
modest” (Bennett and Chi 2010, 13).
The final factor is the influence of the ‘polder model’ in shaping the
decision-making style of the Netherlands. This model is characterized by《the
tri-partite cooperation between employers’ organizations, labor unions, and the
Government》(Bennett and Chi 2010, 34). Under this mentality, there is a widespread
willingness among Dutch stakeholders to have discussions and to find solutions
together. As pointed out by an interviewee,《we always talk with everyone to make
things done; that’s quite usual in the Netherlands. You need everyone to make a
science policy》437. All these interconnected factors have contributed to the leading role
that the Netherlands has played in addressing the issues of nanomaterials, e.g.
holding high level conferences, initiating and coordinating joint letters, etc.
1.3. Sweden and Denmark
According to an Eurobarometer survey, in Sweden (75%) and Denmark (77%),
public awareness on nanotechnology is much higher than the average level (46%) in
Europe (EC 2010c, 33-34). And the two countries have for many years given high
priority to address the topic of chemical substances.
436 NIA Press Release. 2012. “Dutch TV reports on impact of nano-Silver on Environment.” February 07.
http://www.nanotechia.org/news/news-articles/dutch-tv-reports-impact-nano-silver-environment
437 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
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Sweden has set up the objective of ‘a Non-Toxic Environment’. And a scholar
observes that during earlier debates on REACH,《the major impetus for a new EU
chemicals policy came from Sweden》(Pesendorfer 2006). It is interesting to note that
Carl Schlyter, the most active green MEP in pushing forward strict governance of
nanomaterials, is a Swedish politician. He is also the rapporteur of the EP’s 2009
resolution on nanomaterials. Sweden Chemicals Agency Kemi noted in a report that
《ten years’ work is needed at EU level to enable Sweden to meet its “milestone”
targets on chemicals.》438 And Sweden has been pushing the EC to enhance REACH
in governing nanomaterials.
Denmark established Danish Board of Technology in the 1980s, which altered
the format of consensus conference to involve citizens in discussion on technologies.
This initiative, regarded as a symbol of Danish participatory democracy, has been
internationally acclaimed (Einsiedel, Jelsøe and Breck 2001; Horst 2014). The
regulation of nanomaterials has been put high on the agenda of Denmark. For
example, Danish Environmental Protection Agency provided additional financial
support in 2012 with the aim of reducing potentially hazardous substances in
consumer goods, nanomaterials included 439. Under the initiative of Danish
Environment Minister Kirsten Brosbøl, a joint letter among eight Member States
(including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden
and Norway) was sent to the new EU commissioners, pressing them to expedite the
work on the EU’s chemicals policy. They emphasized that《nanomaterials shall be
subject to control so that they are safe to use.》440
438 Chemical Watch. 2015. “Sweden’s vision for REACH.” Global Business Briefing, March.
https://chemicalwatch.com/23143/swedens-vision-for-reach
439 Chemiwal Watch. 2011. “Denmark to target hazardous substances, nanomaterials in 2012.” November 24.
https://chemicalwatch.com/9160/denmark-to-target-hazardous-substances-nanomaterials-in-2012
440 Danish Ministry of the Environment. 2014. “Brosbøl gathers ministers for the environment in a wake-up call
on chemicals to the new commissioners.” November 18.
http://eng.mim.dk/news-archive/2014/nov/brosboel-gathers-ministers-for-the-environment-in-a-wake-up-call-on-c
hemicals-to-the-new-commissioners/
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In contrast, CSOs of the two countries are relatively not very active. In Sweden,
CSOs are ‘latecomers’ in addressing nano-related issues. For example, it was until
2014 that the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation published its first report
entitled <Managing the unseen-opportunities and challenges with nanotechnology>.
ChemSec, an influential Swedish CSO dedicated to promoting tighter controls on
chemicals under REACH, only deals with nanomaterials occasionally. In Denmark,
CSOs’ voices were rather weak during the debate with regard to establishing a nano
product register. According to an interviewed policy officer, there were only two
CSOs—the Danish Consumer Council and the Danish Ecological Council—which
worked in this area. And she attributed the government’s proactive action to the strong
scientific work in Denmark441.
According to a scholar,《timing difference in the development debates in different
countries is explained by the presence or absence of actor-carriers from civil society
that give a minimum visibility in public sphere》(Chateauraynaud 2010). The
dissertation argues that CSOs’ contribution is only one of the many interconnected
factors behind an official position taken by the government. For instance, in the case
of Belgium, it was mainly the regulatory authorities that came up with initiatives to
enhance the regulatory framework of nanomaterials. According to an interviewed
policy officer of IEW,
“I think our action helped but was not a major contribution... (It was because)
the Minister of Heath took the lead that we had a nano register. Our lobbying was
more ‘reactive’ than ‘proactive’.”442
Thus, we could not draw a direct correlation between CSOs’ activities with
Member States’ proactive approach. Among the above Member States, only France
has had rich civil society movement. By contrast, in the Netherlands, the involvement
441 Interview with Lone Mikkelsen, chemicals policy officer of the Danish Ecological Council, 26/09/2014
442 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
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of CSOs was of modest level; and in Sweden and Denmark, CSOs’ voices were even
weaker. As an interviewee of ClientEarth put it,《it’s difficult to say that it depends on
the relationship with CSOs. It depends more on their government culture, their
political motivation and priorities.》443 According to this interviewee, the Netherlands
has good relationship with CSOs, and it has also taken a lot of initiatives. But the
Netherlands seemed to prefer waiting for the EU to make proposals rather than adopt
a national registry.
2. Next plans of CSOs
Through interviews with CSOs, many of them have highlighted an accelerated
learning process with regard to debates on nanotechnologies. They also envisaged the
roles that they could play in the near future. This section explores the opportunities
that CSOs, with the support of other influential members of the green alliance and
international partners, could have in gaining new momentum in future debates.
According to a policy officer of HCWH Europe,《the biggest opportunity that we
have is the fact that we are trying to do something positive... I think our strongest
point is that we are justified and having concerns on health and environment》444. The
non-profit nature and their commitment to addressing ‘questions of general interest’
offer CSOs more normative forces. In envisaging the roles that they could play in
future policy debates, most CSOs like CIEL, ANEC, MIO-ECSDE, ECOS are
optimistic, while others like ClientEarth hold a modest view.
One of the next important measures in governing nanomaterials at the EU level
is to modify REACHAnnex. EEB and CIEL will continue to play a coordinating role.
Other interviewed CSOs like ECOS and ClientEarth introduce their future actions in
addressing this topic. As a policy officer of ECOS puts it,《I hope we could achieve
the decisions on the Annex of REACH... We have enough understanding of how to
443 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
444 Interview with a policy officer of HCWH Europe, August 2014
２０６
improve the current situation. We are well placed to push the Commission to do this.
And also we have the backup of the Parliament.》445 ClientEarth, which has long been
following the enforcement and implementation work of REACH, also pays close
attention to this topic,《there is much to do apart from pushing and lobbying. And we
are trying to find new ways to gain a momentum on these issues.》446 ADanish CSO
has adapted its approach and shifted its focus from advocating a ‘nano patch’ to the
modifications of REACHAnnex. As an interviewed policy officer puts it,《we realized
this and we tried to make it as strong as possible.》447 As the signal has been sent out
by policymakers that there is no possibility to change the main text of REACH in the
short term448, CSOs turn to focus more on the modification of REACH annex.
Debates on the registry of nanomaterials at the EU level have been brought into a
stalemate, as the Commission assumed the proposal as “not an appropriate way” in
gathering information449. Three CSOs— EEB, CIEL and BUND— have expressed
their deep concerns and dissatisfaction in response to this conclusion, arguing that it is
《biased towards industry’s economic interests whilst disregarding environmental
health and safety concerns and the public right to know.》450 ETUC has not taken any
official response yet, but an interviewee noted that《it is not a question of increasing
the lobbying, because the message has been there... It is now the Commission who
needs to take up those views.》451 National CSOs like IEW, CFDT, the Danish
Ecological Council, will monitor closely the enforcement and implementation work of
national nano register. As a policy officer of IEW puts it,
445 Interview with Dania CRISTOFARO, Policy Officer of ECOS, 21/10/2014
446 Interview with Vito Buonsante, the Health and Environment Lawyer of ClientEarth, 13/09/2014
447 Interview with Lone Mikkelsen, chemicals policy officer of the Danish Ecological Council, 26/09/2014
448 Chemical Watch. 2014. “REACH nano registration rules coming next year, says Vella.” December 18.
https://chemicalwatch.com/22345/reach-nano-registration-rules-coming-next-year-says-vella
449 Chemical Watch. 2014. “EU nanomaterials register looks unlikely.” December 11.
https://chemicalwatch.com/22241/eu-nanomaterials-register-looks-unlikely
450 EEB, CIEL & BUND. 2015. “NGO comments on Transparency measures for nanomaterials on the market:
Working conclusions.” January 12.
http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/library/ngo-comments-on-transparency-measures-for-nanomaterials-on-the-market/
451 Interview with Doreen Fedrigo-Fazio, NanoDiode project coordinator within ETUI, 16/12/2014
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“nanomaterial is well on the political agenda. It is a great opportunity. We have
to make sure that the regulators will keep it on the agenda.”452
Consumer associations like ANEC will work to integrate the issue of
nanomaterials within more general programs. An interviewed policy officer claims
that they will expand their resources to address nanomaterials, as《nano becomes more
embedded in general strategies. What will be in the future is that several
environmental action programs talk about a ‘non-toxic environment’》 453. And ANEC
is actually developing some concepts with EEB in advocating the goal of ‘non-toxic
environment’. This interviewee adds that《we are now specialized in certain aspects
and we try to set activities where we can make a contribution and avoid doing too
much work in areas where other CSOs are doing the work.》454 We might see the
cooperation further enhanced and the division of labor among CSOs in greater depth
in the near future.
CSOs, especially those located in France, believe that the re-opening of
discussion on science-technology-society relationship offers opportunities to address
nanotechnologies. An interviewee, who has participated in the NanoCap project,
argues that《it is quite an interesting experiment, because this is how science
development should be driven. We can’t miss this debate. And this is the chance to
contribute towards driving something to the right direction.》455 A scholar observes
the emergence of a good number of CSOs in France which address specifically the
topic of ‘the politicization of science’, e.g. Fondation Sciences Citoyennes in 2003,
Science et Démocratie in 2005, Vivagora in 2003 and Avicenn in 2011 (Suraud 2013).
Other CSOs also integrate such a topic into their agenda. For example, CFDT
highlights in its report that,《in our democracy, science is not equal to verity. That’s
why it is important to have public debate around the questions of science’ evolution. It
452 Interview with Valérie Xhonneux, Policy Officer of IEW, 10/12/2014
453 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
454 Ibid.
455 Interview with Dr. Thomais Vlachogianni, Programme Officer of MIO-ECSDE, 02/12/2014
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is a political question. We doubt, and we suspect.》456
Attention should also be paid to CSOs which are ‘watching’ nanotechnologies
but do not have developed an official position yet. For example, although Greenpeace
Europe does not address the topic of nanotechnologies at this moment, it doesn’t rule
out the possibility that it undertakes an anti-nanotech campaign were any significant
contaminating or health accidents occurred in the near future. The earlier incident of
Magic Nano has shown that《if something bad happens to an item that has “nano” in
its name, attention will immediately focus on the whole category of nanoproducts》
(Guston 2010, 408). It is worth noting that policy officers of Greenpeace Europe have
already been watching the topic of nanomaterials. In an e-mail exchange, Kevin Stairs
argues that nanotechnologies should be addressed within an emerging/new technology
legal regime, which is characterized by the precautionary principle, absolute and
unlimited liability and full assessment of alternatives457.
International partners also continue to address the topic of nanotechnologies.
FoE Australia has expanded the scope of its Nanotechnology Project in 2014, taking
other emerging technologies (e.g. synthetic biology and geo-engineering) into
consideration458. As You Sow, in light of its success in pressing Dunkin’Donuts to
remove nanomaterials from its powdered donuts, will continue to monitor the use of
nanotechnologies in food and to increase corporate responsibility. As an interviewed
advisor to green MEP put it,《I think nanomaterials have very interesting potential.
But if we do not propose necessary amendments, it is a matter of time that we will
have something happen that should not happen.》459 It remains uncertain whether the
positive space of interaction between ‘system’ and ‘civil society’ at this moment,
marked by CSOs’ non-confrontational approaches, could be an enduring one. The
456 Original text:《la science, dans nos démocraties, ne fait pas la vérité. C’est pour cela que le débat public autour
des questions relatives à l’évolution de la science est important. C’est un enjeu politique. On se méfie, on doute》.
CFDT. 2014. “Nanotechnologies: l’exigence d'un développement responsable.”
http://www.cfdt.fr/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-01/cs_nanothek-bd.pdf
457 E-mail exchanges with Kevin Stairs, chemicals policy director of Greenpeace Europe, 29/08/2014
458 See the introduction of Emerging Tech Project. http://emergingtech.foe.org.au/about-us/
459 Interview with an advisor to green MEPs, 22/06/2014
２０９
present dissertation represents a starting point in understanding the stances that CSOs
hold towards nanotechnologies. It is valuable to keep a close eye on how their
positions evolve with new developments over the coming years or decades.
B. Regulators’ emphasis on mutual understanding
Habermas underlines the ‘self-limitation’ of CSOs, noting that《within the
boundaries of the public sphere... actors can acquire only influence, not political
power》(Habermas 1996, 371). The influences that CSOs have in the public spheres
must pass through institutionalized procedures to coalesce into communicative power.
According to Habermas,《political influence supported by public opinion is converted
into political power…only when it affects the beliefs and decisions of authorized
members of the political system and determines the behavior of voters, legislators,
officials, and so forth》(Habermas 1996, 363).
Based on interviews with EU regulatory authorities, it is remarkable to see that
some of them, regardless of the difficulties, hold strong commitment of promoting
mutual understanding and dialogue with other stakeholders in dealing with risk
controversies around emerging technologies. An interviewed DG SANCO points out
that the current situation is marked by a mismatch between scientific, technical
languages and political, ideological, philosophical and ethical languages:
“On the one hand, you may have arguments which have technical nature; on the
other side, a group may say privacy should be respected. These are some
important but much more general and ideological questions… It is not something
that is good or bad, but something that we have to work with. Everybody really
needs education about the topic and about the other stakeholders’ views and
understandings of the issues.”460
460 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
２１０
Another interviewee shares with this view by noting that《if the two languages do
not cross, then there is no communication.》461 A scholar observes that there are few
CSOs who “speak science” and few scientists who “speak society” (Osgood 2001).
How to cultivate constructive and meaningful communication among different
stakeholders? The two interviewees believe that the way forward is to help enhance
the understanding among different parties:one the one hand, to help CSOs understand
better what the scientific issues are; on the other hand, to help scientists and regulators
improve their knowledge about public concerns and values. An interviewee of the
Dutch government also points out that《what’s most important is mutual trust and
understanding of differences and interests and open discussion about an issue.》462
She also stresses the importance to support their own counterforces (e.g. CSOs) so as
to “keep policymakers sharp”. These arguments testify to an accelerated learning
process among regulatory authorities, representing a kind of shift from ‘deficit model’
towards ‘dialogue and engagement’.
In the Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2014-2015, societal engagement based on
the concept of Mobilization & Mutual Learning Platforms463 is proposed. And the EU
will allocate between 500, 000 and 1 million euro to fulfill this goal (EC 2013b, 48).
The editorial of Nature points out that 《embracing societal concerns represents a
great shift in thinking of H2020》(Nature materials 2012). Against this background,
CSOs have reasons for hope.
C. Conclusion
Chapter VI analyzes several favorable factors for CSOs’ involvement in future
debates. As noted by Börzel,《Member States have an incentive to ‘upload’ their
policies to the European level to minimize the costs in ‘downloading’ them at the
461 Interview with a DG SANCO, 28/06/2014
462 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
463 AMobilisation and Mutual Learning (MML) Action Plan or Platform is a mechanism to bring together a wide
range of actors and pool their knowledge and experience, and to facilitate mutual understanding and develop joint
solutions and research agendas to address societal challenges (EC 2013, 48).
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domestic level》(Börzel 2002). We could see several ‘pace-setters’ (the Netherlands,
France, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden) , with the support of other countries (Austria,
Croatia, Finland, etc.), hold a strong commitment to pushing forward more stringent
measures on nanomaterials. This situation provides a chance to study civil society
movement within differing political contexts.
CSOs from pace-setting countries could seize the opportunities and contribute to
keep the issue on the national policy agenda and promote the discussions at the EU
level. Besides, for CSOs which are located in foot-dragging or fence-sitting Member
States, they could enhance cooperation with other partners to trigger domestic
pressures and to advocate change. It is important for CSOs to examine which roles
that different countries play (pace-setting, foot-dragging or fence-sitting) in nano
debates and to adopt corresponding strategies and approaches so as to make their
lobbying more effective.
At the EU level, green MEPs (Satu HASSI, Michele Rivasi, Christa Klaß, José
Bové, etc.) and several DGs ENV are more in favor of adopting precautionary
measures on nanomaterials. For example, Green MEP José Bové called for boycotting
M & M’s candies and Hollywood chewing gums, in which nanoparticles of titanium
dioxide are added to turn the products whiter and brighter464. As an interviewee of
ANEC put it,《it is quite clear who have the power, and the power distribution is
changing. With cooperation, more and more would happen.》465 With the forming of a
green coalition, CSOs have the potentials to further contribute to the power
distribution in debates on nanomaterials and contribute to the policy-making process.
As a policy officer of BEUC put it,《the opportunity is networking.》466
464 BFMTV. 2015. “José Bové s'en prend aux M&M’s: ‘Vous n’avez pas besoin de bouffer cette merde!’.” March
17.http://www.bfmtv.com/politique/quand-jose-bove-s-en-prend-aux-mm-s-vous-n-avez-pas-besoin-de-bouffer-cet
te-merde-869592.html
465 Interview with Franz Fiala, the chair of ANEC Nanotechnologies Project Team, 27/08/2014
466 Interview with Sylvia Maurer, head of BEUC Sustainability and Safety, 14/07/2014
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Apart from coalition building, we could also observe a shift towards a more
precaution-oriented culture in governing new technologies. This is another favorable
factor for CSOs’ advocacy. As a Dutch regulatory authority puts it,《we try to learn
now from the nanomaterials dossiers, how we handle that, and try to find out the way
of treating other new uncertain and complex risks.》467 In this sense, nanotechnologies
act as an interesting site in experimenting with novel initiatives in addressing risks
around new and emerging technologies.
467 Interview with Monique Bosman, the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, national
coordinator of the NANoREG Project, 22/12/2014
２１３
Conclusion
The research chronically examines the interaction between European policy-makers
and CSOs around the risk governance of nanotechnologies. From a Habermasian
perspective, this dissertation investigates specifically whether and how ‘upstream
public engagement’ could add vibrancy to the public spheres and facilitate the
formation of communicative power.
One tempting conclusion here is that ‘upstream public engagement’ represents
encouraging attempts towards more democratic governance of emerging technologies,
as the imbalance in information, resources, access to policy makers is corrected
somehow. By accommodating diverse voices from the early stage of the R&D process,
‘upstream public engagement’ actually facilitates and enables a more positive
interaction space between CSOs and the political system. As demonstrated in Chapter
II, despite the surge of activism led by ETC Group, the momentum against nanotech
abated rather than intensified in the EU. Chapter III also illustrates how EU-funded
project NanoCap, together with other participatory exercises and deliberation
activities, contributes to the direct involvement of EU-level CSOs in nanotech debates.
CSOs have engaged in a cooperative, argumentative and expertise-based manner.
Ideally, a shift in science-technology-society relationship allows for greater
maneuvering space for CSOs. Discussions in Chapter IV show that ‘upstream public
engagement’ is not a magic cure for everything, especially when we take into account
the dynamics of the wider world. Here lie what appeared to be some barriers which
hamper CSOs and the public to achieve further democratic impetus: the
pro-technology belief system, the inertia of administrative power, asymmetrical
access to expertise, etc. An ambiguous context, marked by a blend of inclusiveness
and scientism, gave rise to two different approaches of CSOs: while some of them
took advantage of the existing windows of political opportunities and addressed
nanotechnologies in an cooperative manner, others withdrew from this field in
frustration at the tokenistic engagement and out of fatigue after the intense lobbying
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battle for REACH. ‘Upstream public engagement’ can be ‘boost’ for certain CSOs,
while proved to be ‘unattractive’ or ‘irrelevant’ for others. Understanding the factors
behind CSOs’ approaches and strategies could serve as a first step to better
formulate the structures and arrangement of engagement activities in the future.
Chapter V centers around the question with regard to whether, how, and to what
extent the considerations of EU level CSOs, as kind of counter-knowledge, have been
incorporated into the institutionalized procedures. Whereas much policy and scholarly
attention has been paid to the eventual policy uptake in evaluating CSOs’ political
leverage (Miller and Scrinis 2010), the dissertation suggests that CSOs’ capacity to
《catalyze the growth of autonomous public spheres》(Habermas 1996, 488) should
not be ignored. This requires a more ‘dynamic’ approach, that’s to say, to consider
CSOs’ impact on formal decision-making as flexible and subject to renewal.
Thus, apart from analyzing the concrete results that CSOs have achieved (e.g.
nano-specific provisions in sectoral legislation, several Member States’ initiatives of
national nano register, the EC’ decision to modify REACH annex) , I also investigate
how CSOs, against the backdrop of increasing divergence between the ‘pro-industry
alliance’ and the ‘green alliance’, contributed to shifting the power distribution among
the EU governing institutions and member states. CSOs have been instrumental in
putting forward concrete proposals, inspiring and mobilizing a good number of
regulators, especially members of the ‘green alliance’ who share similar policy beliefs,
to support their advocacy. Accordingly, I draw the conclusion that CSOs, with their
closer proximity to the grassroots constituencies and higher sensibility to societal
problems, could build up a modest level of counter-expertise against the powerful
industries.
Similarly, we should not bear a too narrow view on the effectiveness and value of
engagement exercises, which is not confined to direct output on short-term policy
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results. Indirect ones, such as its contribution in cultivating a culture of external
scrutiny in governing emerging technologies, should also be taken into consideration.
According to an interviewed DG SANCO,
“there is a shift towards an interconnected paradigm. It is a change just like a
young tree, needs to grow roots, depends on soil to grow and to really live a long
life.”468
The realization of such a shift requires a sustainable process marked by
long-term commitment, genuine openness and mutual learning of all stakeholders.
This goal appears to be unrealistic at this moment, as I’ve discussed the struggle of
poorly funded CSOs against the predominant interests. In despite of the difficulties,
there also exist several favorable factors for CSOs’ involvement in future debates, as
discussed in Chapter VI.
Focusing on CSOs, the “carriers” of the public spheres, the dissertation
represents the starting point in the critical task of understanding how engagement
practices could be linked to the political system. The rich empirical interview
materials and the way it has been used in quotations create a kind of ‘thick
description’ of complex EU politics. Research on this relatively unexplored terrain is
expected to contribute to the literature on STS and S&T policy-making. Findings
from the research may also have implications for CSOs that actively seek to access
and embed themselves in the policy network relating emerging technologies so as to
enhance the effectiveness of their involvement. They may also help policy-makers to
design, implement, and revise socially accountable S&T policy through engaging
various stakeholders.
468 Interview with a DG SANCO, 20/06/2014
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I acknowledge the limitations of my research, and I’d like to demonstrate some
approaches—both theoretical and political—that can guide future actions. Firstly,
focusing narrowly on CSOs, no contribution explicitly examines the role of other
important stakeholders (e.g. research community, newspapers and journals,
international organizations like OECD and ISO) in regulating nanotechnologies.
Additional research in consideration of CSOs’ interaction with these stakeholders is
thus required to complement the findings of this study.
Furthermore, this dissertation focuses mainly on the debates on regulatory issues
of nanotechnologies, which are more or less about the conditions of product
marketization which have not per se a strong relation to R&D activities as the central
place and time for upstream engagement. Voluntary self-regulation initiatives may be
more ‘upstream’ than ex-post evaluations of or debates on existing hard regulations
related to nanomaterials. Examples are the code of conduct for responsible
nanosciences and nanotechnology research, voluntary reporting schemes, or voluntary
risk and safety frameworks. It once again brought to the fore the paradox of
participation: a learning process is usually needed for CSOs to firstly understand, and
then to influence. In many cases, their influence does not take shape immediately.
How to tackle this dilemma is an important question uncovered in this dissertation
that requires further research.
Findings from this study also have limitations in terms of being generalized to
other places and cases. According to Habermas, a robust civil society can develop and
blossom only in the context of a liberal political culture and an already rationalized
lifeworld (Habermas 1996, 371). Comparative studies between Europe and other
countries (e.g. China) could be an interesting topic to follow. In China, there is still no
CSOs that are concerned with nanotechnologies issues. Some questions are worth
pondering: how could the experiments of ‘upstream public engagement’ and the wider
reflections on science-technology-society relationship inform and influence the
practices of the Chinese government in governing emerging technologies? Is an
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energetic civil society a precondition for conducting ‘upstream public engagement’?
What are the prospects for the emergence of green activism in China towards
emerging technologies? In this regard, some extended studies could be valuable.
There also exists other transformative, platform technologies such as synthetic
biology, which pose similar ethical and governance challenges. It would be interesting
to investigate the lessons from nanotechnologies for other fieldwork.
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Appendix: Interview questions
With policymakers:
1. Since when and how did nanomaterials become a policy concern for you?
2. EU official documents (e.g. the 2005-2009 action plan) have highlighted the
importance of integrating the societal considerations “at an early stage”. What
factors contributed to this commitment to acting proactively?
3. Several programs under FP6 and FP7 (e.g. NanoCap project, NanoDiode
project) have been funded to promote the involvement of CSOs in policy debates.
How would you evaluate the effectiveness of these programs? What lessons have
been learned with regard to public engagement in nano debates?
4. CSOs propose a ‘nano patch’ to address the loopholes of REACH. They also
call for the establishment of an EU nanomaterials register. How would you evaluate
the roles that CSOs (e.g. worker unions, environmental organizations, consumer
associations) have played in the policy-making of nanotechnologies?
5. In the case of nanotechnologies, what do you think are the challenges as well
as opportunities in achieving constructive dialogue among different stakeholders?
6. The Netherlands plays a leading role in debates on nanomaterials, for example
through holding conferences, initiating joint letters with other Member States. What
factors contribute to this proactive role of the Netherlands?
２４７
With CSOs:
1. When and under what context did your team decide to put the topic of
nanotechnologies on the agenda?
2. Could you please briefly introduce the main activities on nanotechnologies?
How does your team lobby and mobilize the European regulatory authorities to
regulate nanomaterials?
3. What are the opportunities as well as difficulties for CSOs in dealing with
nanotechnologies? How to make your advocacy more effective?
4. EU official documents highlight the importance of integrating the societal
considerations ‘at an early stage’. Scholars also call for ‘upstream public engagement’.
What sort of democratic space, if any, is opened by such a commitment to public
engagement? Against this backdrop, could CSOs have more opportunities to influence
the policy-making process?
5. The proposal of ‘nano patch’ has won the support of several Member States;
green MEP Satu Hassi also called for a ‘mini-REACH’. How would you consider the
influences of ‘nano patch’ on the European authorities’ further action on regulatory
aspects of nanomaterials?
6. Several CSOs like Greenpeace UK have withdrew from this field. In your
opinion, what may be the reasons that some CSOs no longer have interest in
addressing nanotechnologies?
7. I observe that EU level CSOs have taken several joint action by releasing
joint letters, contributing to public consultation, etc. Could you please introduce the
cooperation among CSOs?
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